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Abstract
This dissertation seeks to contribute to the body o f literature covering the field of 
inter-organizational relationships o f entrepreneurial firms in developing economies. 
More specifically, this study attempts to fill a significant gap in the research into 
relationships between entrepreneurial firms and their venture capital investors in 
China. Even though it has been recognized that social capital embedded in 
inter-organizational relationship may be more important in imperfect completion 
characterized by weak institutional support and distorted information, there is little 
rigorous, theory-based, empirical research that focuses on the factors influencing the 
monitoring and value-added that start-up companies receive from their venture 
capital investors in developing countries. This dissertation contributes to the literature 
by developing and empirically testing a model o f the monitoring and the value-added 
mechanisms and o f the factors influencing those mechanisms.
Based on a review o f the literature covering venture capital and related domains of 
research into inter-organizational relationships, this dissertation identifies formal and 
informal monitoring as the primary mechanism through which venture capital 
oversee their investees, and classifies resource and knowledge access as the major 
mechanisms through which venture capital investments add value to 
technology-based new firms beyond financing.
Building on received theories, an integrated model o f the monitoring and 
value-added mechanisms, and the factors influencing those mechanisms is developed. 
The model draws on the agency theory and the asymmetric information and 
resource-based view o f the firm in order to understand the factors influencing both 
mechanisms. These theories are complemented by social capital theory in identifying 
the factors facilitating monitoring and sharing resource/knowledge across 
organizational boundaries.
In order to test the model empirically, primary data were collected from fund 
managers o f active Chinese venture capital using two sequential mail surveys. The 
primary data were complemented by archival data. The hypotheses were tested using 
multivariate statistical techniques, including multiple regression analysis and structural 
equation modelling. The model and the hypotheses received support from the 
empirical data.
This dissertation makes im portant contributions to the literature in the area o f 
venture capital and inter-organi2ational relationships o f technology-based new firms 
in the Chinese business environment. The findings have important practical 
implications for venture capital either seeking investment opportunities in China or 
already managing an existing investor relationship with a Chinese investee. In 
addition to venture capitalists, the findings have important implications for 
entrepreneurs.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
James Wolfensohn, the recent World Bank President, once said, “The Chinese 
have accomplished in only 20 years what would take many other countries two 
centuries to achieve”. Statements such as these are not far-fetched: apart from 
undergoing many structural changes, China has maintained gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth rates of 8 per cent per annum since 1980, has an increasingly 
affluent population of approximately 1.3 billion and an emerging middle class, 
making it an economic powerhouse in the region. In 2007, China overtook 
Germany and became the third largest economy in the world in terms of GDP 
(Wall Street Journal July 16, 2007).
These developments have attracted a lot of attention from overseas investors and
-  not surprisingly -  a considerable amount of foreign capital. Of particular interest 
to investors have been venture capital investments in recent years (Business Week, 
2006). Statistics show that in 2006, China took second place in the world as the 
country with the largest amount of venture capital investments after the United 
States (Financial Times, 2007). Given China’s fast growing economy and 
promising future, Western interest is unlikely to subside any time soon. Yet, 
entering the Chinese market is not straightforward. Even outside of Asia, there is 
ample evidence of significant cross-country differences in venture capital markets 
and their internal structures, making it difficult for industry professionals to move 
from one market to another. While the gap appears to be shrinking among Western
-  particularly European and North American -  markets in recent years (Oehler et 
al., 2006), the disparities between the Western venture capital markets and the 
emerging venture capital market in China remain large (Pukthuanthong, 2007). In 
the West, legal protection, efficiency, and public information disclosure are 
important factors for investors. In contrast, personal relationships, networking, and
harmony are ranked highly in East Asia (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2001; Chen, 2006). 
The Chinese culture in particular places a large emphasis on the maintenance of 
so-called “Guanxi”, under which harmony with and within organizations is 
frequently in favour over information disclosure and shareholder rights (Bruton et 
al., 2004). While Western business culture emphasizes shareholder rights 
protection and information transparency, Chinese business culture focuses on 
networking, harmony, and seniority. In addition, the Chinese culture typically has 
a high tolerance for information asymmetry between the firm’s insiders and 
external investors as well as outside board members (Bruton et al., 2002b).
A proper understanding of these differences and the challenges they create is 
very important, particularly in an industry that is already as complex and risky as 
the venture capital market. Given the difference of institutional environment, it is 
particularly important for venture capitalists to understand how to effectively 
monitor Chinese investees, how to add the potential economic value for these 
portfolio firms, and how to manage the relationship within the Chinese business 
culture environment. So far, there has been no rigorous empirical research into 
these issues. To help Western investors avoid potentially costly mistakes, this 
study aims to provide a detailed first ever empirical research on inter-organization 
relationship between China’s venture capital firms and their technology-based 
portfolio companies.
In the second part of this chapter, research background, research problem, 
research objectives, and research approach and methods are introduced. At the end 
of the chapter the key concepts are defined and explained.
1.1 Research Background
While China offers growth opportunities for firms, it also imposes challenges for
them. China’s formal institutional constraints such as inefficient legal frameworks 
and weak intellectual property rights pose significant problems for 
technology-based firms. In addition to those constraints, technology-based firms 
are also, in general, associated with long product development lead time, unproven 
markets, limited asset base (Van Auken, 2004), and are highly dependent on 
external resources such as financing and managerial skills (Van Auken 2000, 2004; 
Van Auken and Sonnebom, 2001; Jarillo, 1989; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Stinchcombe, 1965). These issues generate investor apprehension about investing 
in technology-based firms. Venture capital is commonly cited as important sources 
of capital for technology-based firms with high growth potential. Previous 
researches show venture capital provides not only money, but also, often close 
supervision, valuable, hands-on help and expertise in turning new ventures into 
successes (Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Sapienza, 1992).
The main unit o f analysis in this study is the inter-organizational relationships 
between venture capital investors and their technology-based portfolio companies 
in China. The purpose for selecting technology-based firms is that venture capital 
investors can potentially have a significant influence on the performance of 
technology-based firms (Gompers and Lemer, 1998; Hellmann and Puri, 2001; 
Maula and Murray, 2000). Building on received theories and empirical research, 
the present dissertation develops and validates an integrated multi-theoretic model 
of the monitoring and value-added mechanisms and the factors influencing these 
mechanisms in the relationships between venture capital and their 
technology-based portfolio firms in China.
One of the key perspectives of this analysis is the agency theory. Based on the 
assumptions of agency theory, the objectives of the agent may not align perfectly 
with those of the principal. Furthermore, asymmetric information makes it hard for 
the principal to select and monitor the agent. Goal incongruence and asymmetric
information may give rise for agency problems including adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems (Eisenhardt, 1989). Most of the existing literature on 
venture capital generally understands venture capital from an agency perspective 
(Zeng, 2004). There are severe information and incentive problems associated 
with venture capital investment because venture capital is focused on investing in 
young and unproven technology-based firms. Solutions to these problems are 
critical to success of venture capital financing (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). 
Previous research on venture capital suggested venture capital may relieve the 
problems caused by asymmetric information and goal incongruence through both 
formal and informal monitoring (Tsui et al., 2004; Pruthi and Wright, 2003). 
These two monitoring mechanisms have been factored into the integrated 
multi-theoretic model in this dissertation.
Another key perspective of this analysis is the resource-based theory of the firm, 
which views firm resources as the primary determinant of competitive advantage 
of the firm (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959). It is recognized that technology-based 
start-ups often lack some critically important complementary resources (Teece, 
1986). Therefore, resource-combining alliances with venture capital are often an 
important strategy for technology-based firms (Park et al., 2001; Rothaermel and 
Deeds, 2001; Deeds and Hill, 1996; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Rothwell, 
1989; Rothwell and Zegweld, 1982). For a technology-based firm, venture capital 
investments may be a potential way of accessing resource with venture capital 
firms.
Some researchers argue that closer relationships can assist monitoring progress 
(Smith, 2003; Pukthuanthong et al., 2007; Bruton et al., 2002; Lee and Dawes, 
2005). Other researchers state that better relationships facilitate resource and 
knowledge sharing between organizations (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai and
Ghoshal, 1998; Yli-Renko et al., 2001a). This dissertation applies social capital 
theory in explaining some of the variation in the level of formal and informal 
monitoring, resource and knowledge access. Contributing to the understanding of 
the social capital theory, the present study provides new empirical evidence on 
incentive and influence of social capital in China, where Guanxi (explained later in 
this Chapter) is widely recognized and playing a central role in business 
(Standifird and Marshall, 2000).
The last key perspective of this analysis is the theory of inter-organization 
relationship. Previous literature suggests that the greater the environmental 
uncertainty, the more likely it is that firms will rely on inter-organizational 
relationship to mitigate risk (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Powell, 1990). The social 
capital embedded in inter-organizational relationship may be more important in 
imperfect competition characterized by weak institutional support and distorted 
information (Burt, 1997). Given that most existing research has taken place in 
relatively stable Western economies, it follows that the inter-organizational 
relationship in China may embody more useful social capital that can compensate 
for China’s lack of market-supporting institutions such as transparent laws and 
regulations (Peng and Heath, 1996). These settings, therefore, offer a fascinating 
context in which to explore the inter-organizational relationships which is largely 
dominated by research that counts the number of relationships and examines the 
network structures, rather than analyzing specific relationships in more detail 
(Stuart, 2000; Yli-Renko et al., 2001a).
Inter-organization relationships are basically the inter-personal ties between two 
organizations. Most Chinese cultivate intricate and pervasive personal ties, called 
Guanxi, which govern their attitudes toward social and business relationships 
(Tsui and Farth, 1997). Although managers all over the world devote a 
considerable amount of time and energy to cultivating interpersonal ties
(Mintzberg, 1973), Chinese managers have a widely noted cultural propensity and 
institutional imperatives to rely on informal interpersonal ties, and to resort to 
personal connection to achieve organizational goals (Luo and Chen, 1997; Boisot 
and Child, 1996; Peng and Heath, 1996). As a result, the present study used 
primary data collected from fund managers of venture capital firms based in 
mainland China since China represents an ideal research laboratory in which to 
explore the inter-organizational relationships.
It has to be bore in mind that the inter-organization relationship between the 
venture capital firms and the investee companies is very important to discuss. The 
present study seeks to contribute to the literature by developing an integrated 
multi-theoretic model of monitoring and value-added mechanisms and how 
Guanxi and complementarities influence those mechanisms. By building the 
model on the basis o f received theories and empirical research in related fields, 
and by testing, the model and hypotheses by means of primary data, the present 
study hopes to create a better understanding of venture capital and of the 
monitoring and value added activities as related specifically to technology-based 
firms in China. This study also hopes to contribute to the larger body of literature 
on inter-organizational relationships by examining the relationship within Chinese 
venture capital industry. The findings have important practical implications for 
both China’s venture capital and entrepreneur on selecting investees/investors, and 
managing existing investment relationships with investees/investors as well as for 
seeking to maximize investment/enterprise’s performance. Finally, to our 
knowledge, this is the first empirical study that examines the impacts of Guanxi 
and complementarities on monitoring and value-added mechanisms in transitional 
economies context and in the context of China. Therefore, we see a contribution to 
the management literature on transitional economies as well as the Chinese 
context.
1.2 Research Problem
There is some evidence that the operation of venture capital in emerging markets 
shares some features with that in the more developed markets of the West, but that 
there are also substantial differences (e.g., Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003; Bruton et 
al., 2002; Bruton et al., 2004). Previous studies have examined specific countries 
such as China (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003). These studies have found that while 
the model o f venture capital in developed markets has relevance to the practice of 
venture capital in China, little is known about how these models require change 
for Chinese market. The present dissertation focuses on the monitoring and 
value-added provided by venture capital investors for their portfolio companies.
Based on previous research on venture capital in developed markets which has 
suggested that venture capital firm through monitoring and value added activities 
can make a positive impact on the performance of portfolio companies (Kann, 
2000; Kelley and Spinelli, 2001; Gompers and Lemer, 1998; Maula and Murray, 
2000a). However, there is a significant gap in the research on the actual 
relationships and the mechanisms through which venture capital investors may 
actually mitigate agency risk and influence the performance of technology-based 
firms. This dissertation attempts to fill this major research omission by developing 
theory-based hypotheses about the factors affecting the monitoring and 
value-added, and by testing these hypotheses using primary data collected from 
the fund managers of venture capital firms based in mainland China. The main 
research problem can be defined as a question
What are the key mechanisms through which venture capital investments 
mitigate agency risk and add value to technology-basedfirms, and what factors 
influence these mechanisms?
In order to tackle the research problem, the first challenge is to conceptualize the
monitoring and value-added mechanisms on the basis of the literature and 
theoretical reasoning. The research problem is broken into three generic research 
questions. The first generic research question is
What are the key mechanisms through which venture capital investors may 
actually mitigate agency risk in the relatively uncertain institutional 
environment?
The second generic research question is
What are the key mechanisms through which venture capital investors may 
actually add value to portfolio companies in transitional economies?
In addition to understanding what the monitoring and value-added mechanisms 
are, it is important to understand how these mechanisms work, and what 
influences them. Therefore, the third generic research question is
What factors influence monitoring and value-added mechanisms?
The above three research questions have normative implications for venture 
capitalists. The factors affecting the monitoring and value-added can be divided 
into structural factors that can only be managed trough selecting a right partner, 
and behavioural factors that can be managed within the relationship (Stronks et al., 
2008). Because of the structural factors that cannot be managed after the 
investment has been made, the selection of suitable complementary investors is 
very important. Therefore, the fourth generic research question is
How should venture capitalists select technology-basedfirms?
In addition to structural factors that cannot be managed after the relationship has 
been established, there may be behavioural factors affecting the monitoring and 
value-added that can be managed within the investment relationship. 
Understanding these factors helps in managing the investment relationships. 
Therefore, the fifth generic research question is
How should venture capitalists manage their relationships with 
technology-based firm s?
1.3 Research Objectives
The overall objective of this dissertation is to identify the monitoring and 
value-added mechanisms and to identify the factors that affect these mechanisms. 
The detailed objectives of the dissertation are:
1. To review and analyze the research on venture capital and related fields 
in Western countries
2. To review recent research on venture capital in China
3. To review the literature on China’s regulatory systems, capital market 
structure and culture distinction to study venture capital in a Chinese 
business setting
4. To review the theoretical approaches applicable to the analysis of 
monitoring and value-added provided by venture capital investors in 
China
5. To conceptualize the mechanisms through which venture capital 
investors monitor and add value to their portfolio companies
6. To conceptualize the factors that influence the mechanisms through 
which venture capital investors monitor and add value to their portfolio 
companies
7. To generate a set of empirically testable hypotheses linking the monitor 
and value-added mechanisms to the factors affecting them
8. To empirically test the hypotheses. This will include operationalizing the 
theoretical constructs, designing the research instrument, identifying a 
suitable sample, designing and carrying out the data collection, and using 
suitable quantitative methods to statistically test the hypotheses
9. To present conclusions regarding the significance, reliability, and validity 
of the results of the study
10. To discuss the theoretical, empirical, and practical implications of the 
findings of this study
This study, focusing on venture capital investment in China, is of particular 
interest to venture capitalists, is also interesting to entrepreneurs, policy makers 
and academics.
A number of stakeholders, including Western venture capitalists, can learn how 
to effectively monitor and add the potential economic value to Chinese portfolio 
firms from the result of the present study. In addition, it is of particular interest to 
Western venture capitalists to understand how Guanxi and complementarities 
influences these two mechanisms. This knowledge may help venture capitalists to 
manage the relationship with investees in the Chinese business culture 
environment. It may also help them to select those firms that are likely to be 
complementary to them with respect to monitoring and value-added requirements.
Second, this research is of interest to entrepreneurs. Especially with regard to 
understanding what matters to venture capitalists during the selection phase, and 
what factors drive this selection behaviour. This can help entrepreneurs to better 
choose the appropriate investor, and may increase his/her chances of finding 
appropriate venture capital financing. Also, understanding how venture capital can 
affect company growth is of major interest to the entrepreneur, as it can allow 
entrepreneur to select the investor that is likely to fit the business plan growth 
perspectives best, and may increase the chances of finding the right venture 
capitalist for the business.
Policy makers are interested in understanding what incentives can stimulate 
partnerships between venture capital firms and entrepreneurs and what factors 
affect venture capitalists’ monitoring and value-added mechanism. It may also 
interest to them to know whether public funds behave differently from non-public 
and public/private partnerships, both with respect to monitoring and value-added 
mechanism. Understanding how venture capital and entrepreneur could also create 
new value through the inter-organisational relationships. This is of major concern 
to Chinese policy makers, trying to increase employment levels and develop 
domestic technology-based firms.
Finally, this study is of interest to academics and can make an important 
contribution to management science. It is the first rigorous empirical analysis of 
relationships between venture capitalists and technology-based firms in the 
transitional economy of China. Most existing research has taken place in relatively 
stable, Western economies and some researchers argued that inter-organizational 
relationship in transitional economies such as China may embody more useful 
social capital that can compensate for these countries’ lack of market supporting 
institutions such as transparent laws and regulations (Peng and Heath, 1996). By 
building a theoretically grounded model of the monitoring and value-added 
mechanisms and the factors affecting these mechanisms in China, the present 
study will provide empirical support for previous theoretical venture capital 
research on Guanxi, monitoring and value-added in transitional economy setting 
and giving a deeper understanding of relationships of venture capital investors 
with their portfolio companies in transitional economy. This study 
comprehensively analyses monitoring and value-adding mechanisms and the 
factors influencing them. By employing primary data collected from the fund 
managers of venture capital based in mainland China, it has been able to test the 
roles o f different monitoring and value-adding mechanisms and the factors
influencing these mechanisms, especially Guanxi, thus creating increased 
understanding of the monitoring and value-added processes in venture capital 
investment in a transitional economy.
1.4 Research Approach and Methods
The lack of research into the monitoring and value-added conducted by venture 
capital investors raise a question of the most appropriate research approach. The 
lack of previous research could justify an explorative research method. But this 
method has been soundly criticized by many researchers for its unsophisticated 
design and inability to achieve conclusive results (Aaker, Kumar and Day, 2001; 
Zikmund, 1994; Armstrong, 1970). Armstrong (1970) argued that the exploratory 
approach tends to be akin to a projective test in psychology. The researcher has 
much more freedom to read his/her own ideas into the data. He/she can experiment 
with an almost unlimited number of possible models and choose one which fits 
his/her needs. Zikmund (1994) suggested that the best way to avoid the problems 
associated with using exploratory research is not to do exploratory research. More 
precisely, researcher should try to reduce the degree of exploratory work in a 
given study by the extensive use of a priori analysis as it forces the researcher to 
develop most of the model before he/she looks at the data. The present study 
evades these problems by using a more sophisticated research 
methodology— Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) which is a statistical 
technique that integrates multivariate techniques like regression analysis and factor 
analysis.
Structural Equation Modelling has increasingly been seen as a useful 
quantitative technique for specifying, estimating, and testing hypothesized models 
describing relationships among a set of substantively meaningful variables 
(Thompson & Daniel, 1996). This approach requires wide and extensive literature
reviews of relevant fields to understand the relevant concepts both in theory and in 
practice and to identify the most important facets of constructs (latent variables) 
and the measurement items (observed variables) which have to be developed on 
the basis of previous research. This approach greatly restricts the freedom of the 
researcher in massaging the data and produces largely conclusive results.
While there is little research into the specific topic of the present dissertation, the 
monitoring and value-added mechanisms conducted by venture capital investors to 
their portfolio companies, there is a lot of research into related, relatively similar 
contexts o f inter-organizational relationships (e.g. Bergemann and Hege, 1998; 
Reid, 1998, 1999; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). By reviewing thoroughly 
relevant research in these related fields and identifying the commonalities in these 
literatures, it is possible to build relatively strong hypotheses on these 
mechanisms.
The Structural Equation Modelling approach advances the understanding of 
monitoring and value-added mechanisms in venture capital investment further than 
what would be possible through an explorative survey and helps to consolidate the 
existing streams of literature on inter-organizational relationships by identifying 
commonalities in these literatures and validating the hypothesis in the context of 
venture capital in transitional economies. By conducting a thorough literature 
review, consolidating the literature, building robust hypotheses, and testing them 
empirically in the context of venture capital in China, the present study attempts to 
contribute not only to the understanding of venture capital but also to a more 
specific understanding of inter-organizational relationships in China.
The conceptual frameworks and the hypotheses of the dissertation are developed 
on the basis of an extensive review of research into both venture capital and
related fields in Western countries and China, and of theoretical approaches 
relevant to the analyses of the monitoring and value-added conducted by venture 
capital investors to their portfolio companies. Theoretical constructs are then 
operationalized by adopting measures from previous research, and by developing 
new theory-based measures where needed. Exploratory interviews with venture 
capital investors are used in developing the hypotheses and the questionnaire 
instrument. The hypotheses are thus tested empirically using statistical methods. 
The data used in the analyses were collected with face to face interview and mail 
survey in September 2006 from the fund managers of venture capital firms based 
in mainland China. The primary data collected with the mail survey is 
complemented by secondary data gathered from several databases such as 
IP02Zero.com.cn. The hypotheses are tested by confirmatory factor analysis, 
multiple regression analysis, and structural equation modelling.
By building on received theories and empirical research and developing an 
integrated model of the monitoring and value added mechanisms and the factors 
influencing those mechanisms, by collecting both primary and secondary data, and 
by subjecting the hypotheses to rigorous empirical testing, this dissertation aims to 
consolidate and expand the existing literature on relationships between venture 
capitalists and their portfolio companies and to contribute also to a wider body of 
literature on inter-organizational relationships between investors and investees.
1.5 Concepts
In this section, the key concepts are defined and explained. While this section 
presents some of the definitions, the operationalizations used in the empirical part 
of the dissertation are described in more detail in the methodology chapter 
(Chapter 4).
1.5.1 Venture capital
The board concept of “venture capital” dates back for centuries. The roots of the 
venture capital industry lie as far back as the fifteenth century with the activities of 
merchant ventures who were active traders in the Far and Middle East where they 
also set up commercial enterprises (Reid, 1998). It is also believed that primitive 
venture capital was originally practiced in the Arabian Peninsula even in the 
pre-Islamic era. Cizakca (1995) finds the root of Venture Capital in the Islamic 
world. He argued that the Italians borrowed the Islamic version of Venture Capital 
‘Mudaraba Concept’, in the tenth century and it then spread throughout Europe. 
However, Mudaraba offers some characteristics of venture capital, but differs in 
others.
The first contemporary venture capital firm was established in 1946 by MIT 
President Karl Compton, General Georges F. Doriot. The U.S. National Venture 
Capital Association defined venture capital as: “money provided by professionals 
who invest alongside management in young, rapidly growing companies that have 
the potential to develop into significant economic contributors” (NVCA 2001). 
Lorenz (1989) defined venture capital as long-term equity-based risk finance 
where the primary reward for the investor is capital gain. Bygrave and Timmons 
(1992:1) described venture capital as having a catalytic role in the entrepreneurial 
process, being fundamental value creation that triggers and sustains economic 
growth and revival. Wright and Robbie (1998) defined venture capital as 
investments by professional investors of long-term, unquoted, risk equity finance 
in new firms where the primary reward is eventual capital gain supplemented by 
dividend yield. Hellmann (2000b) defined venture capital as “professionally 
managed, equity-like financing of young, growth-oriented private companies”. All 
these definitions focus on the type of investments venture capitalists make and the 
rewards they gain from it. Further analysis of the development of the venture
capital industry is conducted in chapter 2.
However, there is more to venture capital than investing and exiting from 
investments. Gompers and Lemer (1999b:2-4) argued against the misguided belief 
that venture capitalists can add little value to young firms aside from providing 
money, or can be easily duplicated by an institution whose core strengths are very 
different. They went on to argue that these misconceptions have often led not only 
to a failure to capitalize on attractive opportunities but also to a substantial 
destruction of value. In their book, Gompers and Lemer defined venture capital as 
a process. They argued that venture capital can be viewed as a cycle that starts 
with the raising o f a venture fund, proceeds through the investing in, monitoring of, 
and adding value to firms; the cycle continues as the venture capitalist exits 
successful deals and returns capital to their investors, to renew itself as the venture 
capitalist raises additional funds. This definition points to the very important 
monitoring and value-adding role of venture capitalists (Hellmann and Puri, 2000a; 
2000b; Sapienza, 1992). Supporting this view, Hellmann (2000b) argued that a 
simple analogy of the role of venture capital is to consider venture capitalists as 
sport coaches. In his view, entrepreneurs are like athletes, who fight the actual 
game and get most of the glory in case of success, while venture capitalists are like 
coaches, who choose which athletes get to play, who train and monitor them, and 
who try to create the most favourable conditions for them to succeed in. Without 
coaches, inexperienced athletes would spend extraordinary effort on the wrong 
task. According to Hellmann, venture capitalists can similarly provide mentoring 
and guidance that helps entrepreneurs to turn their efforts into success.
An important aspect in venture capital is the manner in which venture capital 
firms are organized. Most of the professional venture capital firms are organized 
as limited partnerships in which the partners of the venture capital firm act as
general partners, while the institutional investors and other investors in the venture 
capital fund act as limited partners (Sahlman, 1990). This structure has been found 
to be efficient in alleviating agency problems between the investors and venture 
capital firms by providing strong incentives for venture capitalists to monitor and 
add value to the ventures (Gompers and Lemer, 1996; 1999a).
In China, the term “venture capital” is defined more broadly than it is in the 
USA. For example, all of the funds in the sample chosen for this study undertake 
early-stage investments, but they also finance later stage investments (which is 
referred to as “private equity” not “venture capital” in the US). Hence, we do not 
exclude venture capital firms from the sample data on the basis of the stage of 
development, because the same venture capital managers in the sample have 
contemporaneously invested in both early stage projects and buyouts. As such, we 
use the term “venture capital” in the broad definition of the term.
1.5.2 Technology-Based Firms
The definition of technology-based firms has many variations (Jones-Evans and 
Westhead, 1996). Typically, technology-based firms have been defined as 
businesses based on the exploiting of technological resources (Yli-Renko, 1999). 
In the present study, technology-based firms are defined on the basis of the 
Venture Economics’ classification of high technology firms, which includes 
companies operating in the following sectors: biotechnology, medical/health 
science, Internet specific, communications, computer software and services, 
computer hardware and semiconductors/other electronics and new energy.
In addition to the term technology-based firm, we use synonymously the term 
portfolio company, which refers to a company in which a venture capitalist has 
made an equity investment. Similarly, the words ‘investee’, ‘start-up’, and
‘venture’ are also used as synonyms for portfolio company. All these terms are 
used to refer to technology-based firms in the study.
1.5.3 Guanxi
Social capital theory suggests that inter-organizational relationships facilitate the 
exchange of information and resources (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai and 
Ghoshal, 1998; Yli-Renko et al., 2001a). Social capital consists of networks of 
relationships and resources inherent in these networks (Bourdieu, 1985; Coleman, 
1988). Research on social networks of entrepreneurs revealed that entrepreneurs 
obtain information and advice from network members (Birley, 1985) and access 
bank loans through contacts (Uzzi, 1999).
The idea of social capital and social networks in the Chinese context captures the 
indigenous social phenomenon called Guanxi (King, 1991; Luo, 2000; Tsui and 
Farh, 1997). The Chinese phrase “Guanxi” consists of two characters. The 
character “ US (guan)” means a gate or a hurdle, and “3^ (xi)” refers to a tie, a 
relationship, or a connection. So Guanxi literally means “pass the gate and get 
connected.” The concept of Guanxi refers to interpersonal relationships or 
connections and can be applied not only to kinship and friendship relationships but 
also to social connections, such as dyadic relationships (Bond and Hwang, 1987; 
Jacobs, 1979).
Research on Guanxi is not new. As early as the 1940s, the eminent Chinese 
anthropologist Fei ([1947] 1992, pp. 25—33, qtd. in Peng 2004, p. 1050) observed 
that whereas U.S. society is organized by voluntary associations based on 
universalistic principles and qualifications, Chinese society is organized by 
concentrically Guanxi circles, extending from the family (the core) to relatives, 
friends, and so on. Literally, Guanxi means social connection and is a synonym for
special favours and obligations to the Guanxi circle. The core of Chinese values is 
differentiated attitudes toward parents, children, siblings, kinsmen, friends, and so 
on, which Fei calls “differentiated mode of association.” Individual rights in the 
Chinese context are not universalistic but Guanxi specific and particularistic—that 
is, no tie, no obligation, and no rights. Guanxi is based implicitly on mutual 
interests and benefits (Yang, 1994), and some authors (Park and Luo, 2001: 457) 
even describe it as “utilitarian rather than emotional” and “based entirely on the 
exchange of favours, not an emotional attachment.” In sociological terms, Guanxi 
consists of personal ties or social bonds (Walder, 1986) and is described by some 
management consultants as “the informal connections so essential to gaining 
approval for or access to just about everything in China” (Tsang, 1998; p. 64). 
Guanxi is among the most important, talked about, and studied phenomena in 
China today. Guanxi lies at the heart of China’s social order, its economic 
structure, and its changing institutional landscape. It is considered important in 
almost every realm of life, from politics to business and from officialdom to street 
life (Gold, Guthrie, and Wank, 2002: 1).
In the context of venture capital, previous research into China has emphasized 
the important role of Guanxi plays in venture capital investments as a 
risk-mitigating device (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003). As the basis of all 
relationships lies within unwritten social rules, this process is far more pervasive 
than economic or legal controls in China. Unlike Americans and Europeans, 
Chinese traditionally do not rely so heavily on laws, regulations, and contracts 
(Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003). As such, venture capital firm may not expect 
carefully worded agreements and China’s legal system to solve all the difficulties 
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988).
Chen and Chen (2004) proposed three sequential stages of Guanxi development.
The first stage is initiating Guanxi, which follows the principle of mutual 
disclosure. The second stage is building and maintaining Guanxi, following the 
principle o f dynamic reciprocity. The third stage is using Guanxi, based on the 
principle o f equity. In Chen and Chen’s model, the authors treat Guanxi as a 
variable that changes as a function of the relationship stages and associated 
operating principles. In the present study, we adopt this dynamic view. Basing on 
Hwang’s (1987) and Yang’s (1993) categorization of Guanxi, we proposed two 
sequential stages of Guanxi in venture capital investment in China, namely 
pre-contract Guanxi and post-contract Guanxi. In pre-contract Guanxi -  an 
instrumental-tie relationship, there is no expectation on either side that it will 
undertake any exchange of affection in the future, so they expect objective, fair 
and immediate exchanges and follow the rule of equity. In post-contract Guanxi -  
a mixed instrumental and expressive-tie relationship, the social exchange follows 
the rule o f dynamic reciprocity, with ‘the component of affection in the 
relationship serving the instrumental function of striving for needed resources’ 
(Hwang, 1987: 957). We exam these two Guanxi stages separately.
The present study focuses on Guanxi between the venture capital investor and 
technology-based companies. We apply the measures from Lee and Dawes (2005) 
Ganesan (1994), Chen and Peng (2008), Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) and Yli-Renko 
et al. (2001a) and measure Guanxi as trust, knowledge of investees on a personal 
level, and the existence of frequent meetings at work and after work which used 
earlier in the context o f venture capital by Sapienza (1992) and Sapienza and 
Gupta (1994).
1.5.4 Complementarities
One of the key concepts in this study is the complementarities between venture 
capital investors and the technology-based firms. Complementarities refer to the
degree the venture capital investor and their portfolio company complement each 
other (Maula, Autio and Murray, 2003). The complementarities can be related in 
resources and capabilities, products and services, or some other dimension. The 
key determinant of complementarity is whether the success of one player is 
positively related to the success of the other player (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 
1996).
One of the key dimensions of complementarities is the complementarities 
between the resources and capabilities of the two companies. Typically, investee 
‘nearly always has a technology advantage but has little or no management skill or 
experience’. Venture capital investor, correspondingly, normally has a team of 
specialists in finance, marketing, economics and law (Smith, 2005). The resource 
between foreign venture capital and Chinese technology-based firms are even 
more complementary. The foreign venture capital firms, though often possessing 
valuable resources such as financial capital and managerial capabilities, still need 
to learn about local markets, about often vague and changing institutional 
arrangements and how to gain access to social connections (Arregle and Borza, 
2000). Conversely, while technology-based firms are familiar with local 
conditions, they usually short of capital and managerial skills.
Besides complementarities in resources, there can be complementarities in other 
dimensions as well. For instance, Amit and Zott (2001) argued that, 
“complementarities are present whenever having a bundle of goods together 
provides more value than the total value of having each of the goods separately.” 
This definition is partly based on the work by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) 
who highlighted the importance of providing complementary outputs to customers. 
In their game theory based competition framework, they stated that that, “A player 
is your complementor if customers value your product more when they have the
other player’s product than when they have your product alone” (Brandenburger 
and Nalebuff, 1996:18). Following Brandenburg and Nalebuff (1996) and Amit 
and Zott (2001), we also consider complementarities in both inputs and outputs. In 
addition to resources, complementarities in the product markets of the two 
companies are likely to influence their capability and willingness to collaborate.
1.5.5 Asymmetric Information
In the concept of asymmetric information, the seminal paper of Akerlof (1970) is 
often referred as the first investigation of the economics of unevenly distributed 
information. In his paper, Akerlof demonstrated, using an example from the 
market for used cars, how markets can break down when potential buyers cannot 
verify the quality o f the product they are offered. Faced with the risk of buying a 
“lemon” (bad quality product), the buyer will demand a discount, which in turn 
discourages the potential sellers who do not have “lemons”. Akerlof gave 
examples of the possible application areas of the theory in many areas including 
insurances. In the context of insurances, the theory of asymmetric information 
helps to understand the problem of adverse selection, which means that as the 
price level of insurance increases, the people who insure themselves will be those 
who are increasingly certain that they will need the insurance (Akerlof, 1970).
In venture capital, investments are made in young and highly uncertain ventures. 
Chan (1983) developed a model on how venture capitalists, as better-informed 
intermediaries, may relieve the problems caused by asymmetric information. Other 
studies examining the role of asymmetric information in venture capital 
contracting include Amit et al. (1990), Admati and Pfleideler (1994), Bergemann 
and Hege (1998), and Trester (1998). In venture capital contracting, various 
methods are used to deal with asymmetric information including monitoring and 
staged investments (Gompers, 1995; Sahlman, 1990). Focusing on the initial
public offerings of firms backed by venture capital investors, Barry et al. (1990), 
Megginson and Weiss (1991), Francis et al. (1999), Hamao et al. (2000) among 
others have examined the role o f venture capitalist in reducing the problems from 
asymmetric information in initial public offerings.
1.5.6 Agency Theory
The origins of the agency theory date back to Adam Smith, who in 1776 
described how managers of companies owned by others cannot be expected to 
manage the business as well as if it was owned by themselves (Smith, 1776). In 
the modem literature, Jensen and Meckling (1976) introduced the agency theory 
viewing external financing of a company as a principal-agent problem. In their 
paper, they defined the agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority 
to the agent”. In the agency theory, both principals and agents are assumed to be 
self-interested, rational, and risk-averse (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Based on the assumptions of agency theory, the objectives of the agent may not 
align perfectly with those of the principal. Furthermore, asymmetric information 
makes it hard for the principal to monitor and add value to the agent. Goal 
incongruence and asymmetric information may give rise for agency problems 
including adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the 
context of venture capital, agency theory has typically been used in the analysis of 
principal-agent problems considering the entrepreneur as an agent working for the 
principal venture capitalist.
From monitoring perspective, Gompers (1995), applying agency theory in his 
analysis, analyzed 794 venture capital backed firms and found that asymmetric
information (decreases in the industry ratios of tangible assets to total assets, 
higher market-to-book ratios, and greater R&D intensities) lead to more frequent 
monitoring. The monitoring model of this study follows this approach and 
considers the entrepreneur as an agent working for the principal venture capitalist.
Some researchers have applied agency theory to examine the value-added 
relationship between venture capitalists and portfolio companies. For instance, 
Sapienza and Gupta (1994) analyzed 51 venture capitalist-CEO dyads and found 
support for agency theory predictions in that frequency of interaction depended on 
the extent of venture capitalist-CEO goal congruence, the degree of CEO’s new 
venture experience, the venture’s stage of development, and the degree of technical 
innovation the venture was pursuing. However, the degree of management 
ownership had no impact on the frequency of interaction. Along the same lines, 
Lemer (1995) analyzed 271 venture capital backed biotechnology firms and found 
support for agency theory predictions. He found that venture capitalists’ 
representation in the board of directors increased around the time of turnover of 
chief executive officers, while the number of other outsiders remained constant. 
The present study also considers potential agency problems in the relationship of 
original owners of the ventures as agents and venture capitalists as principals in 
the value-added model. There is great potential for conflicts of interests between 
start-up companies and their investors operating in related fields (Hellmann, 2001; 
Kann, 2000; Maula and Murray, 2000a; 2000b), and investors may face agency 
problems related to the asymmetric information in forms of moral hazard and 
adverse selection risks when deciding which value is most needed and should be 
added to the investees.
1.5.7 Monitoring
The nature of the principal-agent relationship assumes that the principal is the
lead player (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1983a, 1983b), who attempts to 
control the relationship by the input of resources and by employing agents to work 
on his behalf. As he requires reassurance that his resources are being utilized to 
their best advantage (Fried et al., 1998), we might expect him to install a system of 
monitoring and control. Theories of financial intermediation tend to focus on the 
monitoring role of intermediaries (for example, Diamond, 1984; Stiglitz, 1985). 
Venture capitalists are uniquely positioned to provide such monitoring services 
since they have access to detailed knowledge of their portfolio companies. Several 
studies confirm that venture capitalists serve such a role in start-up companies 
(Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Chan, 1983 ).
This study makes a distinction between formal and informal monitoring 
mechanisms. Formal monitoring which refers to the specified contractual 
conditions such as restriction on management’s actions and requirements for the 
provision of detailed and regular information encoded in a business contract and 
enterprise’s Articles of Association/Corporate Charter. Informal mechanisms 
include all the monitoring activities that are not clearly codified in a formal 
contract, such as residual rights of control that are bestowed through ownership 
and monitoring through personal interactions (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 
1995).
1.5.8 Formal Monitoring
An organization is the nexus of contracts, written and unwritten, among owners 
of factors o f production and customers. In venture capital contracting, various 
methods are used to deal with agency problem including various restrictions and 
staged investments (Gompers, 1995; Sahlman, 1990). These contract terms 
specify the rights of each agent in the organization, performance criteria on which 
agents are evaluated, and the payoff functions they face (Fama and Jensen, 1983a).
To deal with agency risk, venture capital firms can specify contractual conditions 
that place restrictions on management’s behaviour. The conditions include 
restrictions on management’s ability to sell the business without the consent of the 
venture capitalist, restrictions on capital expenditure and acquisitions, etc. (Kaplan 
and Stromberg, 2001a). Agency theory would suggest that all possible 
consequences of additional investment should be analyzed pre-investment.
1.5.9 Informal monitoring
In practice, the contract is the settlement of differences in which each side makes 
concessions. Venture capitalists cannot legalize all the monitoring measures in 
their formal contract (Smith, 2005; Peng, 2000; Tsui, 2004). Furthermore, in 
transitional economies, where is a business environment where formal institutional 
constraints such as laws and regulations are weak. As a result, the effect of formal 
monitoring may be subdued (Peng, 2000; Tsui, 2004). Therefore, informal 
monitoring may play a more important role in facilitating information exchanges 
and hence assert a more significant impact on firm performance in transitional 
economies (Peng and Heath, 1996). These involvements helps to protect the 
interest of the venture capital firm, ameliorate the problems of information 
asymmetry and increase the likelihood of higher return on investment (Sahlman, 
1990). In their recent research about inter-firm relationships in China, Tsui et al. 
(2004) found that Chinese regards contracts as backward rather than forward 
looking. The finding is in line with Das and Teng (2000) who suggests that the 
contract should be considered as a ‘backdrop’ to the relationship between 
transacting parties, and should only act as a set of promises which the law 
recognizes as a duty and has some prescriptions when breached (Macneil, 1974).
Therefore, it is important to draw attention not just the specific rights of control 
that are detailed in contracts but also the informal monitoring. Pruthi and Wright
(2003) have concluded six main aspects of informal monitoring which are used in 
this study as the measure items.
1.5.10 Resource Dependence Perspective
The resource dependency perspective argues that no organization can survive 
alone, and that firms have to enter into inter-organizational relationships because 
they cannot generate all the necessary resources internally (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 
1976; Jacobs, 1974; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). It builds on social exchange 
theory (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962) and explains the dependence on 
inter-organizational relationships (Jacobs, 1974; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) have argued that when conditions of exchange and 
competition are uncertain and problematic, organizations attempt to establish 
linkages with elements in their environment and use those linkages to access 
resources, to stabilize outcomes, and to avert environmental control. However, 
using external links to gain access to resources makes firms dependent on the 
environment (Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
1.5.11 Resource-Based View
The key idea of the resource-based view is that firm-specific skills, 
competencies, and other tangible and intangible resources are viewed as the basis 
for the competitive advantage of a firm (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990). Because of environmental uncertainty, the firm-specific resources 
and capabilities are considered as a more sustainable basis for competitive 
advantage than product-market positioning (Grant, 1991). The essence of a firm’s 
strategy lies in the ways that the firm uses existing resources and in the means the 
firm acquires or develops internally additional unique resources (Wemefelt, 1984).
Since the emergence of the resource-based view, it has been widely applied in
empirical research explaining the success of entrepreneurial ventures and has 
many streams. One stream of resource-based theory of the firm, which is 
particularly related to this study, is its application in inter-organizational 
relationships — in this stream, inter-organizational collaboration and alliances are 
usually viewed as a mechanism to share or acquire resources. For example, in his 
research on the use of external resources, Jarillo (1989) found that entrepreneurial, 
fast growing firms used more external resources than their competitors. Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhoven (1996) extended the application of resource-based view to 
strategic alliances of young firms and found that firms entered into strategic 
alliances because of lack of internal resources in a vulnerable strategic position 
when pursuing innovative strategies in emerging competitive industries. Another 
reason why firms engaged in strategic alliances was the opportunity to take 
advantage of their own capabilities, such as a large, experienced management team. 
Park et al. (2001) found that firms’ use of alliances as mechanisms to adapt to 
market uncertainties was contingent on internal resource conditions. In growing 
markets, resource-rich firms leveraged their resources by accessing external 
complementary resources and reduced uncertainty through alliances while 
resource-poor firms were less likely to do so. However, in relatively stable 
markets, this relationship is reversed and resource-poor firms became more active 
in alliance formation because of the need to enhance their short-term viability.
The resource-based view of the firm suggests that firms are heterogeneous in the 
resources they control (Penrose, 1959). Organizational resources consist of all the 
assets, capabilities, attributes, and knowledge a firm possesses that enable it to 
develop and implement strategies that improve performance (Barney, 1991; 
Wemerfelt, 1984). A firm’s resources can be a source of competitive advantage in 
markets when these resources are valuable, rare, difficult-to-imitate, and have 
qualities that make them non-substitutable (Barney, 1991). Teece, Pisano and
Shuen (1997) extended the resource-based view with a dynamic perspective. They 
argue that because the value of a resource can change over time, competitive 
advantages come not only from organizational resources, but also from the firm’s 
capability to continually create, integrate, and reconfigure new resources. There 
may be several ways in which new capabilities are developed by firms but most 
entail accessing new knowledge or organizational learning (Sirmon, Hitt and 
Ireland, 2007).
1.5.12 Resources
One of the key concepts of this study is resources. In her book on firm growth, 
which has become the foundation of the resource-based view of the firm, Penrose 
(1959) defined resources as “physical things a firm buys, leases, or produces for its 
own use, and the people hired on terms that make them effectively part of the 
firm” (Penrose 1959:67).
Some other authors have taken a broader view of resources. For instance, 
Wemefelt (1984:172) defined resources as “anything which could be thought of as 
a strength or weakness of a given firm. More formally, a firm’s resources at a 
given time could be defined as those (tangible and intangible assets) which are tied 
semipermanently to the firm.” As examples of resources, Wemefelt (1984:172) 
listed “brand names, in-house knowledge of technology, employment of skilled 
personnel, trade contacts, machinery, efficient procedures, capital etc.” Along 
similar lines, Barney defined resources as “all assets, capabilities, organizational 
processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that 
enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency 
and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991:101). Although both of these definitions are 
broad, there is an important difference between the definitions of Wemefelt and 
Barney, as Barney’s definition includes only elements that are potentially rent
yielding (i.e. strengths).
An important distinction is the inclusion of capabilities, skills, and competencies 
as part of the resource portfolio o f the firm. While some of the definitions clearly 
include these (Barney, 1991; Wemefelt, 1984), some other authors have explicitly 
separated capabilities, skills, and competencies from other resources (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993; Grant, 1991). Amit and Schoemaker (1993) defined the 
difference between resources and capabilities as follows: “Resources can be 
defined as stocks of available factors that are owned or controlled by the
firm Capabilities, in contrast, refer to a firm’s capacity to deploy resources,
usually in combination, using organizational processes, to effect a desired end.” 
Resources (such as individual employees, patents, brand names, finance etc.) are 
seldom productive alone but can be turned into outputs with the help of suitable 
capabilities (Grant, 1991).
The present work makes a distinction between resources and knowledge and 
considers resources as tangible or intangible assets possessed by the firm or 
accessed through inter-organizational relationships. Knowledge, on the other hand, 
is an ingredient that ensures that the stakeholders in the business extract higher 
value from those resources (Penrose 1959:76).
1.5.13 Knowledge
The traditional definition of knowledge is “justified true belief’, a concept first 
introduced by Plato (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995:21). This definition, grounded in 
Western epistemology, focuses on the explicit nature of knowledge. Knowledge is 
modelled as an unambiguous, reducible and easily transferable construct, while 
knowing is associated with processing information (Eisenhardt and Santos, 2000). 
In contrast with this traditional conception, a newer view of knowledge, based on
the distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1958), has emerged. 
Tacit knowledge is linked to the individual, and is very difficult to articulate.
The distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge has been the basis for the 
emergence of the knowledge-based view of the firm (e.g. Grant, 1996; Kogut and 
Zander, 1992). The knowledge-based view argues that because tacit knowledge is 
difficult to imitate and relatively immobile, it can constitute the basis of sustained 
competitive advantage (DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999; Grant, 1996; Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 2000; Kogut and Zander, 1993).
Knowledge is the base of firm capabilities and thus, to develop capabilities, 
firms must access the appropriate knowledge stocks and integrate them. 
Manufacturing capabilities often require specific types and levels of technological 
knowledge, for example. Marketing capabilities require knowledge of markets and 
consumer behaviour as well as promotional activities. Firms must regularly access 
and learn knowledge to continuously reconfigure their resource portfolio and build 
new capabilities in order to remain competitive in dynamic markets (Sirmon et al., 
2007).
The relationship between the terms knowledge and resources varies in the 
literature. While physical resources, such as land or money, are clearly distinct 
from tacit knowledge possessed by the employees of a firm, there is a large 
overlap between the concepts. The present study focuses on the outcomes of 
relationships between venture capital investor and their investees. In the 
examination of these relationships, we refer to resource access when defining 
access to concrete resources such as distribution channels, production facilities and 
technology. In contrast, knowledge access refers to the learning that portfolio 
companies undertake from their relationships with venture capital investors that
helps them use their own resources more efficiently and effectively (Penrose 
1959:76).
1.5.14 Value-added
The primary role of venture capitalists is the provision of funding for young 
entrepreneurial firms (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989). However, venture capitalists 
are typically far from passive investors. According to Gorman and Sahlman (1989) 
venture capitalists spend half of their time in monitoring and post-investment 
relationships with, on average, nine ventures each. Because of their experience 
with numerous ventures and their large exposure to financial, labour, and other 
resource markets, venture capitalists are in a good position to support their 
portfolio companies. Venture capitalists have been acknowledged as providing 
valuable help for portfolio companies through the provision of advice and 
information to the entrepreneur and his/her team, through helping the firm obtain 
alternative further sources of equity financing, interfacing with the investor group, 
and helping their portfolio firms attract alternative sources of debt financing 
(MacMillan et al., 1988). Similar results have been found by Gorman and Sahlman 
(1989), Sapienza et al. (1996), and Rosenstein et al. (1993).
There are also some activities that have two-way function which can be 
monitored and which can add value to portfolio companies at the same time. These 
include monitoring financial and operating performance, which can potentially add 
value to portfolio companies. Following the previous research (Gorman and 
Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza et al., 1996; Rosenstein et al.; 1993), this study has used 
those dyad function actives as the measure to exam both monitoring and 
value-added mechanisms.
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a 
literature review, in which extant literature on venture capital both in Western 
countries and China. Furthermore related fields and relevant theories of venture 
capital and China’s law, finance and culture distinction are also reviewed; Chapter 
3 presents the models and hypotheses; Chapter 4 describes methods, the sample, 
the selection and operationalization of the variables. Chapter 5 describes the 
empirical results of the study. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the conclusions of the 
research, the possible interpretations of the findings and their theoretical and 
practical implications.
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews the relevant literature in three parts. First, the review 
focuses on the extant research on the topic area describing the role of 
inter-organizational relationships for venture capital firms both in developed 
countries and China. Thereafter, China’s regulatory systems, capital market 
structure, and culture distinction are reviewed in order to build a solid basis for 
hypothesis development. As there is very little earlier research on the monitoring 
and value-added provided by venture capital investors for their portfolio 
companies in China, literature on Western countries and other related types of 
inter-organizational relationships is reviewed and covers research on monitoring 
and value-added in venture capital and alliances between two firms. Finally, 
applicability of the theoretical approaches to the present study is assessed.
2.1 China’s venture capital industry
China’s venture capital industry has grown in recent years, and overtook the UK 
as the world’s second-biggest destination for venture capital investments in 2006 
with venture-capital investment rising 55% from the previous year (according to a 
report from Dow Jones VentureOne and Ernst and Young LLC), likely because it 
has many of the right elements that are required for a strong venture capital 
industry, including robust economic growth, a growing commitment to intellectual 
property rights protection, and a strong entrepreneurial culture. The latter not only 
drives much of the economic development in mainland China, but also in many 
other Asian countries such as Taiwan, Indonesia, and Singapore -  countries that 
have experienced economic growth that is similar to that in China. Moreover, the 
Chinese educational system directs a large number of its students to programmes
in engineering and business at Chinese and overseas universities, laying the 
groundwork for its continued development and increasing dominance in world 
trade (Wall street journal, 2007).
The current structure of China’s venture capital industry is a recent phenomenon 
emerging from decades of government-led technology policy and a 
still-transitioning business system. The Chinese government has always seen 
science and technology as a critical part of its search for economic development 
and national security (White, Gao and Zhang, 2002). Venture capital in the 
Chinese context, therefore, has been promoted not only a means to private gain, 
but also as a critical mechanism for linking scientific and technological 
capabilities and outputs, with national and regional economic and social 
developments.
Although still developing, China’s venture capital industry is clearly an outcome 
of its particular combination of political, economic and social institutions and the 
nature of the broader changes it has been undergoing during its transition from 
central planning to a more market-based business system. China’s venture capital 
industry, including the total set of related actors and institutions, has undergone a 
dramatic transformation over the last two decades. Because of its starting 
conditions— in particular, its legacy of inefficient central planning and socialist 
ideology—the results of this transformation seem particularly striking. The system 
that has emerged so far is highly complex in terms of variety and number of 
organizational actors. This complexity is increased because all of the 
organizational and institutional elements are themselves changing in response to 
policy, technological and other developments.
2.1.1 The history of venture capital in China
China’s venture capital industry was established in the mid-1980s, when the 
Chinese government decided that it should develop local high-tech industries 
(Xiao, 2002). However, initial attempts to create a flourishing high-tech sector 
were not very fruitful, largely because government officials and early venture 
capitalists lacked the necessary understanding and expertise and frequently 
channelled their efforts in the wrong direction. The failure of the China New 
Technology Start-up Investment Company, a well-known venture capital firm in 
China that went bankrupt in 1997, serves as a good example. However with 
continued support from the government and the private sector, China’s venture 
capital industry overcame its sluggish growth and started to flourish in 1999 and 
2000, a time period characterized by strong stock market performance and investor 
optimism not only in China but also in the rest of the world. According to China 
Venture Capital Directory maintained by Zero2IPO, a venture capital research 
company based in Beijing, there were around 263 venture capital firms in China in 
2006 and Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen are emerging as the centres of the 
venture capital industry.
The evolution of venture capital in China was marked by the establishment of 
so-called “China Direct Investment Funds” (CDIFs). These funds were listed on 
the Dublin, London, and Hong Kong stock exchanges and were primarily targeted 
at institutional investors. Yet, because the stock exchanges recognized these funds 
as investment companies, they restricted their investments. For example, Bruton 
and Ahlstrom (2003) point out, the London Stock Exchange prohibited CDIFs 
from becoming majority shareholders in any of the ventures they invested in, 
restricted them from playing a significant role in the management of a funded firm, 
and barred them from investing more than one-fifth of their capital pool in any one 
firm. Bruton et al. (1999) and Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003) note that, possibly as a
result of these restrictions, CDIFs were largely invested in government-owned 
state or township/village enterprises (TVEs) throughout China, not in privately 
owned businesses. CDIFs typically did not focus on a specific industry. Instead, 
they provided interim financing for firms in a wide variety of industries and aimed 
to build relationships with large state enterprises which, in turn, frequently helped 
the CDIFs source investment opportunities in other affiliated firms. Xin and 
Pearce (1996) and Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003) review the relationship between 
Sino-Chem -  a large state-owned firm that is in charge of building external 
import-export networks for the chemical industry in China -  and a Western CDIF. 
They note that the collaboration between Sino-Chem and the CDIF serves as a 
good example for the aforementioned symbiosis. As part of their deal, the Western 
CDIF provided not only money but also managerial expertise to Sino-Chem. In 
return, Sino-Chem located a number of chemical-related deals and provided the 
CDIF with the necessary connections to government officials to ensure the success 
of those deals. Once a CDIF decided to follow through on a proposed deal, it 
typically entered a joint venture with the funded firm and the large state entity that 
sourced the deal (Xin and Pearce, 1996).
Yet, a frequent problem for CDIFs was that large state entities like Sino-Chem 
often kept the best deals for themselves and only offered the lower quality deals to 
the CDIFs. Despite the poor performance that CDIFs frequently suffered as a 
result, a large part of China’s venture capital industry is still organized in the form 
of CDIFs. What has changed, however, is that most of the new investment funds 
are not listed on stock exchanges any more. Instead, they are organized as limited 
partnerships, as is typically the case for US venture capital funds (Bruton and 
Ahlstrom, 2003).
2.1.2 Recent developments in China’s venture capital industry
Today, venture capital investments in China are emerging from a range of 
different sources, including the central and provincial and municipal governments, 
state-owned enterprises, private firms, public companies, non-banking financial 
institutions, and foreign venture capital funds. As of 2006, and foreign funded 
venture capital firms account for 23 percent of China’s venture capital 
organizations and their presence and market share keeps growing (Zero2IPO, 
2007). More than 50% of domestic venture capital firms are state-owned, most of 
them are set up by provincial or municipal government driven by the regional and 
local economic and technological development. However, these venture capital 
firms are small and lack project evaluation capabilities as compared with their 
foreign independent counterparties (White, Gao and Zhang, 2002). As a result, 
domestic investors increasingly compete with foreign venture capital funds that 
possess abundant capital and superior project evaluation capabilities for access to 
high-quality investments in China, most of them in the fast-growing technology 
sector.
For years, the most active and successful players in Chinese venture capital 
markets have been mainly high-powered foreign investors like TPQ Carlyle 
Group and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., which are going after the country’s 
prime assets. The situation may be about to change as Chinese central government 
now views venture capital as a real industry sector, and it’s quietly cultivating a 
home-grown venture capital industry. Until recently, unfavourable tax laws 
hampered the development of a domestic, Yuan-denominated venture capital 
industry. Yuan funds had to pay income taxes, and their shareholders also paid 
income tax on their returns. That changed on 1st June 2007, when China 
established a law allowing for a venture capital structure that eliminates this 
double taxation. On October 2007, China's securities regulator cleared two of the
country’s strongest domestic investment banks, China International Capital Corp. 
and Citic Securities Co., to make direct-equity investments (Wall street journal, 
28/10/2007). That approval lifts a ban on venture-capital-style investing by 
securities firms that had been in place since April 2001. They now join Bohai 
Industrial Investment Fund Management Co., which at the end of 2006 became 
one of the Yuan-denominated venture capital funds in China to adopt the same 
model as Western rivals. Bohai, which is 53%-owned by Bank of China Ltd, raised 
more than £2 billion last year from investor and is led by industry veteran Mr. Au. 
Newly formed US$200 billion sovereign-wealth fund, China Investment Corp., 
also makes direct equity investments, which paid US$3 billion for 10% of 
Blackstone Group LP, the private-equity firm on May 2007 (Wall street journal, 
12/05/2007). In order to bring in more experience, on either domestic or 
international market, domestic venture capital firms provide very competitive 
salary package to attract talented financial professionals. Big domestic venture 
capital firms also start aggressive recruitment campaigns both home and abroad. 
On October 2007, China International Capital Corp. kicked off its U.S. 
headhunting trip in Wall Street, Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania 
and other business schools in the U.S. (Wall street journal, 16/10/2007). In May 
2008, the Chinese government cleared the country's nearly $75 billion national 
social-security fund to invest more freely with local private-equity funds, making 
it the biggest potential pool of capital for Chinese currency private-equity deals in 
the country (Wall Street journal, 16/05/2008).
Latest events show that the Chinese government no longer view venture capital 
funds as a means to promote scientific and technological capabilities, but also a 
mechanism to support its “go global” policy and an instrument to gain access to 
foreign technologies, raw materials and skills. On March 2007, China 
Development Bank, which bought a strategic stake in Barclays PLC, launched a
US$ 5 Billion venture capital fund called China-Africa Development Fund (“The 
CADFund”), to encourage and support Chinese enterprises to invest in Africa via 
equity or quasi-equity investment. On October 2007, Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China Ltd., which just purchased a 20% stake in South Africa's largest 
bank—Standard Bank, announced it had started up a venture capital fund to 
channel Chinese and global money into mining and resources companies. Private 
contributions to the fund are expected to bring it more than an initial SI billion 
(Wall Street journal, 1/11/2007).
At the same time, the future prospect for foreign venture capital firms looks less 
rosy, especially for big U.S. venture capital firms. The Chinese government has 
introduced a series of policies that make venture capital investments less easy for 
foreign venture capital firms. The real start of problems for international funds in 
China can be traced back to the failed bid by China National Offshore Oil Corp for 
US oil firm Unocal in 2005. That deal was sunk by political opposition in 
Washington based on concerns over national security and in the aftermath, many 
influential voices in Beijing called for reciprocal action. Eventually China's 
State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission issued its own 
“national security” regulations, identifying large swathes of the economy, such as 
petrochemicals, telecoms and basic infrastructure, over which the government 
must retain control for the foreseeable future. Any company that could be 
considered a “national brand” also came under the tough new rules (Wall Street 
journal, 12/09/2006).
The Ministry of Commerce then took the lead in 2006 by promulgating 
legislation adding new layers of approval to any proposed investment by 
foreigners in a Chinese company and basically shut down the most popular 
offshore corporate structure used by overseas venture capital funds to invest in
Chinese companies and sell their shares on overseas stock markets. Foreign 
buyout funds now found it virtually impossible to take majority stakes in China, 
since the most interesting targets were almost all state-owned and the government 
was taking a much stricter line on the sale of any state assets. In an example of 
very bad timing, the Carlyle Group announced in October 2005 that it was about to 
become the first foreign private equity firm to take a controlling stake in a 
state-owned company—Xugong Construction Machinery, the country's largest 
crane and digger producer. The deal promptly ran into trouble, forcing Carlyle to 
revise its bid to a minority stake at a higher price. Two years later, the deal has yet 
to be approved (Wall Street journal, 6/8/2007).
The array of new barriers has not locked foreign funds out completely and while 
headline venture capital and private equity investment has dropped in 2007, it is 
still growing slightly if giant one-off investments in China's state-owned banks in 
2005 and 2006 are discounted, according to data from the Asian Venture Capital 
Journal. Some venture capital funds are managing to operate by taking minority 
stakes in non-strategic industries as well as privately-owned companies. Others are 
trying to mitigate the restriction by selling a small stake of its own to Chinese 
government. The idea is simple, when Chinese government has more equity in the 
firms, its incentives should be more likely to be aligned with those of firms, and it 
is less likely to against venture capital firms’ investments. Blackstone Group has 
stroke a deal in which it sold almost 10 per cent of itself to China's nascent 
sovereign wealth fund for $3bn prior to its initial public offering in June 2007. The 
move appears to have paid off with the announcement last month of Blackstone's 
successful $500m purchase of an 18 per cent stake in Bluestar, a sprawling 
state-owned Chinese conglomerate. Other big venture capital firms are likely to 
follow suit. Three of the biggest US private equity firms, Carlyle, Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts & Co and TPG, have each held preliminary talks about selling a minority
stake to China’s giant Social Security Fund, which had Rmb460bn ($61.5bn) in 
assets at the end of June 2007(Financial Times, 30/10/2007).
In response to growing competition from domestic venture capital firms, foreign 
venture capital firms are also trying to make themselves less of an outsider in 
China. While most foreign companies first entered China with people from head 
office running their funds, the importance of language, personal relationships and 
the ability to navigate China's opaque regulatory and legal environment soon 
meant the foreigners were replaced by Chinese fund managers. Foreign venture 
capital firms are not only seeking to increase the local investment professionals 
but also the number of Chinese investors in its funds. This is a strategy that 
Carlyle has pioneered in Tokyo, where all Carlyle's investment professionals are 
Japanese. More than half of the money in Carlyle's Japan funds comes from local 
Japanese investors (Financial Times, 14/11/2007).
2.2 Unique Challenges in China
China has its very own long history and different regulatory systems and 
financial structure, and venture capital investors face a number of unique 
challenges in China. In this section, we aim to outline and examine the specific 
factors that have affected -  and continue to affect -  China’s venture capital market 
and set it apart from its Western counterparts. A proper understanding of these 
differences should not only be beneficial to practitioners by helping them make 
better-informed investment decisions but also to academics who want to conduct 
further comparative research in this area.
2.2.1 China’s Regulatory systems and capital market structure.
In recent years, there has been considerable debate among academics about what 
causes one country’s capital market to develop differently from that of another
country. While most of that debate has revolved around broader issues such as 
economic growth and firms’ access to capital (Allen et al., 2002), a small but 
growing strand of the academic literature focuses on the venture capital industry in 
particular. An early study by Black and Gilson (1998) points out that one of the 
main factors that causes the venture capital industry to differ from country to 
country is the underlying structure of the country’s capital market, i.e. whether it is 
bank-centred or stock-market cantered. Stock-market centred countries typically 
have many banks that are small relative to large corporations. The stock markets in 
these countries tend to be well developed and corporate governance functions tend 
to be conducted via cross-holdings and interchanging board memberships among 
the corporations. Bank-centred countries, on the other hand, tend to have fewer but 
larger banks that make significant investments in the corporate sector and 
consequently play a central corporate governance role. In contrast to the US 
capital market, which is largely stock-market centred, the Chinese capital market 
is by and large bank-centred, similar to that of Japan. European markets, in 
comparison, are somewhat mixed: the British and Irish capital markets are 
stock-market based whereas most Continental European countries have 
bank-centred capital markets (see Oehler et al., 2006). As is typical in 
bank-centred economies, Chinese banks tend to hold significant stakes in local 
firms and frequently serve on their boards of directors, a practice that is unusual 
for US firms. As Bruton et al. (2002b) points out, one of the reasons why a nation 
is bank- or stock-market centred is the regulatory scheme employed by that nation. 
In China -  as in many other Asian countries -  regulators have traditionally 
encouraged banks to own equity in customer firms and to serve on the boards of 
directors of those corporations. Regulators in the US and other stock-market 
centred countries typically oppose such relationships.
Bruton et al. (2002b) note that the Chinese regulatory system provides little
support for stock market development. First, the financial reporting requirements 
in China are far less transparent than Western reporting standards (Backman, 
1995), which makes it difficult for investors to monitor their investments. Second, 
Chinese securities laws and their enforcement are comparatively weak, leaving 
shareholders with insufficient protection and inadequate means of legal recourse in 
the case that a company defrauds them (Allen et al., 2002; Bruton et al., 2002b).
Whilst, these shortcomings hamper stock market investments, they provide an 
even bigger impediment for venture capitalists -  an investor group whose success 
depends more than that of any other investor group on the ability to monitor and 
steer the firms they invest in.
2.2.1.1 Culture
Everyone who does business in a foreign country has to be aware of and 
responsive to that nation’s culture. In the Western hemisphere, cultural differences 
between countries tend to be comparatively minor and businessmen and -women 
can typically adjust to another nation’s culture without major difficulties. When 
setting foot into China, however, it is easy for Westerners to become overwhelmed 
by the cultural differences they suddenly face. These differences not only require 
personal adjustments in one’s lifestyle and the way we interact and communicate 
with others while working abroad, they also necessitate substantial modifications 
in the corporate decision making process as many standards and routines that are 
taken for granted in the Western business world may not apply in China. The four 
most striking Chinese cultural phenomena related specifically to interpersonal 
relationship are: collectivism, mainzi (face), renqing (reciprocal favour) and 
ganqing (affection).
Collectivism One of the key aspects of Chinese culture is high degree of
collectivism (Hofstede 1980). From birth onward, people belong to strong, 
cohesive in-groups, such as extended families. The norms of Chinese interpersonal 
behaviour clearly distinguish in-group from out-group people, such as strangers. 
For in-group relationships, in which expressive ties are predominant, Chinese 
people pay more attention to attachment, harmony, and long-term relationships by 
going along with the group and avoiding rejection (Hui and Triandis 1986). For 
out-group relationships, in which instrumental ties are predominant (Bond and 
Smith 1996), people distrust one another; are “on guard against everyone and on 
all occasions”; and “treat each person like a guest, but guard against him like a 
th ief’ (Chiao 1989, qtd. in Gabrenya and Hwang 1996, p. 310). Moreover, 
Fukuyama (1995) categorizes Chinese society as a low-trust society in which its 
citizens tend to distrust out-group people and trust only in-group people.
In a country like China, whose culture shows a strong collectivistic orientation, 
employees tend to share responsibility within an organization. That is, it is rare for 
an individual to be responsible for an activity; instead there is an emphasis on 
collective actions across all levels in a firm’s hierarchy (Boisot and Child, 1988; 
Bruton et al., 2002b). For Western business people, that means that negotiations 
and routine communications will rarely take place on a one-on-one basis, but will 
typically entail communicating with several individuals who share responsibility 
for a given task.
Mainzi (face) Another key aspect of Chinese culture is mainzi (face). Mianzi 
refers to a person’s claimed sense of positive image in a relational context, and it 
is gained by performing one or more specific social roles that are well recognized 
by others (Bond 1991). Face describes a person’s proper relationship with his or 
her social environment, and its importance lies in the consequence of living in a 
society that is conscious of social contexts (Hofstede 1992). A loss of face brings
shame to people and their family, and causing others to lose face is considered an 
aggressive act by those whose face has been discredited (Tung and Yeung 1996).
The Chinese idiom “would rather make sacrifices than lose face” illustrates the 
importance of face. Because it is so important in the personal life of Chinese 
people, members of in-groups protect the other members’ face (Bond 1991). Face 
is important not only for Chinese people’s personal lives but also for their business 
lives. Redding and Ng (1982) find that Chinese businessmen claim that face is a 
consistently important consideration in their professional interactions and that fear 
of losing face forms the basis for the informal system of contracts and agreements 
that are common in Chinese business. They also find that for middle level business 
executives in Hong Kong, face has a significant influence in business negotiations. 
To give face to someone during a business negotiation is perceived as highly 
desirable, whereas to jeopardize or challenge the other’s face is considered highly 
undesirable.
The norm of preserving face in Chinese society encourages people to play proper 
social roles, to meet the requirements of and to be liked by peers of the same 
affiliated group, and to allow all members to appear good in the group (Lee and 
Dawes, 2005). As a result, conflicts within the group are reduced, and harmony is 
enhanced. Therefore, in Chinese interpersonal relationships, face has a function 
that is instrumental in the stabilization of the group.
Rena ins Reciprocal favour in Chinese is called renqing. Reciprocal favour is a 
strong social norm in Chinese society. If a personal relationship partner gets into 
difficulties, the other partner should help him or her, and after the recipient has 
received the favour, he or she should return it as soon as the opportunity arises 
(Hwang 1987). Reciprocal favour is morally binding for Chinese people, and those
who do not repay favours are considered to have “no credibility,” to have “no 
conscience,” and to be “mean,” and they lose face, reputation, and ultimately 
personal relationships and their peers’ trust. The norm of reciprocal favour 
requires that all members of a group perform favours to help those in need and that 
all favours be repaid.
The rules of reciprocal favour require certain social behaviour in Chinese culture 
(Hwang 1987). First, in normal times, a person should keep in contact with 
acquaintances in his or her Guanxi circle by greetings, visitations, or exchanging 
gifts with them from time to time. Second, when a person in a network gets into 
trouble or faces a difficult situation in life, other members of the group should 
sympathize with and help that person and do a renqing (offer favour or help); after 
the troubled member has received a renqing from others, he or she should return it 
as soon as the opportunity arises. Reciprocal favour has several implications in 
Chinese culture (Hwang 1987). First, it indicates the emotional or affective 
responses of a person who is confronting various situations or life events. Second, 
it is a resource that a person can present to another as a gift in the course of social 
interaction. Third, it connotes the social norms by which a person must abide to 
get along well with others. Reciprocal favour, with its rules and implications, 
facilitates the survival of each person in the group and thus the survival of the 
group. Reciprocity is a universal concept and rule; it is even applicable to animal 
behaviour (Axelrod 1984).
Ganging (affection) Ganqing (affection) refers to human feelings and is related 
to enduring and emotional commitments that are found in long-term and intimate 
social bonds, such as those between parents and their children, close friends, and 
teachers and students (Yang 1994). Ganqing is the most important foundation of 
Guanxi, and it is so critical that Chinese people tend to mix the word Guanxi with
ganqing, sometimes using the words interchangeably. Notably, Chinese people 
tend to differentiate between two types of friendship. One is based on deep mutual 
ganqing and a willingness to sacrifice materially for a friend, and the other 
consists of an affected ganqing and is established for the purpose of enabling 
mutually beneficial material exchanges. However, even when two “friends” desire 
only a mutually beneficial exchange, they still find that it is necessary to affect 
ganqing. In both types of friendship, ganqing and mutual indebtedness go together 
(Kipnis, 1997).
2.2.1.2 Guanxi
Researchers defined Guanxi as a web of extended family relationships (Kipnis 
1997), a cluster of patron-client exchange relationships for instrumental purposes 
(Walder 1986), particularistic relationships which built simultaneously for the sake 
of the relationship and instrumental purposes (Lin, 2001b), and special 
relationships due to the existence of particularistic ties (Tsui et al. 2000, Yeung 
and Tung, 1996). Guanxi is ubiquitous and comes in many varieties. In many 
cases it is the only insurance that transactions will go through. According to Tsang 
(1998), Guanxi can serve as a resource that can be called on when needed but also 
represents a liability when a favour is owed. When maintained and employed 
properly, Guanxi with key individuals both inside and outside one’s organization 
can be used efficiently to create value both for the venture capitalist organization 
itself as well as the firm it funds. Another characteristic of Guanxi is that they are 
driven by unwritten social rules. While business transactions in the West are 
typically based on carefully worded contracts that are enforceable under a 
country’s laws and regulations, China’s legal system provides comparatively less 
protection if things go sour. As a result, Chinese business partners rely more 
heavily on the social responsibilities that come with a well-maintained Guanxi 
relationship. Because collectivism, mainzi (face), renqing (reciprocal favour) and
ganqing (affection) are manifestations of Chinese personal relationships, closer 
Guanxi between two partners (in this case, between a venture capital firm and a 
technology-based firm) helps their relationship move toward in-group-like 
relationships, thus fostering more trust (Fukuyama 1995).
Yang (1994) categorizes Guanxi in China into three groups: (1) between family 
members; (2) between familiar people, such as neighbours, friends, and colleagues; 
and (3) between strangers or mere acquaintances. These three categories of 
relationships have completely different social and psychological meanings to the 
parties involved and are governed by different sets of interpersonal rules. This 
classification is consistent with that of Hwang (1987), who argues that the 
relationships of family members primarily consist of expressive ties, strangers of 
instrumental ties, and familiar people of mixed ties. We place these three kinds of 
Chinese interpersonal relationships on a continuum of Guanxi; the family Guanxi 
is on the right extreme (primarily with expressive ties), the stranger Guanxi is on 
the left extreme (primarily with instrumental ties), and the familiar person Guanxi 
floats in the middle (with mixed ties). For Chinese people, when they talk about 
Guanxi, they often imply an interpersonal relationship outside of the family, 
primarily with a familiar person, because between family members, the 
relationship is unalterably that of an expressive tie, and obligations are dutifully 
assumed (Kipnis 1997, p. 184).
Our focus of venture capital and entrepreneur relationship falls into the 
acquaintance category. In such relationships, the norm of renqing (reciprocal 
favour) prescribes some expectations of both expressive and instrumental 
exchanges (Chen and Peng, 2008). Expressive exchanges between venture capital 
and entrepreneur can be manifested by non-job related incidents, such as having 
dinner, playing games, or watching movies together, or helping out one another
with personal problems. Instrumental exchanges can be manifested by helping to 
solve job related problems, cooperating at work, communicating honestly with 
each other about problems or conflicts between work colleagues, and so on. In 
addition, the practices of Chinese organizations also cultivate the mixed working 
Guanxi. For example, many Chinese organizations hold regular birthday parties 
and organize vacation trips for their employees. They also provide financial or 
personnel help in the case of employees’ family crises. Therefore, a close work 
Guanxi in China consists both the expressive and instrumental components. 
Brutona and Ahlstrom (2003) found that venture capital investment in China 
indeed involves frequent personal interaction.
To gain insight into how Chinese managers understand the meaning of Guanxi, 
Lee and Dawes (2005, p:32-33) interviewed about a dozen sales managers in 
China. One of these Chinese managers gave them a striking description of Guanxi 
that summarizes its essence: “Guanxi is just like door steps. If you’re not yet on 
the steps, no one will do business with you. If we don’t know you, how can we 
trust you! Once you’re on the door steps, then we start to know you, then we open 
the door to talk business with you.” This description of Guanxi reveals three things: 
First, Guanxi is a formality, a necessary procedure that businessman must go 
through for strangers to establish intention to conduct business with one another. 
In short, with no Guanxi, there is no intention. Second, there is a threshold level 
for Guanxi below which strangers remain strangers. Third, the establishment of 
Guanxi may take time. It is unlike the United States, in which strangers can 
immediately begin talking business after they are introduced by a third person 
(Lee and Dawes, 2005).
Moreover, Kipnis (1997) points out that the production of Guanxi 
simultaneously creates human feeling and material obligation; therefore, in Guanxi,
feeling and instrumentality are a totality. Guanxi unifies what Western bourgeois 
relationships separate, namely, material exchange and affectionate feelings. In 
Western countries, “business is business”, i.e. business cannot be mixed with 
affection. The former is self-interested and is governed by contracts and rules of 
the market; the latter is pure and altruistic, governed by spontaneity, and above 
economic consideration (Kipnis, 1997). However, in China, business and affection 
go together. Historically, Chinese firms arose in legal contexts in which property 
rights and contract law were unreliable. Therefore, the cultivation of long-term, 
reliable Guanxi and the adoption of a Guanxi-oriented management style build the 
trust that is necessary to conduct business transactions and are essential for 
survival (Redding, 1990).
Taken together, these studies suggest China’s political, economic and social 
institutions influence the characteristics of China’s venture capital firms and their 
relationship with investees. As Chinese managers have a cultural propensity and 
institutional imperatives to rely on Guanxi (Luo and Che, 1997; Boisot and Child, 
1996; Peng and Heath, 1996; Child, 1994: 150), China represents an ideal research 
laboratory in which to explore the inter-organizational relationships. In the next 
section, extant research on venture capital is reviewed.
2.3 Extant Research on Venture Capital
2.3.1 Technology-Based Firms and Inter-organizational 
Relationships
Technology-based firms have been argued to be highly dependent on resources 
available through inter-organizational relationships (Jarillo, 1989; Stinchcombe, 
1965; Yli-Renko et al., 2001b). Technology-based firms usually operate in fields 
requiring substantial resources but typically have very little resources themselves.
The objective often being rapid growth, technology-based firms are forced to use 
external resources and form rapidly new business partnerships and customer 
relations (Autio and Gamsey, 1997; Jarillo, 1989; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The 
new partner, e.g. venture capital firm, can usually provide all the external 
resources technology-based firms need, but new partner’s goal is protecting his 
investment and seeking better return. As a result, the external resources provider 
usually undertakes a number of activities to address problems relating to 
asymmetric information.
Technology-based firms may have various kinds of inter-organizational 
relationships. There is a large body of literature examining the relationships of 
entrepreneurial firms with their venture capitalists. Summarizing previous research, 
there are two main approaches: (1) principal-agent relationship approach (from 
venture capitalist’s point of view) (Mitchell et al., 1992; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; 
Gifford, 1995; Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Reid, 1998, 1999; Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2003), and (2) resource dependence approach (from entrepreneur’s 
point of view) (MacMillan et al., 1988; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996; 
Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996; Deeds and Hill, 1996; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2001; Schoonhoven and Lyman, 
2000; Shan et al., 1994; Stuart et al., 1999; Stuart, 2000).
2.3.1.1 Inter-organizational Relationships between Venture Capital 
and Technology-Based Firms
Many researchers examined the relationship between venture capital and 
technology-based firms within an agency framework, with the venture capital 
investor acting as principal, and his investee company as agent (Mitchell et al., 
1992; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Gifford, 1995; Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Reid, 
1998, 1999; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003).
The nature of the principal-agent relationship assumes that the principal is the 
lead player (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). As agents usually have 
superior knowledge about their firm, the principal will attempt to control the 
relationship by the input of resources and by employing agents to work on his 
behalf. As the principal requires reassurance that his resources are being utilised to 
his best advantage (Fried et al., 1998), principal will set up a mechanism of 
monitoring and control. However, in venture capital, the principal will not always 
be around to oversee the actions of his agent(s). The agent, on the other hand, will 
receive a payoff for working on behalf of the principal. If this were to be in the 
form of a fixed amount, then the agent might be tempted to exert only minimum 
effort; without additional incentive, there is nothing to be gained by doing more 
than is necessary. Thus a moral hazard will arise and with an absent principal, the 
agent relaxes and works to a sub-optimal degree.
There are steps that can be taken to attenuate the problems of information 
asymmetry and moral hazard that can arise in a principal-agent relationship (Fama, 
1980). In order to maximise the outcomes of such a relationship, the principal can 
set in place monitoring systems such that the agent has an incentive to work for the 
good for the partnership. There are two main mechanisms that venture capital 
firms conduct to control relationship with technology-based firms: formal 
monitoring and informal monitoring (Pruthi, Wright, Lockett, 2003).
Formal monitoring, which refers to the specified formal contractual conditions 
(Pruthi, Wright, Lockett , 2003), is the foundation of the relationship between 
venture capital firms and their technology-based investees. These contract terms 
specify the rights of each agent in the organization, performance criteria on which 
agents are evaluated, and the payoff functions they face (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Venture capital firms can specify contractual conditions that place restrictions on 
management’s behaviour. The conditions include on capital expenditures, 
restriction on managerial salaries, restriction on raising additional outside capital, 
technology non-disclosure agreements, and conditions for forcing a change in 
managing and liquidating the deal, etc. (Barney and Lowell, 1994; Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2001).
Informal monitoring is another important reason for venture capital firms to 
enter into relationships with technology-based new firms. After signing a contract, 
venture capitalists keep a close relationship with their portfolio companies and are 
involved in these companies’ operations. These involvements helps to protect the 
interest of the venture capital firm, ameliorate the problems of information 
asymmetry and increase the likelihood of higher return on investment (Sahlman, 
1990). For instance, venture capitalists regularly meet with entrepreneurs. 
According to Gorman and Sahlman (1989) survey, venture investors spend 100 
hours in direct contact (on site or by phone) with the company.
For technology-based firms, the motivation for engaging in inter-organizational 
relationships with other organizations is to access resource and knowledge. The 
form of relationship with outside organizations is evolving dynamically with the 
growth of the firms. Research on strategic alliances (e.g., Kogut, 1988) or strategic 
networking (Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 2000) has long suggested that the need for 
resource and knowledge is a major rationale for alliance/network formation. 
Strategic alliances/networks provide opportunities for partners to share resources 
and learn from each other.
For emerging firms, the social network of the entrepreneur is virtually 
synonymous with the network of the firm, as network ties initially exist on the
interpersonal level (Hite and Hesterly, 1999, 2001). Emerging firms typically 
leverage entrepreneurs’ existing ties such as family members and friends to gain 
the key resources needed to establish firm viability (Bhide, 1999; Hite and 
Hesterly, 2001; Johannisson, 2000). Ostgaard and Birley (1996) assumed the 
personal networks of the owner-managers to be the most important resources upon 
which the owner-managers can draw in the early days of the firm’s development.
As emergent firms evolve into growth firms, their networks evolve from identity 
based, existing ties of the entrepreneur to more calculative relationships based on 
assessment of economic costs and benefits (Hite and Hesterly, 2001). Firms in 
different life cycle stages have different strategic challenges. In their attempt to 
respond to new strategic challenges and resource access needs, evolving firms 
develop new inter-organizational relationships to match the needs (Hite and 
Hesterly, 2001). When moving into the early-growth stage, firms make clear 
strategic decisions to grow intentionally beyond mere survival (Churchill and 
Lewis, 1983; Hite and Hesterly, 2001; Kazanjian and Drazin, 1989). In this stage, 
a more extensive and broader set of resources is needed to enable growth. During 
the early growth stage, the search for external resources, and the building of 
inter-organizational relationships to access them, becomes more intentional and 
calculative. Instead of leveraging resources from their families and friends, early 
growth stage companies often seek external financing from venture capitalists and 
other investors, and form alliances with other companies. However, not only does 
lack of resources constrain the growth of technology-based firms, they are also 
limited by their competencies and knowledge of the markets and customer needs. 
The knowledge access is another important reason for technology-based firms to 
enter into inter-organizational relationships (Almeida et al., 2001; Liebeskind et al., 
1996; McGee and Dowling ,1994; Powell et al., 1996; Yli-Renko et al., 2001a).
Two broad categories cover most of the reasons why technology-based firms 
establish inter-organizational relationships: access to resources, and access to 
knowledge through inter-organizational relationship.
Access to resources is an important reason for entrepreneurial technology-based 
firms to engage in inter-organizational relationships with other organizations (De 
Meyer, 1999; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Hite and Hesterly, 1999, 2001; 
Jarillo, 1989; Park et al., 2001). Resources accessed through inter-organizational 
relationships may include simple resources, e.g. financial, which are often sought 
from venture capitalists. Resources obtained through inter-organizational 
relationships can also include access to distribution channels and production 
facilities or something else that is needed to create, produce and distribute the 
products competitively (Steams, 1996).
Access to knowledge is another important motivation for technology-based new 
firms to enter into relationships with external parties (Almeida et al., 2001; McGee 
and Dowling, 1994; Powell et al., 1996; Yli-Renko et al., 2001a). 
Technology-based firms need external knowledge to focus their scarce resources 
to the most effective use and to develop their competencies and organizations. 
According to the knowledge-based view of the firm, the partnership between 
venture capital firm and entrepreneur can be understood as a social and therefore 
also collaborative community specialising in the speed and efficiency in the 
transfer and creation of knowledge across their borders (Almeida et al., 2002; 
Kogut and Zander, 1996). For instance, new firms are known to seek venture 
capital financing and select venture capital investors on the basis of strategic 
advice they believe to get from the investors (Smith, 2001). Strategic advice has 
been confirmed as the most important form of hands-on value-added that 
entrepreneurs gain from their venture capital investors (Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza
et al., 1994; Sapienza et al., 1996).
Having discussed the inter-organizational relationship between two parties, it is 
useful to mention that building a good inter-organizational relationship is very 
important and critical because all the venture capitalist’s roles in the investee 
companies will rely upon this relationship (Maula, 2001). In this context, there is 
some consensus between previous studies regarding this issue (Tyebjee and Bruno, 
1984; Timmons and Bygrave, 1986; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sweeting, 1991; 
Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza, 1996; Boocock and Woods, 1997; Sweeting and Wong, 
1997). All these studies mentioned that once the deal is completed, the relationship 
between the two parties must work because the role of the venture capitalist has 
transferred from being a mere investor to a collaborator. The structure of a 
relationship has built depending on converge of the interest for both parties which 
all should look for the further growth and development of the company. This 
interest converge is similar to the concept of “expectations of continuity of a 
relationship,” because both capture the likelihood of future interactions 
(Noordewier et al., 1990). Nevertheless, long-term orientation encapsulates the 
desire of the parties toward a long term relationship. According to Ganesan (1994), 
trust based on good relationship is a necessary antecedent for long-term orientation 
because it shifts the focus to future conditions. A venture capitalist’s trust in the 
entrepreneur affects the long-term orientation of the venture capitalist in two ways: 
(1) it reduces the perceived risks associated with opportunistic behaviours by the 
entrepreneur, and (2) it reduces the transaction costs in an exchange relationship 
(Lee and Dawes, 2005). Therefore, an informal, open and mutual 
inter-organizational relationship is very important for venture capital investment.
2.3.1.2 Inter-organizational Relationships between venture capital and 
technology-based firms in China
Inter-organizational relationships in China have all the common characters 
discussed in the previous section although the relationship is much more intensive 
than that in Western countries. Backman (1995) and Weidenbaum and Hughes 
(1996) examined standard buyer/seller relationships in Asia and note that they are 
much closer than in the West. Their results are in line with an earlier study by Kao 
(1993), who pointed out that when a Chinese entrepreneur enters into a business 
deal, he is not just interested in the economics of the contract, but also in the 
relationship it represents. Indeed, Chinese businessmen generally anticipate that 
their commercial dealings will result in more than a formal legal relationship -  
they expect their business partners to provide them with personal and equity links 
and extended interconnected networks (Gerlach, 1992).
Furthermore, Chinese culture is hierarchical (Hamilton 1991); a firm is usually 
tightly controlled by the top boss and a few senior managers (Redding and Wong 
1986). Because Chinese firms adopt a Guanxi business style, the person is the firm, 
and the firm is represented by the person. Thus, the closeness of the 
inter-organizational relationship to a portfolio company is primarily determined by 
the Guanxi between venture capitalists and top boss and senior managers in the 
company.
Research on venture capital inter-organizational relationship in China has not 
emerged until very recently. Bruton et al. (2002b) argue that this close 
inter-relationship culture affects venture capitalists as well. When examining the 
interactions between venture capitalists and the CEOs of the firms they fund, 
Bruton et al. (2002b) find that, in the West, the time a venture capitalist spends in 
face-to-face contact with the firm’s CEO generally varies with the perceived risk
of the funded venture. That is, the riskier a firm is perceived to be, the more time 
the venture capitalist will devote to monitoring his investment (Sapienza et al., 
1996; Bruton et al., 2004). In contrast, Chinese venture capitalists frequently 
maintain contacts not only with the CEO, but with a wider range of top and 
mid-level managers (Pukthuanthong and Walker, 2007). Indeed, after conducting 
extensive interviews with venture capitalists in East Asian countries -  many of 
them in China -  Bruton et al. (2004) found that effective monitoring in these 
countries is only possible if a venture capitalist builds personal relationships with 
funded entrepreneurs. They argue that as a result, Western venture capitalists have 
to be aware that the time, effort, and costs they will have to spend in an effort to 
monitor a firm effectively will be significantly higher in China than what they are 
used to in the West. This is in line with earlier findings by Bruton et al. (2002b), 
who show that the number of years the funded venture has been in the venture 
capital firm’s portfolio is negatively related to the amount of time the venture 
capitalists devote to the funded venture in the USA and Europe. On the other hand, 
they document that the factors are unrelated in China.
In the following chapters, we will examine some of the most relevant fields of 
research related to relationships (Guanxi) between technology-based firms and 
their venture capital investors. We will first discuss the extant research on venture 
capital in Western countries. Mainly, we will review two main areas of research: 
venture capital monitoring and venture capital value-added. Thereafter, we will 
focus on extant research on venture capital developing countries, particularly in 
China, which we believe is offering a fascinating example for better understanding 
of the important dimensions in the relationships between venture capital and their 
portfolio companies. We will employ the findings from these related, but more 
extensively researched fields, in developing hypotheses about the important 
factors to be considered in research on venture capital and their portfolio
companies.
2.3.2 Venture capital monitoring
Each year venture capitalists screen hundreds of investment proposals before 
deciding which ideas and team to support. It is important to choose the right 
entrepreneur and project, but that is not the end of a venture capitalist’s job. In his 
case study, Gupta (1986) attributed the venture capital’s success to its hands-on 
involvement in the management of its portfolio companies—recruiting managers, 
monitoring companies’ performance, sitting on the boards of directors, regular 
meeting with entrepreneurs, providing a range of expertise, including operations, 
technology, finance, etc. Thus, an appropriate monitoring mechanism along with 
value-added ensures a rewarding relationship during the investment period.
The purpose of the monitoring of venture capital firms is to respond to warning 
signals. These signals are late payments, losses, late financial reports, poor 
financial reports, large changes in balance sheet, significant changes in 
management, sales, inventory changes, and changes in accounting methods, etc. 
responding to these signals, venture capitalists can take remedial action before 
serious trouble infects the investee company (Gladstone, 1983, 1988).
Summarizing previous research on the venture capital monitoring on 
technology-based firms, there are two main monitoring approaches venture 
capitalists take to mitigate agency risk: For formal monitoring, venture capitalists 
structure a formal financial contract between the entrepreneur and venture capital 
firm to provide incentives for the entrepreneur to behave optimally. For informal 
monitoring, venture capitalists can engage in information collection and 
monitoring through the activities that are not clearly codified in a formal contract, 
i.e. residual rights of control that are bestowed through ownership and monitoring
through personal interactions (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995).
2.3.2.1 Formal Monitoring
In the jargon of economics, venture capital contracts are incomplete. Venture 
capitalists are entered into in uncertain environments, and they fail to exploit even 
available information (for example, probability distributions) because of two 
obstacles. First, some information is observable by only one party (the 
entrepreneur) who cannot credibly communicate it to others (information 
asymmetry). Second, the parties cannot control post-financing behaviour by 
contract because either the behaviour itself or future states of the world cannot be 
verified by third party arbiters (agency problems). These two problems motivate 
the design of venture capital contracts.
Previous researchers have tested the formal contractual arrangements based on 
different theories. Embedded in the organizational economics paradigm, Barney 
and Ouchi (1986) assumed that contracts between new firms and venture capital 
firms are monitoring devices used to manage possible conflicts of interest between 
these two. Based on transaction cost economics, Williamson (1975, 1985) argued 
that monitoring is costly, i.e. those contractual covenants are costly to write and 
enforce, and thus will only be included in a contract if their benefits are greater 
than their cost of writing and enforcement. Based on agency theory, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) declared that the need to write and enforce contractual covenants 
is partly a function of the probability of opportunistic behaviour occurring in a 
relationship: The greater the probability of particular types of opportunism, the 
greater the need for monitoring and controlling that behaviour, and thus the more 
likely particular covenants will be included in the contract.
Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), most of research on formal contract
agreements has been based on principal-agency approach. For example, 
Holmstrom (1979) assumes that the agent’s effort is unobservable to the principal, 
and the optimal incentive contract ensures that the agent puts in enough effort by 
making the agent’s compensation dependent on the outcome of the signals. In the 
context of a financing problem, the signal is typically output or profits. Harris and 
Raviv (1979) show that with a risk-neutral principal and agent, and no wealth 
constraints, the optimal financing contract is to give a fixed payment to the 
investor and make the manager the residual claimant. These theories stress the 
importance of providing monetary incentives or cash flow rights to the 
entrepreneur, and ownership is relevant only as it affects pure cash-flow rights.
Whereas the research described above analyzes general financial contracts, a 
number of other papers focus specifically on venture capital contracts. Previous 
venture capital contracting papers may be categorized into two groups, namely, 
empirical research indicating the prevalent use of convertible preferred equity, 
staging finance, syndication, and various control rights, etc. (Sahlman, 1990; 
Lemer, 1994; Gompers, 1995, 1997; Bergmann and Hege, 1998; Gompers and 
Lemer, 1999; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2002); (2) Theoretical research explaining 
the optimality of convertible preferred equity in venture capital, and the allocation 
of various control rights (Sahlman, 1990; Chan, et al., 1990; Berglof, 1994; 
Comelli and Yosha, 1997; Hellmann, 1998; Marx, 1998; Trester, 1998; Bergmann 
and Hege, 1998; Repullo and Suarez, 1998; Bascha and Walz, 2001a; Houben, 
2001; Kirilenko, 2001; Schmidt, 2001; among others).
Summarising the previous research on venture capital contracts, the following 
findings were obtained:
First, a key feature of venture capital contracts is that they allow venture capitals
to separately allocate cash flow rights, voting rights, board rights, liquidation 
rights, and other control rights (Lemer, 1994; Gompers, 1995, 1997; Bergmann 
and Hege, 1998; Gompers and Lemer, 1999). The allocation of control rights 
between the venture capital and the entrepreneur is a central feature of the 
financial contracts. This strongly suggests that, despite the prevalence of 
contingent contracting, contracts are inherently incomplete. This finding gives 
support to the incomplete-contracting approach pioneered by Grossman and Hart 
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990,1998).
Second, convertible securities are used most frequently in venture capital 
contracts (Gompers, 1995, 1997; Bergmann and Hege, 1998; Gompers and Lemer, 
1999; Kaplan and StrOmberg, 2002). Contracts have demonstrated a preference for 
convertible securities rather than short-term secured credit, the paradigmatic 
financial security held by banks (Kaplan and Stromberg, 1999; Sahlman, 1990). 
This contrast is relatively easy to explain. In most countries, including US, Banks 
are prevented by law from holding equity interests (US CODE: Title 12, Chapter 
24 (7)). High-technology start-ups have low liquidation values and volatile going 
concern values that compel them to offer equity-linked securities to their investors. 
Venture capitals also implement the same set of rights using combinations of 
multiple classes of common stock and straight preferred stock.
Third, cash flow rights, voting rights, and control rights are frequently 
contingent on observable and verifiable measures of financial and non-financial 
performance (Bergmann and Hege, 1998; Repullo and Suarez, 1998; Bascha and 
Walz, 2001a; Houben, 2001; Kirilenko, 2001; Schmidt, 2001). These rights are 
allocated such that, if the company performs poorly, the venture capitalist obtains 
full control. As company performance improves, the entrepreneur retains/obtains 
more control rights. If the company performs very well, the venture capitalist
retains their cash-flow rights but relinquish most of their control and liquidation 
rights. Ex ante, the investors are likely to be in control in more states of the world 
for early-stage ventures that have not yet started to generate revenues, while 
previously successful entrepreneurs get to retain more control in their new 
ventures. This is most supportive of theories that predict shifts of control to 
investors in different states, such as Phillippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1992) 
and Matthias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole (1994).
Fourth, one of key characteristics in venture capital financing are staging the 
commitment of capital and preserving the option to abandon the project. Instead of 
providing all the necessary capital upfront, venture capitalists invest in stages to 
keep the project under control. Staged investment allows venture capitalists to 
monitor the firm before they make refinancing decisions. The information about 
the viability of a project acquired through such monitoring helps venture 
capitalists to avoid throwing money at bad projects. It reduces losses from 
inefficient continuation and creates an exit option for venture capitalists. Further, 
by monitoring and credibly threatening termination, venture capitalists also have 
better control over potential moral hazards. Gompers (1995) provides an empirical 
study on the factors affecting the structure of staged financing when moral hazard 
exists. He shows that in financing high-risk companies with pervasive moral 
hazards, staged financing allows venture capitalists to gather information and to 
monitor the progress of projects while maintaining the option to quit.
Fifth, in line with the holdup problem explored in Hart and Moore (1994), 
venture capital contracts normally include non-compete and vesting provisions 
that make it more expensive for the entrepreneur to leave the firm, thus mitigating 
the potential holdup problem between the entrepreneur and the investor.
Taken together, these studies suggest that, like all investors, venture capital firms 
structure financial contracts (i.e. the allocation of cash flow and control rights) 
between the entrepreneur and investor to provide incentives for the entrepreneur to 
behave appropriately. These contractual arrangements specify the rights and 
obligations of both managers and venture capitalists throughout their entire 
relationship in a series of covenants (Fiet, 1991). There are some special venture 
capital features: (1) separately allocate control rights, (2) frequently use 
convertible securities, (3) control rights are usually contingent on observable and 
verifiable measures, (4) staging the commitment of capital, and (5) generally 
include non-compete and vesting provisions.
2.3.2.2 Formal Monitoring in China
The current literature on venture capital generally assumes a strong institutional 
environment: namely mature market intermediate institutions, friendly government 
regulations, and an independent judicial system. However, these conditions are 
normally not satisfied in developing countries (Zeng, 2004). There is no rigorous 
empirical research on venture capital formal monitoring in China so far, while a 
number of researchers did argue that China’s formal institutional constraints such 
as laws and regulations are relatively weak compared to Western countries and the 
effect of formal monitoring may be subdued (Bruton et al. ,2004; Zeng, 2004).
2.3.2.3 Informal Monitoring
Unlike investors in listed companies, venture capital firms are also quasi-insiders 
in a firm with concentrated ownership. With their specialist skills and significant 
equity block holding, they have both the skills and incentives to become active 
investors (Wright and Robbie, 1998) which include exerting costly effort to 
improve outcomes (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001). No contract between an 
entrepreneur and a venture capitalist can anticipate every possible disagreement or
conflict. Partly for this reason, the venture capitalist typically plays a role in the 
operation of the company and monitors portfolio firms informally, which helps to 
protect the interest of the venture capital firm, ameliorate the problems of 
information asymmetry and increases the likelihood of higher returns on 
investment (Sahlman, 1990).
Board membership and frequent board meetings Kaplan and Stromberg (2001) 
argued that board membership and frequent board meetings can be important 
means by which venture capital firms can exercise control and influence on 
investees apart from formal contract control. Lemer (1995) analyzed 271 venture 
capital-backed biotechnology firms finding that venture capitalists representation 
on the board of directors increased around the time of the chief executive officer's 
turnover, while the number of other outsiders remained constant. Lemer (1995) 
argued board membership may be important to gain greater access to management 
information and to effect closer monitoring of management.
Regular meeting with entrepreneur Regular meetings with the entrepreneur can 
be another important way by which venture capital firm can monitor portfolio 
companies informally. Gorman and Sahlman (1989) found that lead venture 
investors visit each portfolio company an average of 19 times per year, and spend 
100 hours in direct contact (on site or by phone) with the company. Since each 
venture capitalist in the survey is responsible for almost nine investments and sits 
on five boards of directors, the allocation of time to each portfolio company is 
considerable (MacMillan et al., 1989; and Timmons, 1987). Gomez-Mejia (1990) 
noted that many venture capitalists use informal meetings because it provides an 
important chance for exchange of information between two parties.
Taken together, venture capitalists sit on boards of directors, hold full board
meetings, and regularly meet with entrepreneurs. They are sometimes also willing 
to take over day-to-day operations themselves. All of these activities are designed 
to increase the likelihood of success and improve return on investment: they also 
protect the interests of the venture capital firms and ameliorate the information 
asymmetry.
2.3.2A Informal Monitoring in China
Bruton et al. (2004) found venture capital monitoring in China is done much 
more informally via personal interactions with the entrepreneur. Some of the 
informal monitoring approaches used in the West are relevant, while other 
different circumstances and practices in China compel venture capitalists to 
monitor investments differently, specifically focusing on building a relationship 
with the entrepreneur for which the project is funded.
Board membership and frequent board meetings In Western countries, venture 
capitalists typically conduct their monitoring activities through a membership on 
the firm’s board of directors (Sapienza, 1992; Fiet, 1995; Bruton and Ahlstrom, 
2003). However, Low (2002) found that venture capitalists do not always have a 
board seat in China and even if they do obtain a board seat, it typically does not 
provide them with the same benefits they enjoy in the West. Furthermore, Bruton 
et al. (2004) note that, in China, information is often withheld from the board and 
the influence of outside directors remains weak. In addition, Bruton et al. (2004) 
quote several venture capitalists who have invested in China and report that it is 
not uncommon for the minutes of board meetings to be written before the meeting 
has actually started, complete with ready-made quotes from that venture capitalist.
Regular meeting with entrepreneur Frequent interaction with the firm is a typical 
requirement for venture capital monitoring in West. When monitoring a funded
firm in China, venture capitalists must be even more diligent. Venture capitalists 
are well advised to build an extensive Guanxi that will allow them to acquire the 
information they need to monitor the entrepreneur (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003; 
Pukthuanthong and Walker, 2007). A close personal relationship with the 
entrepreneur and gaining the entrepreneur’s trust is the key for informal 
monitoring. Once they have developed such a relationship, they are much more 
likely to obtain the information they require and can feel more assured that the 
information is indeed accurate. Such trust between the funded firm and the venture 
capitalist is consistent with the nature of communication between parties in 
Chinese culture. In this cultural setting there are typically clear insiders and 
outsiders (Goa, Ting-Tooney, and Gundykunst, 1996), and the flow of information 
to outsiders is severely restricted.
Taken together, since some of the traditional means to monitor the funded firm 
in mature economies such as formal contract and board membership may provide 
fewer insights in China, venture capitalists are advised to frequent meet with 
entrepreneurs and build a closer Guanxi with them.
Conclusions from Research on Monitoring for Ventures in Venture 
Capital
The previous studies indicate that venture capital firms attempt to mitigate 
principal-agent conflicts in two ways suggested by theory: through sophisticated 
formal contracting and close informal monitoring. In formal contract, venture 
capitalists allocate rights in order to facilitate monitoring and minimize the impact 
of the identified risk factors (e.g. by allocating more control to investors when 
management is weak) or make founder cash-flow rights and release of funds 
contingent on management actions. After signing the formal contract, venture
capital firms informally monitor their portfolio companies very closely to increase 
the likelihood of success and improve return on investment.
However, monitoring in China proved to be even bigger challenge for venture 
capitalists. Firstly, formal contracting may be subdued as its eventual enforcement 
is often difficult in the fact of underdeveloped regulatory institutions, a 
comparatively weak court system, and insufficient commercial code. Secondly, 
informal monitoring has to be more active due to the different circumstances and 
practices in China. Venture capitalists are advised to meet with entrepreneurs 
frequently and develop a high level of trust between venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs.
2.3.3 Venture capital value-added
In the research on the value-added provided by venture capitalists for their 
portfolio companies, two streams can be identified: (1) different types of 
value-added provided by venture capitalists, and (2) factors influencing the 
value-added. In the first stream focusing on the forms of value-added, surveys and 
other primary data are often employed in order to understand what is really 
happening in the relationships. The second stream also relies primarily on surveys.
2.3.3.1 Different Type of Value-added Provided by Venture Capital
In one of the earliest studies examining the nature of value-added support 
provided by independent venture capitalists, Gorman and Sahlman (1989) 
analyzed 49 venture capitalists and documented a ranked order of the forms of 
assistance as follows: (1) help with obtaining additional financing, (2) strategic 
planning, (3) management recruitment, (4) operational planning, (5) introductions 
to potential customers and suppliers, and (6) resolving compensation issues.
In another early study examining the nature of venture capital value-added, 
MacMillan et al. (1988) analyzed 62 venture capitalists and reported that activities 
attracting the highest degree of venture capitalists involvement were: (1) serving 
as a sounding board to the entrepreneur team, (2) helping the firm obtain 
alternative further sources of equity financing, (3) interfacing with the investor 
group, (4) monitoring financial performance, (5) monitoring operating 
performance, and (6) helping their portfolio firms attract alternative sources of 
debt financing. Rosenstein et al. (1989, 1993) have also examined the 
contributions of venture capitalists in the boards of high technology companies. 
They surveyed 162 high tech firms asking about the same potential categories of 
value-added as MacMillan et al. (1988) and found that contributions of venture 
capitalists as a group did not differ significantly from other board members. 
However, the advice from the board members of the top-20 venture capital firms 
was valued higher than the advice from other board members or venture capital 
firms not in the top-20 (Rosenstein et al. 1993). They also found that the areas 
where CEOs rated outside board members (both venture capitalists and others) as 
most helpful were in their roles as a sounding board, interfacing with the investor 
groups, monitoring operating performance, recruiting/replacing the CEO, and 
assistance with short-term crisis. The help was rated higher for early stage 
companies than for late-stage companies.
Sapienza et al. (1994) analyzed the differences in the value-added between 
venture capitalists in UK, France, and the Netherlands in addition to the United 
States. Corresponding to the findings of U.S. research, they found that strategic 
roles were viewed as the most important roles by venture capitalists, followed next 
by interpersonal roles and finally by operational roles. The order was the same in 
all countries. Continuing the comparisons between United Kingdom, France, the 
Netherlands and the United States, Sapienza et al. (1996) found, consistent with
prior research, that of the three main value-adding roles (strategic, interpersonal, 
and networking), venture capitalists viewed strategic involvement (providing 
financial and business advice and acting as a sounding board) as their most 
important value-added role. Interpersonal roles (acting as a mentor or a confidant 
to the CEO) were evaluated as being the second most important in value. 
Networking roles (i.e. contacts to other firms and professionals) were the third 
most important. Sapienza et al. (1996) found that these ratings were consistent 
across the countries. Overall, venture capitalists were most involved and provided 
the highest value-added in the United States and United Kingdom.
Examining the various value-added roles of venture capitalists using a 
case-based approach, Steier and Greenwood (1995) carried out an in-depth 
longitudinal case study of the venture capital financings of a single venture. They 
found that social endorsement from the first investor superseded business plans in 
attracting additional financing from new investors. Venture capitalists provided 
considerable value-added to the entrepreneurial firm giving knowledge, expertise, 
and experience, as well as funding, to the enterprise. Fried and Hisrich (1995) also 
employed case methodology in order to create understanding of the relationships 
of entrepreneurs and their venture capitalists. Based on their interviews of 14 
venture-capital financed start-ups, they identified seven areas where venture 
capital had influence: money, operating services, networks, image, moral support, 
general business knowledge, and discipline.
Examining the role of venture capitalists certifying the quality of their portfolio 
companies, Seppa and Maula (2001) employed data from 2,327 venture capital 
investments in U.S. information and communications technology companies 
between 1982 -  2000 and found that despite the fact that top venture capitalists are 
hard to get and require large discounts, prominence of the venture capitalists was
strongly related to future value creation supporting the certifying hypothesis.
Taken together, these studies suggest that venture capital investors add value 
primarily by advising ventures and by employing their contact network and 
reputation to open doors for the entrepreneurs.
2.3.3.2 Factors Influencing Value Creation for Ventures in Venture 
Capital
There are several streams of research examining the factors influencing 
value-added in venture capital. For instance, Sapienza (1992) surveyed 51 venture 
capitalist-CEO dyads in order to create understanding of when venture capitalists 
add value and whether the value-added influences performance. He found that the 
greater the innovation pursued by the venture, the more frequent the contact, and 
the more open the communication, the greater was the value of the involvement. 
Replicating these results in Europe, Sapienza et al. (1994) found that 
corresponding to the findings of U.S. research, European venture capitalists spent 
more time and communicated more frequently with highly innovative ventures and 
early stage ventures. Surprisingly, CEO experience had a positive rather than 
negative influence on the amount of working hours or frequency of contact. 
Elango et al. (1995) also examined the amount of value-added provided by venture 
capitalists and the factors influencing it in their analysis of 149 venture capitalists. 
They found that the amount of assistance was not strongly related to the target 
stage of the venture capital firm. Active venture capitalists viewed their 
involvement as more important. Landstrom (1990), in his study of the Swedish 
venture capital backed firms, also concluded that hands-on involvement appeared 
to be related to better performance of the ventures.
Some studies have focused on the boards of venture capital backed companies
(Fried et al. 1998, Fredriksen and Klofsten 1999). For instance, Fried et al. (1998) 
analyzed 68 venture capital firms finding that venture capital representation on the 
board was positively related to board involvement with firm strategy. Fredriksen 
and Klofsten (1999) surveyed 41 venture capital backed companies finding that 
firms had better performance where the power over decision-making was equally 
distributed between the CEO and the board. Openness and trust in the relations 
between the CEO and the board were posited to have a positive influence on 
performance.
Applying agency theory, Sapienza and Gupta (1994) examined 51 venture 
capitalist-entrepreneur dyads and found that the frequency of interaction was 
shown to depend on the extent of venture capitalist goal congruence, the degree of 
the CEO’s new venture experience, the venture's stage of development, and the 
degree of technical innovation pursued by the venture. However, the degree of 
management ownership had no impact on the frequency of interaction.
Sapienza and Korsgaard (1996) examined venture capital value-added from the 
procedural justice perspective. They carried out a simulation with 44 graduate 
students and administered a survey answered by 118 U.S. venture capital firms. 
Corresponding to the procedural justice theory-based hypotheses, timely feedback 
was found to be important in promoting positive relations between investors and 
entrepreneurs. In another study examining the influence of procedural justice on 
the relationships between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, Busenitz et al. 
(1998) analyzed 201 venture capital backed firms in the United States and found 
that the use of covenants and the background of the new venture team influenced 
the perceived procedural justice in investor relationships.
In a study examining the receptiveness of entrepreneurs for advice from venture
capitalists, Barney et al. (1996) analyzed 205 venture capital backed firms and 
found systematic differences among new venture teams in their evaluation of 
learning assistance from venture capitalists. New venture teams with more 
industry experience and longer team tenure in the current venture were negatively 
related to both business management advice and operational assistance offered by 
their venture capitalists. When a new venture team had previously worked together 
and its primary experience is from another industry, the new venture teams tended 
to welcome business management advice from its venture capitalist. Business 
management advice was not highly valued by new venture teams that pursued 
more technical innovations. Barney et al. (1996) found that current performance 
was not related to a new venture team's evaluation of venture capital assistance. 
They concluded that an optimal level of involvement by venture capitalists was 
contingent on the new venture team's openness to learning.
Higashide and Birley (2002) surveyed 80 venture capitalists about their portfolio 
companies. Controlling for the agency risk and business risk explanations, they 
examined the role of cognitive conflict between the venture and the investors on 
the venture performance. In support of their hypotheses, they found that cognitive 
goal conflict (disagreement) was positively related to venture performance while 
affective goal conflict (as personal friction) was negatively related to venture 
performance. Contrary to their expectations, the level of involvement was 
negatively related to venture performance. They concluded that the problem might 
be in the causality, so that the more troubled the venture, the more venture 
capitalists have to get involved. In another study, Higashide and Birley (2000) 
examined the same sample from another perspective and found that the quality of 
information being exchanged between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs was 
positively related to venture performance. In support of their hypotheses, they also 
found that the venture capitalist continuance commitment was negatively, and
venture capitalist affective commitment was positively, related to venture 
performance.
Taken together, these studies suggest some factors that may influence the 
value-added provided by venture capital investors. Related to the venture 
characteristics, this research suggests that the younger, less experienced, and 
riskier the venture is, the more it receives attention from the venture capitalist. 
Related to the relationship characteristics, the reviewed research suggests that the 
closer and the more open the relationship is between the venture and the investor, 
the more the venture benefits from hands-on involvement.
2.3.3.3 Value-added in China
Chinese firms have major incentives to access resource and knowledge and to 
convert them into effective capabilities. Given their relatively resource-poor 
conditions, Chinese firms, especially technology-based firms, must access 
resource and learn knowledge continuously in order to survive in their new 
competitive environments (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000; Dawar and Frost, 1999; 
Manikutty, 2000; Prahalad and Lieberthal, 1998). As China’s market is becoming 
more open, foreign entrants bring their often considerable skills to the competition. 
Thus, Chinese firms must develop strong and new capabilities to survive. In 
addition, many Chinese firms also desire to move into markets outside their home 
country. In other words, they desire to build capabilities that allow them to 
compete in global markets, including other emerging markets and eventually in 
developed markets. To do so often requires that they develop sophisticated 
managerial and technological capabilities that will allow them to compete 
effectively in these markets. Venture capital firms provide opportunities for them 
to access the needed resource and knowledge. In other words, Chinese firms can 
achieve a strategic advantage if they access complementary resource and
knowledge and create new value to improve their capabilities. In short, there is an 
increased demand for venture capital value added in China.
However, there is little mention of value-added in previous research on China’s 
venture capital industry. The main reason is that the early venture capital investors 
were generally passive investors and provided little or no advisory services in 
addition to their capital (White et al., 2002). Even early foreign venture capital 
investment tended to be made by China experts rather than venture capital experts. 
As a result, both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are still learning how to add 
value into their funded companies. Only recently, Chinese entrepreneurs are 
slowly getting accustomed to the fact that an outside investor would want to get so 
involved in their firms, and managers still seldom seek strategic input from 
venture capitalists. However, the need for their guidance may be greater than in 
comparable situations in the West. Venture capitalists are also very keen to 
reinvent their value-added techniques in Chinese business setting (Ahlstrom et al., 
2007).
Nevertheless, all the previous research has emphasised the critical role of Guanxi 
and the need for different approaches to providing value-added to the funded firms. 
In Western countries, advice provided to CEOs of funded firms can be very direct 
and may occur in regular interactions (Fried and Hisrich, 1995). However, in 
China, when there is a need for managerial input, one of the keys in such situations 
is to allow managers the opportunity to maintain “face” or respect (Ahlstrom et al., 
2007). Thus, closer Guanxi is essential to providing the value-added to the funded 
firm. Better Guanxi can mediate the conflicts between venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs and smooth the progress of value-added.
Taken together, although there is only very limited research regarding venture
capital valued-added in China. All of this research suggests that a close and good 
Guanxi is crucial for effective value-added in China.
Conclusions from Research on Value added for Ventures in Venture 
Capital
Many previous studies have found differences and also identified mechanisms 
through which venture capitalists add value to ventures. The most important forms 
of value-added by venture capital investors can be synthesized to be in arranging 
additional financing, supporting strategy making, and recruiting key executives.
Regarding the factors influencing the value-added mechanisms, it has been 
found that a close relationship is an important factor influencing the extent of 
value-added delivered by venture capitalists. In line with similar research on 
Western countries, previous research found that Guanxi plays a critical role to 
providing value-added to the funded firms in China.
2.4 Applicability of the Theoretical Approaches to 
the Present Study
The present study will therefore develop a multi-theoretic framework of the 
mechanisms of monitoring and value-added in inter-organizational relationships 
and of the key factors, namely Guanxi and complementarities, influencing those 
mechanisms. The integrative use of several theories in building the models is 
justified by numerous studies suggesting that a multi-theoretic approach is 
required to understand the complexity of inter-organizational relationships (Gulati, 
1998; Osborn and Hagedoom, 1997; Park et al., 2001; Smith et al., 1995:19). We 
believe that the relationships between technology-based companies and their 
venture capital investors with a mix of strategic and financial objectives are by no
means less complex than other potential inter-organizational relationships and thus 
require ideas from several theories to be properly understood. In this study, we 
build the models applying primarily the institutional view, agency theory, 
asymmetric information theory, resource-based view, and the social capital theory. 
All these theoretical approaches has been explained in Chapter one in more detail. 
Next chapter will present the models and hypotheses.
CHAPTER 3 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, models and hypotheses on the influence of China’s venture 
capital on the performance of technology-based firms are developed on the basis 
of key insights gained from the literature review. In the first section, the various 
potential forms of monitoring and value-added are synthesized to a simple and 
testable framework of monitoring and value-added mechanisms. The first section 
argues that venture capital firms monitor technology-based companies mainly in 
two forms: formal monitoring and informal monitoring and provide value-added 
mainly in two forms: resource access and knowledge access. The second section 
develops a model and hypotheses on factors influencing these mechanisms.
3.2 Monitoring Mechanisms
As discussed earlier, uncertainty and informational asymmetries often 
characterize technology-based firms and there is the need for monitoring to 
address the agency problem faced by venture capital investors to reduce 
asymmetric information and constrain opportunistic behaviour by firms’ managers. 
Previous research on the forms of monitoring was reviewed in Chapter 2. In this 
section, we develop hypotheses on two specific theoretically and empirically 
grounded monitoring mechanisms that are hypothesized to account for the 
majority of the supervision provided by venture capital firms. The two forms of 
monitoring mechanisms are (1) formal monitoring, and (2) informal monitoring. 
Formal monitoring refers to the specified contractual conditions. Informal 
mechanisms include all the monitoring activities that are not clearly codified in a 
formal contract (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995). Formal and informal
monitoring are all hypothesized to be positively related to the accuracy and 
adequacy of perceived information form portfolio companies, which is the direct 
intention of monitoring. These two forms of monitoring are hypothesized to 
account for all the monitoring provided by venture capital firms. These forms of 
monitoring and the related hypotheses are discussed more thoroughly in the 
following section. The model on the value-added mechanisms is illustrated in 
Figure 3-1.
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Figure 3-1 Model o f the Monitoring
3.2.1 Formal Monitoring and Perceived Information
Formal monitoring refers to the specified contractual conditions such as 
restriction on management’s actions and requirements for the provision of detailed 
and regular information encoded in a business contract and enterprise’s Articles of 
Association/Corporate Charter. An organization is the nexus of contracts, written 
and unwritten, among owners of factors of production and customers. These 
contracts specify the rights of each agent in the organization, performance criteria 
on which agents are evaluated, and the payoff functions they face (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). To deal with agency risk, venture capital firms typically specify 
contractual conditions that place restrictions on management’s behavior. These 
conditions included restriction on borrowings, restriction on changes in ownership, 
restriction on mergers and acquisition, restriction on capital expenditure and 
acquisitions, and restriction on managers’ appointments (Kaokab and Stromberg,
2001).
Previous literature has identified two primary approaches on contract research: 
the optimal contract approach (Hart, 1995), and the incomplete contract approach 
(Spier, 1992). The first approach relies on the premise that contracts can be 
complete. More comprehensive contracts can be formulated to influence the 
behavior of the agent (Pettit and Singer, 1985). While these contracts specify the 
rights of the contracting parties, stipulation of investee behavior may be more 
difficult. Spier (1992) argued that it is impossible for principal to know all the 
potential outcomes and state all contingent terms in a contract which will eliminate 
all potential agency risks. Similarly, Amihud and Lev (1981) argue that managers 
may take actions that are in their own best interests and not necessarily those of 
shareholders. Previous research on incomplete contract all lead to similar 
conclusions that principal cannot eliminate all the potential agency risks through 
contract restriction alone due to the bounded rationality of economic agents.
To summarize, we first argued that venture capital firms could ease certain 
degree of agency risk involved in venture capital investments by using stringent 
contractual provisions. Subsequently, we introduced some common contractual 
restriction used by venture capital firms. Afterwards, we explained two primary 
approaches on contract research. Finally, we argued that formal monitoring is 
positively related to the accuracy and adequacy of perceived information from 
portfolio companies. Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1. The higher the level o f  formal monitoring applied to Chinese 
portfolio companies, the higher the accuracy and adequacy perceived information 
received by venture capital firms
3.2.2 Informal Monitoring and Perceived Information
Informal mechanisms include all the monitoring activities that are not 
specifically codified in a formal contract, such as residual rights of control that are 
bestowed through ownership and monitoring through personal interactions 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995). As mentioned, stipulation of investee 
behaviour may be more difficult and it is not possible to write a complete contract 
due to the bounded rationality of economic agents. These problems which 
associated with trying to anticipate future contingencies in drawing up the initial 
contract are well documented (Hart, 1995; Sahlman, 1990). Evidence from bank 
monitoring relationships (Citron et al., 1997; Holland, 1994) and venture capital 
firm entrepreneur relationships (Mitchell et al., 1995; Sapienza and Korsgaard, 
1996; Steier and Greenwood, 1995; Sweeting, 1991) both suggest that in order to 
overcome these problems, informal personal relationships or implicit contracts are 
used in addition to formal contracts. Informal personal interactions are viewed as 
complementary to formal contracts as they can help build trust and confidence in 
situations of asymmetric information and uncertainty (Beamish and Banks, 1987).
Furthermore, compared to Western countries, China’s formal institutional 
constraints such as laws and regulations are relatively weak and the effect of 
formal monitoring may be subdued. Therefore, informal monitoring may play a 
more important role in facilitating information exchanges and hence assert a more 
significant impact on monitoring effect. Bruton et al. (2004) find the monitoring is 
done much more through personal interactions with the entrepreneur who founded 
the firm in Eastern Asia.
The institutional regulatory environment can also influence the technology-based 
firm’s behaviour. One of the key aspects of the institutional support framework 
concerns the regulation of financial reporting, which has major implications for
the nature and reliability of the information made available to venture capital firms 
for monitoring purposes. Accounting rules and reporting standards around East 
Asia can deviate significantly from international norms (Broadman, 1999; Low, 
2000; Peng, 2000). Even in those cases where financial information is produced by 
one of the established international accounting firms, there can be considerable 
concerns about the validity of the information presented (Peng, 2000). Therefore, 
building and maintaining relationships, and locating close to the venture are 
paramount to monitor the technology-based firm (Bruton et al., 2004).
To summarize, China’s relatively weaker institutional and contracting 
environment may have made it difficult for investor to use contractual restrictions 
as the sole means by which to solve agency problem efficiently (Zeng, 2004). In 
order to overcome these problems, informal monitoring is used in addition to 
formal contracts. We argued that informal monitoring positively related to the 
accuracy and adequacy of perceived information form technology-based firms 
which are the main object of monitoring. Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2. The higher the level o f  informal monitoring applied to Chinese 
portfolio companies, the higher the accuracy and adequacy o f perceived 
information received by venture capital firms
3.3 Value-adding Mechanisms
In earlier surveys, venture capitalists have been suggested to provide many 
different forms of value-added services for their portfolio companies. Previous 
research on the forms of value-added was reviewed in Chapter 2. In this section, 
we develop hypotheses on two specific theoretical and empirical grounded 
mechanisms of value-added benefits that are hypothesized to account for the 
majority of the value-added provided by venture capital firms. The two forms of
value-added are (1) resource access, and (2) knowledge access. Resource access 
refers to the concrete resources of the venture capital investor start-up company 
accesses to through the investment relationship. Knowledge access refers to the 
venture capital firms’ various knowledge portfolio company accessed through the 
investment relationship. Resource access and knowledge access are all 
hypothesized to be positively related to the value-added activities and are 
hypothesized to account for most of the value-added provided. These forms of 
value-added and the related hypotheses are discussed more thoroughly in the 
following section. The model on the value-added mechanisms is illustrated in 
Figure 3-2.
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Figure 3-2 Model o f the Value-added
3.3.1 Resource Access and Value-added
Various studies on technology-based firms have argued that technology-based 
firms are highly dependent on their external environment for acquiring the 
necessary resources (Jarillo 1989, Yli-Renko et al. 2001b). The resource 
dependence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) suggests that firms are 
dependent on others but try to reduce their dependence. However, Das and Teng 
(2000) and Park et al. (2001) have argued that inter-organizational relationship is 
established to create added value through combination of complementary 
resources. This proactive logic has been explicated by Dyer and Singh (1998) who
suggested that not only are resources inside the company critical for competitive 
advantage but that non-imitable resources can also be associated with 
inter-organizational relationships instead of, or in addition to, those controlled 
exclusively and internally by the benefiting firm.
In relationships between venture capitalists and technology-based firms, the 
venture capital investor often possesses resources that the venture might be able to 
access through the relationship including distribution channels, production 
facilities, research and development, technology, and input products and services 
at lower cost (Maula et al., 2003). Globally leading venture capital have typically 
developed broad links with product distributors and research centres spanning 
several markets, which is rarely the case for small technology-based firms (Almus 
et al., 1999). Similarly, technology-based firms are often superior in developing 
technology and new products but inferior in putting the product in large-scale 
production (Teece 1986). Access to resources of venture capital would therefore 
be valuable for scaling up the production in many industries.
To summarize, we first argued that technology-based firms could build their 
competitive advantage not only on the basis of the resources they control 
themselves, but additionally on the basis of resources available through 
relationships with venture capital investors. Thereafter, we suggested several 
forms of potentially valuable, resources of venture capital that a start-up company 
may potentially be able to access through an investment relationship. Finally, we 
argued that the resource access is positively related to value-added. Therefore, we 
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3. the higher the level o f  resource Chinese portfolio companies can 
access though the venture capital investment relationship, the higher the value 
venture capital firm can add on their portfolio companies
3.3.2 Knowledge Access and Value-added
A wide body of literature has examined knowledge access in inter-organizational 
relationships between firms (Forrest and Martin, 1994; Lang, 1996; Shan et al., 
1994; Yli-Renko et al., 2001a). While there appears to be few empirical research 
focusing on the value of knowledge access by technology-based firms from their 
venture capital investors, the existence of learning benefits in venture capital 
investments has been suggested in previous research on venture capital (Dube, 
2000:49; Kelley and Spinelli, 2001; Maula and Murray, 2000; Maula et al., 2001).
The premise for the creation of value through knowledge access is the existence 
of knowledge. There are good reasons to believe that venture capital firms often 
possess non-redundant knowledge that might be valuable for technology-based 
firms. While technology-based firms typically focus on some specific 
technological area and are very knowledgeable about the specific technology, 
venture capital firms often have more experience and a broader view (Brander, 
Amit, Antweiler, 2002). There are various potential areas of knowledge often 
possessed by venture capital that would be non-redundant and valuable for 
technology-based firms should they gain access via relationship with their venture 
capital investors.
Knowledge is the base of firm capabilities and thus, to develop capabilities, 
firms must acquire the appropriate knowledge stocks and integrate them. 
Manufacturing capabilities often require specific types and levels of technological 
knowledge, for example. Marketing capabilities require knowledge of markets and
consumer behaviour as well as promotional activities. Firms in all markets must 
regularly search for and acquire knowledge to continuously reconfigure their 
resource portfolio and build new capabilities in order to remain competitive in 
dynamic markets (Sirmon et al., 2005).
For instance, leading venture capital typically creates very detailed, strategic 
‘road maps’ as to how they see individual technologies and their market potential 
developing over time (Maula et al., 2001). This intelligence can be of major value 
to the young firm starting or expanding its sales activities. Thus, access to 
complementary, strategic information from the venture capital may generate major 
savings in cost and, critically, time.
Technology-based firms are also often predominantly focused on their 
technologies and products. However, they can sometimes lack a broader 
perspective on the market and customer needs (Van Auken, 2004; Rosenstein, 
1988). On the other hand, venture capital firms spend large amounts of money on 
their market research and operate nationally or even globally. From their existing 
customer relationships, they have a different and deeper understanding of the 
market needs than a start-up developing a product for future markets. Access to 
the market understanding of the venture capital firms may be invaluable for a 
technology-based firm.
Venture capital firms can also provide their portfolio companies with relevant 
information on competition (Maula et al., 2001). Whereas technology-based firms 
are focused on their product development, they often have fewer resources for 
competitor intelligence. Many start-ups also try to avoid publicity until they are 
ready to launch their products. Venture capital firms often put large resources into 
competitive intelligence. They understand where other manufactories are trying to
position themselves in their markets. Access to this kind of information on the 
competitive situation may be valuable for technology-based firms.
To summarize the above discussion, we first argued the importance of 
knowledge for the sustainable competitive advantage of the technology-based firm. 
Thereafter, we described several areas of knowledge, which venture capital firms 
typically possess, and which can be valuable for technology-based new firms. 
Finally, we argued that knowledge access is positively related to value-added. 
Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4. the higher level o f  knowledge Chinese portfolio companies can 
access though the venture capital investment relationship, the more value venture 
capital firm can add to their portfolio companies
3.4 Model on the Role of Complementarities in 
Monitoring and Value-added
In this section, a model is developed to describe the factors influencing the 
monitoring and value-added mechanisms. This model focuses on the factors 
influencing the incentives of the portfolio companies to cooperate with their 
venture capital investors. This model is illustrated in Figure 3-3 and described in 
the following sections.
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Figure 3-3 Model o f  the Value-added
3.4.1 Complementarities and Guanxi
While it has been recognized in earlier research that Guanxi can facilitate 
monitoring, and aid access to resources and knowledge (Ahlstrom et al., 2007), it 
is not fully understood what role Guanxi plays in an inter-organizational 
relationships and greater understanding is needed to explain the role of Guanxi.
In this study, we argue that expected economic benefits from collaboration are 
an important factor determining the willingness of technology-based firms to form 
a partnership with venture capital, and also the motivation for venture capital 
investors to enter in an inter-organizational relationship and devote time for 
start-up management.
Contributing to the literature on the influence of complementarities on partner 
formation, Doz (1988) observed that the complementarities between partnering
firms were typically clear prior to the negotiations on the terms of contract. It was 
the existence of complementarities that brought the potential alliance partners 
together in the first place. Similarly, Shan and Hamilton (1991) found support for 
the important role of complementarities in forming strategic alliances in the 
biotechnology industry. Nohria and Garcia-Pont (1991) reported that in the global 
automobile industry, firms in certain strategic groups formed alliances in a 
complementary manner with firms in other strategic groups in order to increase the 
benefits of cooperation. Supporting the importance of complementarities in partner 
formation, Gulati (1995b) found that firms occupying complementary resources 
had higher likelihood of forming alliances. Hitt et al. (2000) examined 202 
companies in developed and emerging market countries and compared the factors 
affecting their alliance partner selection. They concluded that firms both in 
emerging and developed markets consider complementary resources as a valuable 
determinant in their partner selection and the form of partnership. The ‘Terms of 
Alliance’ is the settlement of differences in which each side makes concessions. 
We argued that once venture capital and technology-based firms realise they could 
create better value by combining their complementary resources and capabilities 
through the relationship, both parties will be willing to collaborate and maintain a 
close Guanxi.
The resource-based views regard complementarities in resources and capabilities 
as the primary reason for firms entering into inter-organizational relationships 
(Chung et al., 2000; Das and Teng, 2000; Hitt et al., 2000). Closely related to the 
context of the present study, Teece (1986) argued that firms in high-growth 
industries have to form alliances with other firms with complementary capabilities 
to ensure timely product introduction and to marshal a full array of the required 
capabilities. Furthermore, complementarities have been found to influence both 
the formation of inter-organizational relationships (Chung et al., 2000; Doz, 1988,
1996; Gulati, 1995b; Hitt et al., 2000; Niederkofler, 1991; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 
1991; Shan and Hamilton, 1991) and their performance (Harrigan, 1985; Johnson 
et al., 1996; Sarkar et al., 2001).
The resource-based views have also been used to explain the partners’ incentives 
and willingness to invest in the relationship. Supporting the role of economic 
motivation for successful collaboration, Park and Ungson (1997) found in their 
event history analysis of 186 joint ventures that opportunistic threat and rivalry 
were positively related to the dissolution of joint ventures. Similarly, Larson (1992) 
conducted case analyses of seven alliances of entrepreneurial firms and found that 
economic incentives and mutually beneficial strategic rewards were a necessary 
condition for the effective development of an exchange relationship.
Summarising the arguments derived from the above-described literature, it can 
be concluded that they all lead to similar conclusions regarding the relationship 
between technology-based and venture capital frims and the incentives to form the 
partnership or to engage in close Guanxi. Synthesizing these arguments leads to 
the hypothesis that complementarities create incentives for collaboration and 
promote motivation for Guanxi both before and after signing a contract. Therefore, 
we argued that complementarities are positively related to Guanxi before and after 
signing a contract in China. Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5. (A) The greater the complementarities between the venture capital
firm and the portfolio company, the closer the Guanxi between the two companies 
before signing a contract.
Hypothesis 5. (B) The greater the complementarities between the venture capital
firm and the portfolio company, the closer the Guanxi between the two companies 
after signing a contract.
3.4.2 Complementarities and Formal / Informal Monitoring
The previous section has argued that the expected economic benefits from 
collaboration are an important factor determining the willingness of portfolio 
companies to collaborate that includes making more concessions on deal 
negotiation and accept more rigorous monitoring requirement. Hsu (2004) 
evaluated the value of venture capital firm’s reputation, and showed that reputable 
venture capital funds negotiate better deal terms, i.e. lower valuations. The author 
confirmed the proposition that entrepreneurs are willing to accept more rigorous 
terms in order to form a partnership with venture capital firm with better 
reputations. This implies that venture capital firms’ complementary resources may 
be more distinctive than their financial capital and have significant impact on deal 
negotiation—formal monitoring. Therefore, we argued that complementarities 
are positively related to formal monitoring:
Hypothesis 6. The greater the complementarities between the venture capital 
investor and the portfolio company, the more formal monitoring requirement is 
applied by venture capital investor.
Similarly, we argued that the expectation of reciprocal benefits through 
combining complementary resources collaboratively from collaboration may 
enhance the portfolio companies’ willingness to accept more informal monitoring 
requirement from venture capital investors. Thus:
Hypothesis 7. The greater the complementarities between the venture capital 
investor and the portfolio company, the more informal monitoring requirement is 
applied by venture capital investor.
3.4.3 Complementarities and Resource Access/Knowledge 
Access
The combination of complementary resources is a significant potential source of 
inter-organizational competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh 1998). Previous 
literature has argued that complementary resources are one of the primary reasons 
for firms to enter inter-organizational relationships. Central to this argument is the 
idea that complementarities create the potential for value creation through 
combination of complementary resources. After forming a relationship with a 
partner possessing complementary resources, it is likely that some of the 
complementary resources will be combined (Larsson and Finkelstein 1999). 
Therefore, we argued that complementarities are positively related to resource 
access:
Hypothesis 8. The greater the complementarities between the venture capital 
investor and the portfolio company, the greater resources access for the portfolio 
company
Another important factor that can determine the incentive for seeking venture 
capital investment is the complementarity of their knowledge bases. Learning 
crystallizes when the new knowledge encourages the entrepreneur to re-examine 
its assumptions, combine the new knowledge with existing ones, or modify its 
procedures and practices (Zahra et al., 2000). Greater opportunities to acquire, 
understand and assimilate new knowledge exist when entrepreneur complement 
rather than substitute their existing knowledge (Hoskisson and Busenitz, 2001). If
the venture capital firm has the complementary knowledge, entrepreneur definitely 
would like to access and exploit the complementarities. This can facilitate new 
product and process developments that improve profitability and growth (Block 
and MacMillan, 1993). Therefore, we argued that complementarities are positively 
related to knowledge access:
Hypothesis 9. The greater the complementarities between the venture capital 
investor and the portfolio company, the greater knowledge access for the portfolio 
company
3.5 The Role of Guanxi as a Facilitator in Monitoring 
and Value-added
In this section, a model of Guanxi as a facilitator in monitoring and value-added 
mechanisms is developed. Adding to the previously described complementarities 
model, this model focuses on the idea that besides influence of the 
complementarities, Guanxi also influences the monitoring and value-added 
mechanisms. This model is illustrated in Figure 3-4 and described in the following 
sections. We use the Chinese concept of Guanxi to develop this model. However, 
some of hypotheses are primarily consistent with Western literature, particularly in 
venture capital and sociology. In general, previous research has found that most 
models of interpersonal relationships proposed by Western psychologists are also 
applicable to Chinese people (Bond and Hwang 1987, p. 241).
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Figure 3-4 Model o f  Guanxi as a Facilitator
3.5.1 Guanxi and Formal Monitoring
Once a venture is selected for investment, negotiations about the components of 
the deal begin. Previous research found even in the rules-based mature market 
economies with strong property rights enforcement (Zacharakis, 2004; Peng, 
2003), inter-organization and inter-personal relationships have a strong influence 
on contractual term negotiations. In her recent paper focused on venture capital 
relationship in UK, Smith (2005) showed that contract was a combination of 
mutual understanding and legal documentation. Venture capitalists in UK set out 
at least the minimum expected requirements on contract, even they believed it is 
important to have a very friendly relationship from the start which they considered 
to be ‘hands-on’ with a ‘level of trust’ .
In contrast, we argued that in the relationship-based transitional economies 
where the enforcement of property rights are weak (Zacharakis, 2004; Peng, 2003),
inter-organizational and inter-personal relationships have much more significant 
influence on contractual term negotiation. This is because an insistence on 
rigorous contractual covenants that directly protect investors’ interests will send a 
signal of distrust and reduced commitment to the entrepreneurial team (Batjargal 
and Liu, 2004). To convince the entrepreneurial team to accept those contractual 
covenants depends on the willingness and understanding of entrepreneurial team. 
We argue that a better Guanxi between two parties will facilitate the understanding 
of usage of contractual covenants and improve the willingness of entrepreneur to 
accept them. Therefore, the better the Guanxi between the venture capital and 
technology-based firms, the more likely the management team is to accept the 
attached terms and conditions.
To summarize the above discussion, despite the institutional differences, 
previous research on Guanxi and venture capital deal negotiation all lead to a 
similar conclusion, namely those strong ties between entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists before signing a contract influence the usage of contractual covenants. 
Therefore, we argued that Guanxi before signing a contract is positively related to 
formal monitoring:
Hypothesis 10. The closer the Guanxi between the venture capital investor and the 
portfolio company before signing a contract, the greater the level o f  contractual 
restrictions.
3.5.2 Guanxi and Informal Monitoring
As mentioned before, venture capitalists will not legalize all the monitoring 
measures in their formal contract as a compromise of their relationship with the 
investee (Smith, 2005; Peng; 2000; Tsui, 2004; Batjargal, 2004). As a result, 
venture capital firm needs to require much more detailed information than contract
requirement (Smith, 2005) as the complementary formal monitoring mechanism. 
Through informal monitoring activities, venture capital investors can help the 
investee stay on the right track, protect the interest of the venture capital firm, 
ameliorate the problems of information asymmetry and increase the likelihood of 
higher returns on investment (Sahlman, 1990). Informal monitoring is viewed as 
complementary to formal contracts in situations of asymmetric information and 
uncertainty.
In the West, informal monitoring typically involves extensive personal 
interaction with the funded firm. When monitoring a funded firm in China, venture 
capitalists must be even more diligent (Bruton, 2003) because of China’s relatively 
weak institutional environment and problematic enforcement of judgments 
(Lubman, 2001; Peng et al., 2001; Young et al., 2001). As a consequence, the 
cultivation of long-term, reliable Guanxi and the adoption of a Guanxi-oriented 
management style builds the trust that is necessary to conduct business 
transactions and are essential for survival (Redding, 1990). Venture capitalists 
have to rely on Guanxi with the funded firm to aid in the monitoring process 
(Bruton et al., 2002). And better Guanxi facilitates the funded firm’s 
understanding of informal monitoring and increases the willingness of the funded 
firm to accept these requirements.
Furthermore, venture capital investors also expected a “full and frank exchange 
of ‘need to know’ information” for efficient monitoring (Smith, 2005:769). The 
quality of information obtained through these monitoring mechanisms depends on 
the portfolio companies committed to this activity (Harris and Raviv, 1979), and 
the portfolio companies’ committed to monitoring depend on how well the 
relationship is between two parties. If the venture capitalists are to properly 
monitor their investment, they must develop trust with the entrepreneur so that
they obtain the desired information and ensure its accuracy. Good Guanxi 
provided venture capitalists with better access to senior management and other 
important individuals and is likely to lead to fine-tuned, honest, precise, and timely 
information exchanges between the venture team and venture capital firm 
(Batjargal and Liu 2004). Good Guanxi is extremely important when a venture 
capitalist requires information from investees in transitional economies, such as 
China. A less market-oriented systems may also be associated with a lower 
willingness to disclose non-mandatory information (Wright et al 2004). In 
particular, in a Chinese culture setting, there are typically clear insiders and 
outsiders and the flow of information to outsiders is severely restricted (Goa et al., 
1996). When venture capitalists have frequent contact and take time to interact 
with entrepreneurs in a business or social context, trust can be engendered because 
an entrepreneur can observe the venture capitalist’s behaviour across a variety of 
situations. Thus, information obtained in interactions enables an entrepreneur to 
foresee the venture capitalist’s future behaviour with confidence, which fosters 
trust and in turn increases the willingness of the entrepreneur to accept informal 
monitoring. Therefore, we argue that Guanxi is positively related to informal 
monitoring:
Hypothesis 11. The closer the Guanxi between the venture capital investor and the
portfolio company after signing a contract, the more informal monitoring
requirement applied. .
The motivation of informal monitoring is to help the investee stay on the right 
track and improve their performance. Informal monitoring is not a mandatory 
mechanism based on a formal contract. To conduct informal monitoring smoothly 
and efficiently depends on the willingness and understanding of the funded firm, 
which depends on the Guanxi between two parties. In short, deepening Guanxi
enables more efficient informal monitoring.
China is generally recognized as having different cognitive institutions than the 
United States and Western Europe (Orru et al., 1997; Peng, 2000). Chinese culture 
also emphasizes the importance of relationships in business (Boisot and Child, 
1996; Bruton et al., 1999). As the venture capital industry is less regulated and 
established than the banking industry in China, this suggests that Guanxi could be 
even more important in the venture capital industry (Bruton et al., 2002). 
Therefore, we hypothesize that whilst complementarities are the key enabler to the 
willingness of the funded firm to collaborate informal monitoring activities and to 
feed more information to the venture capital investor, that effect is mediated by 
Guanxi.
Hypothesis 12. Guanxi mediates the positive relationship between 
complementarities and informal monitoring.
3.5.3 Formal and informal Monitoring
It has been argued that there exists a strong tie between formal and informal 
monitoring (Smith, 2005; Peng, 2000; Tsui, 2004; Batjargal, 2004). If a portfolio 
company has the willingness to accept more informal monitoring requirement after 
signing a contract, it is likely that the company has accepted more rigorous formal 
monitoring terms in a formal contract. Therefore:
Hypothesis 13. Informal monitoring is positively related to formal monitoring.
3.5.4 Guanxi and Resource Access
Although the complementarities between the venture and the investor create 
potential for value creation through a combination of complementary resources
and the fact that the potential is likely to be exploited in these relationships, there 
is still a lack of understanding as to what facilitates this potential. This study 
argues that Guanxi plays a key role in facilitating the potential benefits from 
complementarities between the two companies.
As Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) argued in their research on synergy 
realization in acquisitions, the existence of complementary resources is not enough 
for fully actualizing the potential benefits, and it takes interaction between the 
parties to achieve the potential benefits from complementarities. Guanxi therefore 
facilitates the exchange of information and other resources and assists in the 
identification of opportunities for cooperation (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Dyer 
and Singh 1998, Lane and Lubatkin 1998, Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, Starr and 
MacMillan 1990, Zahra et al. 2000a).
Examining the entrepreneur-venture capitalist relationship from the ‘Prisoner’s 
Dilemma’ (Poundstone, 1992) perspective in U.S., Cable and Shane (1997) argued 
that the probability of cooperative entrepreneur-venture capitalist relationships 
increases with the quality and frequency of their communications. We predict a 
similar effect in venture capital investor-portfolio firm relationships in China. 
Therefore:
Hypothesis 14. The closer the Guanxi between the venture capital investor and the 
portfolio company after signing a contract, the greater resource access for the 
portfolio company
3.5.5 Guanxi and Knowledge Access
Previous research has argued that those venture capital firms which are likely to 
possess knowledge of markets, technology, and competition will be most useful to
their portfolio companies (Bygrave, 1987; Zider, 1998). However, the mere 
existence of complementary knowledge is not enough for the realization of the 
potential combination benefits.
The extent to which a technology-based firm can access external knowledge 
from its venture capital investors will depend on the existence of external 
knowledge, on the ability of the firm to recognize and assess the value of the 
knowledge, on close relationship (Guanxi in Chinese case), and on the willingness 
of the dyad firms to share information (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) argued that 
social capital facilitates knowledge access by affecting conditions necessary for 
the exchange and combination of existing intellectual resources, whilst Lane and 
Lubatkin (1998) have pointed out that dyadic learning relationships involve a 
pattern of interactions that affects the learning of both members of the dyad.
Chinese culture also makes Guanxi play an even more important role in offering 
knowledge to portfolio companies. In the US, advice provided to CEOs of funded 
firms can be very direct and may occur in regular interactions (Fried and Hisrich, 
1995). However, in China the venture capitalist must deal appropriately with the 
rather formidable cognitive institution known as mianzi—face or respect. Its 
relative greater importance in a Chinese culture is widely recognized (Bond, 1988), 
and venture capitalists must advise managers whilst allowing them to maintain 
face. Rather than giving an ultimatum, for example, ideas are best put forth as 
suggestions or even posed as questions and are not made in front of a manager’s 
subordinates (Bruton 2003). It is has been argued good Guanxi facilitates 
understanding and trust of each party, and those venture capitalists who have a 
good Guanxi with their investees can advise them more directly and frankly.
To summarize the above discussion, despite the institutional difference, previous 
research on Guanxi and venture capital knowledge transfer all leads to similar 
conclusion that strong ties between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists facilitate 
knowledge sharing. Therefore, following Dyer and Singh (1998), Lane and 
Lubatkin (1998), Zahra et al. (2000a), we argued that Guanxi facilitates the 
exchange of information and assists in the identification of opportunities for 
cooperation. Therefore:
Hypothesis 15. The closer the Guanxi between the venture capital investor and the 
portfolio company after signing a contract, the greater knowledge access for the 
portfolio company
Complementarities are a key activator for resource sharing, but Guanxi helps in 
understanding the values and beliefs of each party better, facilitates interpersonal 
and cognitive trust, and identifying opportunities for cooperation. Without Guanxi, 
the investee may not be able to access investor’s resource or may only access a 
limited extend. Cultural features of the Chinese, such as a strong sense of role 
obligation, favouritism, and inclinations to categorize people into in-group and 
out-group circles (Farh et al. 1998) may also facilitate better communication and 
resource sharing between investors and entrepreneurs who know each other better. 
Thus, we argue that, good Guanxi gives investee preferential access to an 
investor’s resource and Guanxi mediates the influence of complementarities on 
resource access:
Hypothesis 16. Guanxi mediates the positive relationship between 
complementarities and resource access.
The existence of complementary knowledge creates a learning opportunity but it
does not yet make the learning happen. According to received theories and 
empirical research, network/Guanxi is essential for organizational learning (Peng 
and Luo, 2000; Bresman et al., 1999; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998; Yli-Renko et al., 2001a). While complementarities are likely to 
create potential for valuable learning opportunities, these opportunities would 
remain largely unachieved without Guanxi facilitating the knowledge transfer. 
Therefore, this study suggests that Guanxi will mediate the effect of initial 
conditions on knowledge access in the venture capital investor-portfolio firm 
dyad:
Hypothesis 17. Guanxi mediates the positive relationship between 
complementarities and knowledge access.
3.6 Relationship between Value Added and 
Perceived Information
In this section, a model of the relationship between value-added and the 
accuracy and adequacy of perceived information is developed. Adding to the 
previously monitoring model, this model focuses on the idea that besides influence 
of the formal and informal monitoring mechanisms value-added also influence the 
result of monitoring—the accuracy and adequacy of perceived information. This 
model is illustrated in Figure 3-5 and described in the following sections.
Value-Added
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Figure 3-5 Model on relationship between Value-added and perceived information
Some scholars, i.e. Schindele (2002), have argued that there are strong ties 
between monitoring and valued added and the financier’s incentives for advice are 
in line with entrepreneurial incentives for monitoring. Since the ultimate goal of 
monitoring is to mitigate the information asymmetry, we argued that the portfolio 
companies are willing to disclose more detailed and accurate information to 
venture capital investors when they receive value added from venture capital 
investors through the investment relationship. Our argument is also in line with 
Chinese cultural norm—renqing (reciprocal favour). The rules of reciprocal favour 
require the member of network who has received favour or help from others, 
he/she should return it as soon as the opportunity arises (Hwang 1987). Reciprocal 
favour is morally binding for Chinese people, and those who do not repay favours 
are considered to have “no credibility” and they lose face, reputation, and 
ultimately personal relationships and their peers’ trust. The norm of reciprocal 
favour requires that all members of a group perform favours to help those in need 
and that all favours be repaid. Therefore, we hypothesized value added is 
positively related to perceived information:
Hypothesis 18. The greater the valued added received by the portfolio companies, 
the more accurate and adequate o f perceived information received by venture 
capital firms
3.7 Summary
In order to examine the factors influencing monitoring effect and driving the 
value-added benefits, a model of the monitoring and value added mechanisms and 
the factors influencing these mechanisms was developed based on previous 
research. There are five sub models in the model, namely (1) monitoring 
mechanisms, (2) value-added mechanisms, (3) the role of complementarities in 
monitoring and value-added mechanisms (4) the role of Guanxi as a facilitator in 
informal monitoring and value-added (5) the relationship between value-added and 
perceived information. The summary of the hypotheses is presented in Table 3.1:
Table 3.1 Summary of the Hypotheses
Hypothesis
Model on Monitoring mechanisms
HI Formal monitoring is positively related to perceived information
H2 Informal monitoring is positively related to perceived information
Model on Value-added mechanisms
H3 Resource access is positively related to value-added
H4 Knowledge access is positively related to value-added
Model on the role o f  complementarities in Monitoring and Value-add
H5A Complementarities are positively related to Guanxi before signing contract
H5B Complementarities are positively related to Guanxi after signing contract
H6 Complementarities are positively related to formal monitoring
H7 Complementarities are positively related to informal monitoring
H8 Complementarities are positively related to resource access
H9 Complementarities are positively related to knowledge access
Model on the Role o f  Guanxi as a Facilitator in informal monitoring and Value-added
H10 Guanxi is positively related to formal monitoring
HI 1 Guanxi is positively related to informal monitoring
H12 Guanxi mediates the positive relationship between complementarities and informal monitoring
H13 Informal monitoring is positively related to formal monitoring
H14 Guanxi is positively related to resource access
H15 Guanxi is positively related to knowledge access
H16 Guanxi mediates the positive relationship between complementarities and resource access
H17 Guanxi mediates the positive relationship between complementarities and knowledge access
Model on Relationship between value-added and perceived information mechanism
H18 Value added is positively related to perceived information
The five sub-models together comprise an integrated model the monitoring and 
value-added mechanisms and the factors influencing those mechanisms in 
relationship between venture capital investor and their portfolio companies. Figure 
3-6 illustrates the integrated hypothesized model.
Figure 3-6 Integrated model
Guanxi (Before)
Informal monitoring
Resource Access
Perceived Info
Value-Added
Guanxi (After)Complementarities
Formal Monitoring
Knowledge Access
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction:
This chapter discusses the methodology used in the present study. First, the 
sources of primary data and the survey are discussed. Then, the statistical 
methodology used in the present study is discussed. Thereafter, the 
operationalization of constructs is discussed. Finally, the chapter discusses the 
various elements or reliability, validity, and generalizability and how those 
elements have taken into account in the present study.
4.2 Population and Sample
The sample venture capital firms were identified from the latest China Venture 
Capital Directory maintained by Zero2IPO Venture Capital Research Centre, a 
commercial consultant company based in Beijing, China. This extensive source 
has been used in earlier research on China’s venture capital (Zeng, 2004) and is 
widely recognized as the leading source of China’s venture capital investment data. 
The directory currently contains information on 263 venture capital firms which 
actively invest in mainland China. A questionnaire was sent to the fund managers 
of all these venture capital firms in July 2006.
4.3 Survey
The primary source of data in this research is a mail survey administered to the 
fund managers of the whole population of the identified venture capital firms. 
Additional interviews were conducted in Guangzhou and Beijing, China. The 
survey is described in the following sections.
4.3.1 Questionnaire
The survey instrument used in the present study was a two page questionnaire
with sections covering background information, screening and diligence, valuation, 
monitoring and value-added provided by the venture capital investor, relationship 
with these investors, and more specific questions on the relationship with the 
venture capital investor. In order to identify and eliminate potential problems 
(Hunt et al., 1982), the questionnaire was pre-tested with several fund managers 
and researchers. The relevance and clarity of the questions were also checked with 
several venture capital investors and researchers familiar with the topic area. 
Answering was encouraged by promising a summary of the results in return. 
Appendix B shows the final version of the questionnaire.
An important factor in questionnaire design was that data gathered are 
compatible with statistical software package SAS and SPSS for data processing 
and analysis. This aspect was kept in mind throughout the questionnaire design 
process.
4.3.2 Mailing Process and Response Pattern
A pervasive problem in studying the venture capital industry is the lack of data 
(Lemer, 2001). To boost the response rate, there were altogether three mailings 
administered to the fund manager of the sample firms in the survey of the present 
study. First, a mailing consisting of a cover letter, a letter from researcher’s 
supervisor (Professor Dylan Jones-Evans) as shown in appendix A, and the 
two-page questionnaire were sent to 263 venture capital firms in three batches. A 
week later, reminder emails were sent. Four weeks later, the third and final fax 
was sent to non-respondents as a reminder.
The total number of firms to which the questionnaires was sent was 263. Of 
these firms, 27 could not be located or the named recipient was not employed by 
the company anymore. Therefore, the effective maximum sample was 236
companies. Of these 236 firms, 59 returned the filled questionnaire. This translates 
to a response rate of 25.0 %. This response rate can be considered acceptable, 
given that it was requested that the two-page questionnaires were completed by the 
fund managers. Management time is a critically scarce resource for this group and 
therefore Gaedeke and Tootelian (1976) forecasted a 20 percent response rate from 
surveys of top executives.
Most of returned questionnaire were from Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. 
Illustrating these sample venture firms, the average age of the venture capital firms 
is 7.78 years, with an average of $157.6 million dollars funds available for 
investing in mainland China. The fund managers of these VC firms were likely to 
be under strong investor pressure to focus on their business rapidly (and not to 
spend their busy time answering any surveys). Most of the venture capital firms in 
China is not just focused on technology-based investment but also places much 
attention on the traditional sector, e.g. dairy products. These investment 
environments may have had an adverse effect on the willingness of fund managers 
to participate in this survey research.
Of the 59 returned questionnaires, one company was excluded from the analysis 
because the respondent had not provided sufficient information on the corporate 
investor. The final number of ventures included in the analyses is 58.
As the survey was answered by a single key informant, it is important that the 
respondent is knowledgeable as to the operations of the venture capital firm (John 
and Reve 1982). The survey was sent primarily to the fund managers of the 
venture capital firms. In the absence of the contact information of the fund 
managers, the survey was sent to the managing director. The great majority of the 
respondents were fund manager of the sample companies.
4.3.3 Missing Value Analysis
There were very few missing values in the data (2.29% of all used measurement 
items). We analyzed the missing values and did not find any significant patterns of 
missing values. The influence of missing data appeared to be insignificant. Mean 
substitution was used to replace the missing values. We tested the effect of this 
and noted that this choice did not influence the results in this study.
4.3.4 Analysis of Common Method Variance
As there are no close proxies or external measures available for many of the 
critical variables examined in the present study (such as informal monitoring from 
a venture capital investor relationship) we had to rely on the self-reported 
assessment of fund managers of the sample venture capital firms on these 
variables. Because of this approach, it is important to ensure that common method 
variance is not causing the relationships between variables (Avolio et al., 1991; 
Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). In order to ensure that common method variance 
does not undermine the results, we used earlier validated measures as much as 
possible (Spector 1987). We also examined the possibility of common method 
variance using Harman’s single factor test as suggested by Podsakoff and Organ 
(1986). Inclusion of all the items used in the multi-item scales yielded 9 factors 
with an eigenvalue of over 1.00. The first factor explained 46% of the variance 
(see Chapter 4.6.1). Based on this analysis, it appears that common method 
variance is not a serious threat to the validity of this study.
4.4 Statistical Methods
In order to test the hypotheses developed in the study, the present study 
employed four main statistical methods. First, confirmatory factor analysis was 
employed in testing the validity of the constructs. Second, multiple regression 
analysis was used in testing the paths between constructs. Third, an application of
the multiple regression analysis was used to test the mediation effects. Fourth, 
structural equation modelling was employed to test simultaneously the paths in the 
integrated model. These methods, their assumptions, and the interpretation of the 
results are explained in the following sections.
4.4.1 Confirmatory factor analysis
In the present study, factor analysis was used to confirm that the observed 
measurement items define latent theoretical constructs as expected, on the basis of 
theoretical grounds. This method, known as confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is 
used to test that the number of factors and the loadings of measurement items on 
them conform to what is expected on the basis of pre-established theory. 
Measurement items are selected on the basis of prior theory and factor analysis is 
used to see whether they load as predicted on the expected number of factors. 
Confirmatory factor analysis thereby complements the use of Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients in evaluating the reliability and validity of constructs.
Based on an extensive literature review, Guadagnoli and Velicer (1998) 
concluded that the solutions generated from principal component analysis differ 
little from those derived from factor analytic techniques. In reality, there are some 
circumstances for which this statement is untrue. Stevens (1992) summarizes the 
evidence and concludes that with 30 or more variables and communalities greater 
than .7 for all variables, different solutions are unlikely; however, with fewer than 
20 variables and any low communalities (<.4) differences can occur.
Confirmatory factor analysis assumes that a number of a priori defined factors 
explain the majority of the covariation among the observed variables. The variance 
of each observed variable consists of the proportion of variance determined by a 
linear combination of the common factors and the proportion determined by a
specific component unique to the variable. The coefficients, which define the 
linear combination of factors for each variable, are called factor loadings. A factor 
loading can be interpreted as a standardized partial correlation coefficient between 
the variable and the factor while controlling for the other factors (Schumacker and 
Lomax, 1996).
Eigenvalues represent the amount of variance accounted for by a factor. They 
are commonly used as the basis of extracting factors in factor analysis. The 
common guideline is that any factor with an eigenvalue of less than 1.00 should 
not be used because such factors explain less variance than a single variable (Hair 
et al., 1998). In the present study, this eigenvalue criterion was used to confirm 
that the number of factors that emerge from the data corresponds to the number of 
factors determined a priori on the basis of theoretical grounds.
Besides confirming the correct number of factors, the factor analysis was used to 
confirm that the measurement items loaded on correct factors. In confirmatory 
factor analysis, a common rule of thumb is that only items with factor loadings 
of .60 or higher on the primary factor and loadings of .40 or lower on any other 
factor are retained. These guidelines were employed in the present study.
There are two primary alternative methods available for extracting factors: 
principal component analysis (PCA) and principal factor analysis (PFA). In PCA, 
factors are based on the total variance (common, specific, and error variance) 
whereas in PFA factors are based on a reduced correlation matrix excluding the 
specific and error variance (Hair et al. 1998). PFA uses a PCA strategy but applies 
it to a correlation matrix in which the diagonal elements are not l ’s, as in PCA, but 
iteratively-derived estimates of the communalities. PCA by far is the most 
common form of factor analysis. PCA was also used in the present study for
extracting factors.
Factor rotation is an important part of factor analysis and is needed to make the 
factor solution interpretable. There are various alternative methods for factor 
rotation of which Varimax rotation is most often used. Being an orthogonal 
rotation algorithm, Varimax rotation creates a factor solution consisting of factors 
that are uncorrelated with each other. Varimax rotation aims at finding a factor 
solution where a variable loads highly on one particular factor and loads as low as 
possible on the other factors. In the present study, Varimax rotation algorithm was 
used whenever a factor solution consisted of more than one factor.
4.4.2 Multiple linear regression analysis
Multiple regression is used to account for (predict) the variance in an interval 
dependent, based on linear combinations of interval, dichotomous, or dummy 
independent variables. Multiple regression can establish that a set of independent 
variables explains a proportion of the variance in a dependent variable at a 
significant level (through a significance test of R2), and can establish the relative 
predictive importance of the independent variables (by comparing beta weights). 
Power terms can be added as independent variables to explore curvilinear effects. 
Cross-product terms can be added as independent variables to explore interaction 
effects. One can test the significance of difference of two R 's  to determine if 
adding an independent variable to the model helps significantly. Using hierarchical 
regression, one can see how most variance in the dependent can be explained by 
one or a set of new independent variables, over and above that explained by an 
earlier set. Of course, the estimates (b coefficients and constant) can be used to 
construct a prediction equation and generate predicted scores on a variable for 
further analysis.
In the present study, multiple regression analysis was used as the main statistical 
method to test the hypotheses. The general form of the multiple linear regression 
equation is yj = bo + bjXij + b2X2j + ... + b„xnj +ej, where yj represents the values of 
the dependent variable that is explained in the regression, xij - xnj are the 
observations of the independent variables, bo is the constant, bj- b„ are the 
regression coefficients for x^ - x„j, and ej is the error term representing observed 
residuals from fitting the regression line to the set of observations.
Of the various regression analysis methods, ordinary least squares regression 
(OLS) is the most common regression analysis method. In the ordinary least 
squares regression, the sum of squared residual vertical distances between the data 
points and associated points in the regression line are minimized. The present 
study employs OLS regression.
Assumptions in Multiple Regression Analysis
Multiple linear regression is based on several assumptions concerning the quality 
of the data and the nature of the phenomenon analyzed. The most important 
assumptions are (1) metric data; (2) linearity of the phenomenon; (3) constant 
variance of the error term; (4) independence of the error terms; (5) normality of 
the error term distribution; (6) low multicollinearity and (7) sufficient sample size. 
These assumptions and their implications for the present study are discussed 
below.
Metric data. The data has to be metric or transformed appropriately (Hair et al., 
1998). In this study, the statistical properties of the variables are examined in order 
to identify any violations. In this study, the categorical variables such as industry 
sector are included as dummy variables (Hair et al. 1998).
Linear relationships. The relationships between the dependent and independent 
variables should be linear. The linearity of the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables represents the degree to which the change in the dependent 
variable (the regression coefficient) is constant across the range of value for the 
independent variable. Linearity can be detected using residual plots. Any 
curvilinear pattern indicates a non-linearity. Non-linearity of a relationship can be 
overcome using data transformation techniques (Hair et al. 1998). In the present 
study, data transformations are used when the analyses indicate nonlinear 
relationships.
Dependent variable normally distributed. The dependent variable should be 
normally distributed. The normality of the variables can be tested using normal 
probability plots in which standardized residuals are compared with the normal 
distribution. Some normality issues can be dealt with by transformations such as 
logarithmic transformation in the case of lognormal distribution (Hair et al. 1998). 
In this study, the normality of the dependent variable and non-dummy independent 
variables were examined using the Normal P-P plot. In the Normal P-P plot, the 
cumulative proportion for a single numeric variable is plotted against the 
cumulative proportion expected if the sample were from a normal distribution. If 
the sample is from a normal distribution, points will cluster around a straight line. 
In the present study, the variables are transformed to achieve normality when 
necessary.
Constant variance o f the error term. The variance of the error term should be 
constant. The presence of unequal variance in the error term (heteroscedasticicity) 
violates the assumptions of OLS regression. Heteroscedasticity can be detected for 
instance by using the Levane test for homogeneity of variance, which measures the
equality variances for a single pair of variables. In case heteroscedasticity is 
present, it can be dealt with appropriate transformations, or if the violation can be 
attributed to a single independent variable, the procedure of weighted least squares 
can be employed (Hair et al. 1998). An effective method for dealing with 
heteroscedasticicity is to use the White (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity. In 
this study, the presence heteroscedasticicity was tested and transformations were 
employed in order to homogenize the variance when needed.
Independent error terms. The error terms should be independent. The predicted 
values should not be sequenced by any variable. Possible violations of this 
assumption can be detected by plotting the residuals against any possible 
sequencing variable. If the residuals are independent, the pattern should appear 
random. Violations occur when basic model conditions change but are not 
included in the model. Data transformations such as first differences in a time 
series model, or specially formulated indicator variables can be used to deal with 
this violation. In the present study, several control variables were used in order to 
take the potential differences in the basic conditions into account.
Low multicollinearity. The independent variables that are included in a model 
should not be multicollinear. Multicollinearity means that independent variables 
are highly correlated and makes it difficult to determine the contribution of each 
independent variable because the impact is mixed. High correlations among the 
independent variables, 0.90 and above, indicate substantial multicollinearity (Hair 
et al. 1998:191). However, lack of high correlation values does not ensure a lack 
of collinearity. Thus, better indicators of multicollinearity are the tolerance value 
and variance inflation factor (VIF), which tell the degree to which each 
independent variable is explained by other independent variables. Tolerance is the 
amount of variability of the selected independent variable not explained by the
other independent variables. Thus, very small tolerance values (and high VIF 
values) denote high collinearity. A common cut-off threshold is a tolerance value 
of .10, which corresponds to VIF values above 10 (Hair et al. 1998). In case 
multicollinearity is detected, it can be dealt with by (1) omitting one or more 
highly correlated predictor variables and identifying other, better predictor 
variables; (2) using the model only for prediction and making no attempt to 
interpret the regression coefficients; (3) using simple correlations between each 
predictor and dependent variable to understand the predictor-dependent variable 
relationship; and/or (4) use a more sophisticated method of analysis such as 
Bayesian regression or regression on principal components to obtain a model that 
clearly reflects the simple effects of the predictors (Hair et al. 1998). In this study, 
the existence of potential multicollinearity is examined on the basis of correlation 
matrices and variance inflation factors.
Sufficient sample size. Sample size has a strong impact on the explanatory power 
of multiple regression analysis. Hair et al. (1998) have suggested a minimum of 5 
times as many observations as there are independent variables in the model to 
avoid an over fitting of the model and enabling generalizability. However, too 
large samples may cause the regression analysis to become overly sensitive (Hair 
et al. 1998). In the present study, the sample size is in line with the above 
recommendations. Darlington (1997) suggested 50 or more sample for clear and 
simple factor structure and 100 or more sample would be much preferable for a 
less clear structure.
Interpretation of the Results in Multiple Regressions
The statistical significance of each regression coefficient bj is tested with a /-test. 
The t value indicates how many standard error measures the coefficient is from
zero, and the probability value p  indicates the significance of the test that b, is 
different from zero. A common threshold value for the regression coefficients to 
be considered as significant is .05. Unstandardized regression coefficients have a 
clear interpretation and can be used to build forecasting models. Standardized 
regression coefficients are needed when comparing the explanatory power of 
several regression coefficients in the same equation. In the present study 
standardized coefficients are reported to allow comparison between independent 
variables.
When comparing regression models, the most common standard used is overall 
predictive fit measured as the coefficient of determination (R ). However, the 
drawback of this measure is that when adding new explanatory variables, the 
measure can never decrease. Thus, inclusion of all independent variables would 
give the maximum R , even if the same level had achieved using fewer variables.
•y
In order to take into account the number of explanatory variables, the adjusted R 
can be used. Adjusted R2 is also useful in comparing models between different 
data sets because it compensates for the different sample sizes. In the present study,
'y
both adjusted and unadjusted R are reported.
The statistical significance of the overall model is indicated by the F-test of the 
analysis of variance. The overall model can be considered significant when the 
significance level of the F-statistic is below .05. In the present study, F-statistics 
are also reported in the analyses.
4.4.3 Testing Mediating Effects
Once a relationship between two variables is established, it is common for 
researchers to consider the role of other variables in this relationship (Lazarsfeld, 
1955). In addition to testing relationships with a single dependent variable and a
number of independent variables, the multiple regression method can be extended 
to the analysis of paths of relationships (e.g. Aguinis and Pierce 1999, Baron and 
Kenny 1986, Cohen and Cohen 1975). In this study, multiple regression analysis is 
used to test mediation effects. A variable may be considered a mediator to the 
extent to which it carries the influence of a given independent variable to a given 
dependent variable (Baron and Kenny 1986). Illustration of mediation is presented 
in Figure 4-1 below.
Mediating Variable
(AO 'my
Dependent VariableIndependent 
Variable (.X)
Direct Effect=bxy Mediated Effect=bxm+bmy 
Total Effect= b b xm+b mv
Figure 4-1 Illustration o f  Mediation Effect
If the effect of X on Y is zero when the mediator is included (b'xy = 0), there is 
evidence for mediation (Judd and Kenny, 1981a, 1981b). This would be a full 
mediation.
If the effect of X on Y is reduced when the mediator is included (b'xy < bxy), then 
the direct effect is said to be partially mediated.
Steps in Establishing Mediation
Baron and Kenny (1986), the social psychological researchers presented four 
steps in establishing mediation. This study follows these steps in testing mediation 
hypotheses. Maula (2001) also used this methodology to test value-added
mechanism in a corporate venture capital investment scenario.
Baron and Kenny (1986) have presented four steps in establishing mediation. 
This study follows these steps in testing mediation hypotheses. The steps are 
presented below for variable M mediating the relationship between independent 
variable X and dependent variable Y as illustrated in Figure 4-1.
Step 1. Show that the independent variable is correlated with the outcome 
variable (bxy > 0). Use Y as the criterion variable in a regression equation and X 
as a predictor. This step demonstrates that there is an effect that can be mediated.
Step 2. Show that the independent variable is correlated with the mediator 
(bxM > 0). Use M as the criterion variable in the regression equation and X as a 
predictor. This step essentially involves treating the mediator as if it were an 
outcome variable.
Step 3. Show that the mediator affects the outcome variable (bMY > 0). Use Y as 
the criterion variable in a regression equation and X and M as predictors (estimate 
both bMY and bxY* in same the model). It is not sufficient just to correlate the 
mediator with the outcome; the mediator and the outcome may be correlated 
because they are both caused by the independent variable X. Thus, the 
independent variable must be controlled in establishing the effect of the mediator 
on the outcome.
Step 4. To establish that M completely mediates the X—>Y relationship, the 
effect of X on Y controlling for M should be zero (bxY* = 0). The effects in both 
Steps 3 and 4 are estimated in the same regression equation.
If all four of these steps are met, then the data are consistent with the hypothesis 
that variable M completely mediates the X—»Y relationship. However, if the first 
three steps are met but Step 4 is not, then partial mediation is indicated. Moreover, 
Step 1 is not necessarily required for establishing mediation, because a path from 
the independent variable to the outcome variable is implied if Steps 2 and 3 are 
met. If bxy’ is opposite in sign to bxM * bMY, then it could be the case that Step 1 is 
not met, but there is still mediation. In this case, the mediator acts like a 
suppressor variable. Therefore, the essential steps in establishing mediation are 
Steps 2 and 3.
The amount of mediation is defined as the reduction of the effect of the initial 
independent variable on the dependent variable between the unmediated and 
mediated model. This difference in coefficients can be shown to equal exactly the 
product of the effect of X on M times the effect of M on Y (bxM * bMY = bxY - 
bxY’)- The exact equality holds for multiple regression and structural equation 
modeling without latent variables, but it holds only approximately for structural 
equation model with latent variables. The amount of reduction in the effect of X 
on Y is not equivalent to either the change in variance explained or the change in 
an inferential statistic such as F or a p value. It is possible for the F from the 
independent variable to the outcome to decrease dramatically even when the 
mediator has no effect on the outcome.
Test of Mediation
If Step 2 (the test of bxM > 0) and Step 3 (the test bMY > 0) are met, it follows 
that there necessarily is a reduction in the effect of X on Y in the mediated model. 
An indirect and approximate test that bxM * bMY = 0 is to test that both bxM and 
bMY are zero (Steps 2 and 3).
Baron and Kenny (1986) provided a direct test of bxM * bMY which is a 
modification of a test originally proposed by Sobel (1982). It requires the standard 
error of bxM or sxm (which equals bxM/txM where txM is the t-test of coefficient 
bxM) and the standard error of bMY or smy- Following Goodman (1960), the 
standard error of bxM * bMY can be shown to equal
Goodman(l)Test: S tan darderror = * s x m  +  bxM *  s m y  +  s x m  * s m y
The test of the indirect effect is given by dividing bxM * bMY by the above 
standard error and treating the ratio as a Z test (i.e., larger than 1.96 in absolute 
value is significant at the .05 level).
However, different versions of the above standard error have been published 
(Baron and Kenny 1986, Goodman 1960, MacKinnon et al. 1995, Sobel 1982). 
The above formula (Goodman I) is a population formula (Baron and Kenny 1986, 
Goodman 1960). In the Goodman II version of the test the third term is subtracted 
for an unbiased estimate of the variance of the mediated effect, which can 
sometimes have the unfortunate effect of yielding a negative variance estimate. 
Sobel (1982) presented an approximation of the above formula without the last 
term. The formulas only differ in the last term and its size is usually trivial in that 
it depends on sample size squared whereas the other terms depend only on sample 
size. Baron and Kenny (1986) recommended using the Goodman I version of the 
Sobel test because it does not make an unnecessary assumption that the product of 
sxm and Smy would be negligible small. MacKinnon et al. (1995) analyzed these 
tests using simulation and concluded that the Sobel test and the Goodman I test 
performed best in their analysis and converged closely with sample sizes greater 
than 50. In this dissertation, the first version (Goodman I) of the mediation test is 
used (Baron and Kenny 1986, Goodman 1960). The formula is
^2 jjj
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4.4.4 Structural Equation Modelling
Structural equation modelling is a multivariate method that can be used to 
examine a set of regression equations simultaneously (Bollen 1989, Hair et al. 
1998:584). Structural equation modelling may be used as a more powerful 
alternative for instance to multiple regression, path analysis, factor analysis, time 
series analysis, and analysis of covariance. These procedures can be viewed as 
special cases of structural equation modelling which is an extension of the general 
linear model.
Structural equation modelling has some advantages compared to multiple 
regression including for instance more flexible assumptions, use of confirmatory 
factor analysis to reduce measurement error by having multiple indicators per 
latent variable, overall testing of the model fit rather than coefficients individually, 
the ability to test models with multiple dependent variables, the ability to model 
mediating variables, the ability to model error terms.
Structural equation modelling is normally viewed as a confirmatory rather than 
exploratory procedure (Byrne 2001:3). It uses goodness-of-fit tests to determine if 
the pattern of variances and covariances in the data is consistent with the 
hypothesized structural model specified a priori. It can also be used to test two or 
more causal models to determine which has the best fit (Loehlin 1987). As 
structural equation modelling cannot itself draw causal arrows in models or 
resolve causal ambiguities, theoretical insight and judgment by the researcher is 
critically important.
Interpretation of the Results in Structural Equation Modeling
The fit of a structural equation model is a multidimensional concept and should 
therefore be examined from a variety of perspectives. The examination of model 
fit includes the assessment of the parameter estimates and the model as a whole. 
The procedures used to examine the model fit in the present study are discussed 
below in more detail.
Parameter estimates. Byrne (2001:75) summarizes three areas of assessment on 
parameter estimates: (1) the feasibility of the parameter estimates, (2) the 
appropriateness of standard errors, and (3) the statistical significance of the 
parameter estimates.
The first step when assessing the model fit on the parameter estimate level is the 
examination of the feasibility of the parameter estimates. Parameters should have 
the correct sign and size according to the underlying theory. Clear examples of 
unreasonable estimates include correlations >1.00, negative variances, and 
covariance or correlation matrices that are not positively definite (Byme 2001).
The second step in the determination of the model fit on the parameter estimate 
level is the assessment of the appropriateness of the standard errors. Standard 
errors that are either excessively large or small are indicative of poor model fit 
(Byme 2001). However, this assessment is subjective because the magnitude of 
standard errors is dependent on the unit of measurement and the parameter 
estimates.
The third step in the assessment of the model fit on the parameter estimate level
is the examination of the statistical significance of the parameter estimates. 
Non-significant parameter estimates, with the exception of error variances, can be 
considered unimportant for the model. However, it should be noted that sample 
size influences the significance of the parameters (Byme 2001).
These three steps were followed in the analyses carried out in the present study.
The model as a whole. When examining the fit of the model as a whole, multiple 
indices are typically used to determine the model fit. Table 4.1 describes the 
goodness-of-fit measures used in this study.
Table 4.1 Goodness-of-fit criteria in structural equation modeling used in this
study
Criterion Description Interpretation
Chi-Square
Calculation o f difference between
p>.05 for model to be acceptable;
observe and estimated covariance
sensitivity to sample size
matrices
Normed Chi-Square
Chi-square adjusted for degree o f Recommendation between 1.0 and 
freedom 2.0
Goodness o f fit 
index(GFI)
Predicted squared residuals compared Range between 0 (not fit) to 1.0 
with obtained residual, not adjusted by (perfect fit); recommendation 
degrees of freedom above .90
Non-Normed fit index 
(NNFI)(=Tucker and 
Lewis’s index/TLI)
Range between 0 (not fit) to 1.0
Proposed model compared with the null
(perfect fit); recommendation
model, adjusted by degrees o f freedom
above .90
Comparative fit index 
(CFI)
Range between 0 (not fit) to 1.0
Proposed model compared with the null
(perfect fit); recommendation
model, adjusted by degrees o f freedom
above .95
Akaike information 
criterion (AIC)
Compares models with different number Value closer to zero indicate better 
of constructs fit and greater parsimony
Parsimony normed fit 
index (PNFI)
The PRATIO times normed fit index.
PRATIO (parsimony ratio) is the ratio o f
When comparing nested models, the
the degrees o f freedom in your model to
model with the lower PNFI is better
degrees o f freedom in the independence 
(null) model.
One of the commonly used measures of model fit is the chi-square test where the
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predicted covariance matrix is tested for statistical difference from the original 
covariance matrix. If the difference is statistically insignificant, the model fit is 
considered to be good. Besides the chi-square test, there are many other indices 
used in the testing of model fit. Normed chi-square adjusts the chi-square by the 
degrees of freedom. Values between 1.0-2.0 are considered to indicate a good fit 
(Hairetal. 1998).
Goodness o f  f it index (GFI) is calculated by comparing the predicted squared 
residuals with the obtained residuals. This measure is for absolute fit, and not 
adjusted by degrees of freedom. The range of this index is between 0 (no fit) and 
1.0 (perfect fit). Models with GFI is above .90 are considered to have a good fit. 
This index has been argued to be insufficient because, for example, it is overly 
influenced by sample size (Fan et al. 1999).
Non-normed f it  index (NNFI) compares the proposed model with a null model. 
This index is also called Tucker and Lewis’ index (TLI). NNFI is adjusted by 
degrees of freedom and ranges between 0 (no fit) and 1.0 (perfect fit). Models with 
NNFI above .90 have traditionally been considered to have a good fit. However, it 
should be noted that when the sample size is small, the NNFI tends to reject 
correct models too easily (Hu and Bentler 1999).
Comparative f it index (CFI) compares the proposed model to the null model. 
This index is also adjusted by the degrees of freedom. Also CFI ranges between 0 
(no fit) and 1.0 (perfect fit) Models with CFI above .90 are considered to have a 
good fit (Bentler 1992). However, the recent research recommends higher cut-off 
value close to .95 (Hu and Bentler 1999).
Akaike information criterion (AIC) compares models with different number of
constructs. AIC is based on information theory. Values closer to zero indicate 
better fit and greater parsimony. When comparing different models, the model 
with the lowest AIC is considered to have the best fit (Akaike 1987).
Parsimony normed f it  index (PNFI), is equal to the PRATIO times normed fit 
index. PRATIO (parsimony ratio) is the ratio of the degrees of freedom in your 
model to degrees of freedom in the independence (null) model. The PNFI takes 
into account the number of degrees of freedom used to achieve a level of fit. When 
comparing nested models, the model with the lower PNFI is better (James et al., 
1982).
Model misspecification. Finally, after the assessment of the model on the 
parameter estimate level and the model as a whole, the potential model 
misspecification is examined. The residual covariance matrix is the discrepancy 
between the restricted hypothesized model and the sample covariance matrix. Each 
residual represents the difference between the observed and hypothesized 
parameter estimate. Large residuals indicate potential misfit in the model. Because 
the magnitude of residuals is dependent on the measurement units, standardized 
residuals are typically used in this analysis. Standardized residuals, being defined 
as fitted residuals divided by their asymptotical standard errors, are analogous to Z 
scores (Byme 2001). Joreskog and Sorbom (1988) suggested a cut-off value of 
2.58 residuals to be considered large. In order to identify signs of potential 
misspecification, residuals are examined in the present study following the above 
guideline.
Structural equation model is often used to combine confirmatory factor analysis 
and path analysis. Various processes have been proposed for doing this (Anderson 
and Gerbing 1988, Mulaik and Millsap 2000). In the present study, a relatively
small sample size prevents the use of these techniques. Instead, path analysis was 
carried out using separately validated summated scales employing structural 
equation modeling.
In line with some other recent studies (e.g. Zahra et al. 2000a), the present study 
used multiple regression analysis with summated scales as the primary analytical 
method. However, the multiple regression analyses were supplemented with path 
analyses carried out using structural equation modeling in order to test all the 
hypotheses simultaneously and to test that there are no other important paths in the 
model. Path analysis using structural equation model thereby enables a test of the 
whole model and thereby adds to the multiple regression analyses. The use of two 
methods to carry out the analyses increases the robustness of the results and 
conclusions.
4.5 Construct Operationalizations
This section discusses the operationalization of the constructs of the five 
sub-models tested in this dissertation. The section discusses the selection of the 
measurement items, inter-item reliability, results of the confirmatory factor 
analyses and descriptive statistics.
Whenever an objective measure was not available, constructs were 
operationalized as multi-item scales (Spector, 1992). Whenever possible these 
constructs and their measurement items were derived from existing research. All 
frequency/statement-style items were measured on a scale from 1 (never) to 5 
(always). Confirmatory factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha tests were used to 
test the unidimensionality and inter-item reliability of the measures.
The dependent variables in the integrated model are:
• Perceived information
• Value-added
• Formal monitoring
• Informal monitoring
• Resource access
• Knowledge access
• Controls: Venture capital firm age, Venture capital firm size, Ownership
of venture capital firm, Location of venture capital firm’s ultimate head
office
The independent variables in the integrated model are:
• Complementarities
• Guanxi before signing a contract
• Guanxi after signing a contract
• Controls: Venture capital firm age, Venture capital firm size, Ownership
of venture capital firm, Location of venture capital firm’s ultimate head
office
4.5.1 Variables in the Model o f Monitoring and Value-added 
Mechanisms
There is little research examining the monitoring or value-added activities 
provided by venture capitalists for technology-based firms in transitional 
economies and particularly in China. The majority of the previous research on 
monitoring are based on institutional theory (Peng and Heath, 1996; Brutona and 
Ahlstrom, 2003) and finds that China’s institutional environment creates a number 
of significant differences from the West in terms of ways of monitoring. One of
the few studies examining the value-added service (White, Gao and Zhang, 2002) 
compares the different types of venture capital firms (government, corporate, 
university and foreign-backed) and find that foreign backed venture capital firms 
provided more value-added service to the investees. However, the starting points 
for these studies were the general finding in the difference between the West and 
China or the difference between four types of venture capital firms. The purpose 
of this study is to create a deeper understanding of the monitoring and 
value-adding mechanisms and the factors influencing them. Creating this 
understanding while relying on secondary data would be difficult because of the 
lack of suitable data and measures for many of the important constructs (Das and 
Teng, 2000). The research strategy was to rely on primary data collected from key 
informants, namely the fund managers of venture capital firms.
4.5.1.1 Monitoring
In the model of monitoring mechanisms, the dependent variable is the accuracy 
and adequacy of the information perceived by venture capital firms. The use of 
survey-based measures has recently been warranted (Das and Teng, 2000:53). 
While reliance on dependent variables operationalized using perceptual data may 
introduce problems, perceptual measures have been argued to be well-suited to the 
measurement of inter-organizational relationships. Providing empirical support for 
the reliability of perceptual measures in measuring the value creation provided by 
venture capitalists, Sapienza (1992), and Sapienza and Gupta (1994) demonstrated 
high correlation between perceptual value creation measures and venture 
performance validated by later objective measures and high inter-rater reliability 
between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs on both sides of the dyads. Similarly, 
the reliability of perceptual measures has been argued and shown to be good in 
many of the studies examining analogous situations such as performance of 
strategic alliances (Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993; Saxton, 1997; Weaver and 
Dickson, 1998), joint ventures (Geringer and Hebert, 1989, 1991; Lyles and Salk,
1996), and performance in vertical supplier-customer relationships (Anderson and 
Narus, 1990; Heide and John, 1990; Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Yli-Renko et al., 
2001a). The use of perceptual measures in many of the studies has been based on 
the notion that success is determined, in part, by how well the partnership achieves 
the performance expectations set by the partners (Anderson and Narus, 1990; 
Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Saxton, 1997; Weaver and Dickson, 1998).
Following the traditions in research on the performance implications of 
inter-organizational relationships, we measured the overall accuracy and adequacy 
information perceived by venture capitalists using a multi-item scales. As the 
ultimate goal of monitoring is to ease the information asymmetry, we use the 
information accuracy and sufficiency construct to measure the effect of monitoring 
requirement demanded by the venture capital investors.
The construct of perceived information was operationalized using ten 
measurement items. Responses to the ten measurement items were subjected to a 
principal component analysis using ones as prior communality estimates. The 
principal axis method was used to extract the factor. Table 4.2 provides the initial 
eigenvalues table for analysis.
Table 4.2 Initial Eigenvalues
F actor
Initial E igenvalues
T otal % o f  V ariance C um ulative %
1 7.43 74.33 74.33
2 0.80 7.98 82.32
3 0.38 3.78 86.10
4 0.33 3.35 89.45
5 0.27 2.73 92.17
6 0.24 2.38 94.55
7 0.19 1.93 96.49
8 0.17 1.68 98.17
9 0.11 1.14 99.30
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10 0.07 0.70 100.00
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
There is only one factor displayed eigenvalues greater than one in table 4.2. The 
eigenvalue table also shows that the first item account for over 74% of the total 
variance.
Measurement items and corresponding factor loadings are presented in Table 4.3. 
All the factor loadings are above .791. Scale reliability was assessed by calculating 
coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951). The Cronbach’s alpha inter-item reliability 
coefficient for this construct is .961 which is pretty high. There is evidence that the 
items are well measuring a single unidimensional latent construct.
Table 4.3 measurement items and factor loadings for the monitoring construct
M easurem ent Item M ean Std. D eviation C om m unality L oading
Management account 3.621 0.855 0.776 0.881
Balance sheet 3.638 0.912 0.766 0.875
Cash flow 3.828 0.958 0.752 0.867
Decision-m aking processes 3.897 0.949 0.749 0.866
Product development 3.897 0.810 0.843 0.918
Marketing o f  product 3.897 0.872 0.695 0.834
Strategy o f  business 3.759 0.865 0.772 0.879
Patents 3.810 0.868 0.625 0.791
Goodwill 3.603 0.815 0.724 0.851
Training o f  staff 3.862 0.888 0.731 0.855
Principal Component Analysis. Unrotated
The descriptive statistics of the dependent variable in the model of monitoring 
mechanisms (factor-based scales) is presented in Table 4.4
Table 4.4 descriptive statistics o f the dependent variable in the model o f monitoring 
mechanisms
N M inim um M axim um M ean Std. D eviation
Perceived Information 
Accuracy and adequacy
58 2.4 4.9 3.779 0.760
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Constructs Measuring the Monitoring Mechanisms
In the model of monitoring mechanisms, the independent variables are formal 
and informal monitoring. The control variables are venture age, venture size (total 
size of funds available to investment in Mainland China), ownership of venture 
capital firm, and location of venture capital firm. The descriptive statistics of the 
independent variables in the model of monitoring mechanisms are presented in 
Table 4.5.
Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics o f the independent variables in the model o f monitoring 
mechanism
Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Formal Monitoring 3.417772 3.461538 0.574215 2.384615 4.538462 58
Informal Monitoring 4.031034 4 0.410052 3.2 5 58
Venture age 7.781818 7 3.690282 2 21 55
Size (logarithm) 1.787719 1.69897 0.609519 0.778151 3.041393 53
The confirmatory factor analysis was conducted simultaneously for the two 
monitoring mechanisms. The factor analysis identified the number of factors 
above one is two. Table 4.6 shows that the cumulative percent of variance 
accounted for by factor 1 and 2 is over 74.67%.
Table 4.6 Initial Eigenvalues
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues
Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 11.4007 63.3371 63.3371
2 2.0396 11.3314 74.6684
3 0.7658 4.2546 78.9230
4 0.7304 4.0576 82.9806
5 0.5709 3.1719 86.1526
6 0.5164 2.8687 89.0212
7 0.3871 2.1504 91.1717
8 0.3485 1.9359 93.1076
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9 0.2749 1.5273 94.6349
10 0.2575 1.4305 96.0654
11 0.1763 0.9795 97.0449
12 0.1616 0.8977 97.9427
13 0.1151 0.6395 98.5822
14 0.0842 0.4680 99.0502
15 0.0653 0.3630 99.4132
16 0.0456 0.2535 99.6667
17 0.0374 0.2080 99.8747
18 0.0226 0.1253 100
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
The principal factor method was used to extract the factors, and this was 
followed by a promax (oblique) rotation. In interpreting the rotated factor loading, 
an item was said to load on a given factor if the factor loading was .40 or greater 
for that factor, and was less than .40 for the other. Using these criteria five items 
were confirmed to load on the first factor, which was previously labelled the 
Informal monitoring factor. Thirteen items also loaded on the second factor, which 
was labelled the formal monitoring factor. Measurement items and corresponding 
factor loadings and factor structure are presented in the Table 4.7.
Table 4.7 Rotated factor pattern matrix and Factor structure matrix
Factor Loading Factor Structure
Measurement Items Formal Informal Formal Informal
Monitoring Monitoring Monitoring Monitoring
Formal Monitoring Measurement Items
Restrictions on changes in ownership 0.6187* 0.2629 0.6719* -0.0237
Restrictions on mergers & acquisition 0.8783* 0.2272 0.8919* -0.1659
No capital expenditure beyond 
certain limits without approval
0.8881* 0.2022
0.8902* -0.1927
Restrictions on asset disposals 0.8782* 0.1050 0.8401* -0.2766
Restrictions on additional borrowings 0.8375* 0.2787 0.8767* ' -0.1019
Restrictions on top manager's 
appointment
0.8808* 0.2101
0.8869* -0.1824
Restrictions on director 
management's remuneration
0.8351* 0.1987
0.8407* -0.1735
Audited annual accounts 0.8802* 0.3041 0.9262* -0.0971
Requirement o f certain accounting 
policies
0.8846* 0.3211 0.9374* -0.0835
Requirement to use a particular 
auditing firm
0.8519* 0.2829 0.8916* -0.1043
Requirement for direct access to 
investee's accounting system
0.8680* 0.2476 0.8912* -0.1431
Requirement for monthly 
management accounts
0.8824* 0.3038 0.9280* -0.0983
Requirement for evaluation o f  
monthly performance
0.8364* 0.2779 0.8754* -0.1022
Informal Monitoring Measurement Items
VCs has seat on board at the investee 
company
0.2382 0.7944* 0.5521* 0.6189*
VCs has observer seat on board at the 
investee company
0.0409 0.7942* 0.3733 0.7022*
VCs membership o f investee's audit 
committee
0.2896 0.6631* 0.5431* 0.4782*
Frequency o f full board meetings 0.2395 0.7698* 0.5428* 0.5961*
Regular meetings with entrepreneur 0.3475 0.7630* 0.6378* 0.5442*
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Value greater than 0.4 or less than -0.4 have been flagged by an
Formal Monitoring Mechanism
Formal monitoring mechanisms refers to requirements for the provision of 
detailed and regular information and restriction on management’s actions encoded 
in the contract and enterprise’s Articles of Association/Corporate Charter (Purthi, 
Wright and Lockett, 2003). The formal monitoring mechanism construct was 
defined using thirteen measurement items. The items were adopted from 
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart (1995) and Purthi, Wright and Lockett (2003) 
and modified slightly to fit the context of the present study.
The formal monitoring measurement items and corresponding factor
loadings/structure are presented in the Table 4.7. All items loaded on the correct 
factor and had factor loadings .62 or higher, suggesting a good convergent validity. 
The Cronbach’s alpha inter-item reliability coefficient for this construct is .976, 
indicating the thirteen measurement items measure the single unidimensional 
latent construct well.
Informal Monitoring Mechanism
In contrast to formal monitoring mechanisms, which refer to requirements 
encoded in the contract and enterprise’s Articles of Association/Corporate Charter, 
informal mechanisms refers to all the monitoring activities that are not clearly 
codified in a formal contract, such as residual rights of control that are bestowed 
through ownership and monitoring through personal interactions (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995). Informal mechanisms mainly derive from board 
representation and regular meeting between the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneur (Mitchell, Reid and Terry, 1995).
The informal monitoring mechanism construct was defined using five indicators. 
As before, the items were adopted from Mitchell, Reid and Terry (1995), Hart 
(1995) and Purthi, Wright and Lockett (2003) and modified slightly to fit the 
context of the present study. The five informal monitoring measurement items and 
corresponding factor loadings/structure are presented in the Table 4.7. All items 
loaded on the factor with factor loadings higher than .66, suggesting a good 
convergent validity. The Cronbach’s alpha inter-item reliability coefficient for this 
construct is .85, suggesting good reliability for this construct.
4.5.1.2 Value-added
We measured the overall efficacy of value-added offered by venture capitalists
using a multi item scales measuring the value-added support provided by the 
venture capital investors. The construct was operationalized using three 
measurement items. The items were adopted from Maula (2003) and modified 
slightly to fit the context of the present study. Responses to the three measurement 
items were subjected to a principal component analysis using ones as prior 
communality estimates. The principal axis method was used to extract the factor. 
Table 4.8 provides the initial eigenvalues table for analysis.
Table 4.8 Initial Eigenvalues
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues
Total % o f  V ariance C um ulative %
1 2.526 84.191 84.191
2 0.270 8.990 93.180
3 0.205 6.820 100
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
There is only the first factor displayed eigenvalues greater than one in table 4.8. 
The eigenvalue table also shows that the first factor account for over 84% of the 
total variance.
Measurement items and corresponding factor loadings are presented in Table 4.9. 
All the factor loadings are above .908. The Cronbach’s alpha inter-item reliability 
coefficient for this construct is .905. This coefficient exceeds the minimum value 
of .70 recommended by Nunnally (1978). The high reliability coefficient is 
suggesting a good reliability for this construct.
Table 4.9 measurement items and factor loadings for the value-added
construct
Measurement Item Communality Loading
Our value-added support has been critical for our investee's success .865 .930
Our value-added support is extremely valuable for our investee. .825 .908
Our investee are very happy about our value-added support .836 .914
Principal Component Analysis. Unrotated
The descriptive statistics of the dependent variable in the model of value added 
mechanisms (factor-based scales) is presented in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10 Descriptive statistics o f the dependent variable in the model o f monitoring 
mechanisms
Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum N
VC value-added provision 3.7931 3.6667 0.8534 2.3333 5.0000 58
Constructs Measuring the Value-added Mechanisms
In the model of value-added mechanisms, the independent variables are 
knowledge access and resource access. The control variables are venture age, 
venture size (total size of funds available to investment in Mainland China), 
ownership of venture capital firm, and location of venture capital firm. The 
descriptive statistics of the independent variables in the model of monitoring 
mechanisms are presented in Table 4.11.
Table 4.11 Descriptive Statistics o f the independent variables in the model o f monitoring 
mechanism
Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Knowledge access 3.9808 3.6667 0.6051 3 5 58
Resource Access 1.5345 1.0000 1.0796 1 5 58
Venture age 7.781818 7 3.690282 2 21 55
Size (logarithm) 1.787719 1.69897 0.609519 0.778151 3.041393 53
The confirmatory factor analysis was conducted simultaneously for the two 
value-added mechanisms. The factor analysis identified the number of factors 
above one is two. Table 4.12 shows that the cumulative percent of variance 
accounted for by factor 1 and 2 is 74.41%.
Table 4.12 Initial Eigenvalues
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues
Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 5.9227 45.5595 45.5595
2 3.7510 28.8536 74.4132
3 0.8334 6.4106 80.8238
4 0.6862 5.2781 86.1020
5 0.4194 3.2258 89.3278
6 0.3346 2.5740 91.9018
7 0.3203 2.4636 94.3654
8 0.2745 2.1116 96.4770
9 0.1895 1.4576 97.9346
10 0.1220 0.9381 98.8727
11 0.0817 0.6287 99.5014
12 0.0405 0.3113 99.8128
13 0.0243 0.1872 100
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
The principal factor method was used to extract the factors, and this was 
followed by a promax (oblique) rotation. In interpreting the rotated factor loading, 
an item was said to load on a given factor if the factor loading was .40 or greater 
for that factor, and was less than .40 for the other. Using these criteria nine items 
were confirmed to load on the first factor, which was previously labelled the 
knowledge access factor. Four items also loaded on the second factor, which was 
labelled the resource access factor. Measurement items and corresponding factor 
loadings and factor structure are presented in the Table 4.13.
Table 4.13 Rotated factor pattern matrix and Factor structure matrix
Factor Loading Factor Structure
Measurement Items Knowledge
Access
Resource
Access
Knowledge
Access
Resource
Access
Knowledge Access Measurement Items
Managerial knowledge 0.7152* 0.0197 0.7104* -0.0853
Marketing knowledge 0.7994* -0.0532 0.7830* -0.1698
Strategic knowledge 0.8686* -0.0671 0.8494* -0.1936
Accounting knowledge 0.6955* 0.0422 0.6942* -0.0602
Market research on investee's 
products
0.7979* 0.0739 0.8001* -0.0438
Global competition Information 0.8253* -0.0149 0.8142* -0.1357
Local competition Information 0.8532* -0.0289 0.8398* -0.1536
Information/knowledge on customer 
needs & trends
0.8750* 0.0823 0.8776* -0.0468
Customer list 0.8161* 0.2052 0.8373* 0.0834
Resource Access Measurement Items
Production facilities 0.0715 0.9636* 0.2120 0.9427*
Technology 0.0028 0.9725* 0.1453 0.9616*
Research & Development 0.0667 0.9388* 0.2035 0.9189*
Distribution Channel -0.0240 0.9885* 0.1211 0.9813*
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Value greater than 0.4 or less than -0.4 have been flagged by an
Resource Access
Resource access refers to the concrete resources the investee company has 
acquired or got access to through the investment relationship (Maula, 2001). 
Resource access can be further divided into resources related to production and 
technology and resources related to marketing and distribution of the products.
The measurement items for resource access included production facilities, 
technology, R&D and as distribution channels. These items were adopted from 
Maula (2001) and modified slightly to fit the context of the present study. The 
measurement items and factor loadings are presented in Table 4.13. All items 
loaded on the factor with factor loadings higher than .94 suggesting a good 
convergent validity. The Cronbach’s alpha inter-item reliability coefficient for this 
construct is .976, indicating the four measurement items measure the single 
unidimensional latent construct well.
Knowledge Access
In contrast to resource acquisition which refers to accessing concrete resources 
of the investor through the investor relationship, knowledge access refers to the 
learning benefits realized in the investor relationship. Start-up companies may 
learn from their investor about markets, for instance, and customer needs, 
competition, and technological issues.
The knowledge access construct was defined using nine indicators. The items 
were adopted from Yli-Renko et al. (2001a) and Kale et al. (2000) and modified 
slightly to fit the context of the present study. The knowledge access construct is 
in line with Huber’s (1991:97) ‘grafting’ process of organizational learning. The 
measures of the knowledge access construct cover access to knowledge on market 
trends, customer needs, and competition, etc.
The measurement items and factor loadings are presented in Table 4.13. All 
items loaded on the correct factor with factor loadings higher than .70, suggesting 
a good convergent validity. The Cronbach’s alpha inter-item reliability coefficient 
for this construct is .928, providing additional evidence of construct validity.
4.5.1.3 The integrated Monitoring and Value-added Model
In the integrated monitoring and value-added model, the independent variables 
are complementarities and Guanxi (before and after signing a contract). The 
control variables are venture age, venture size (total size of funds available to 
investment in Mainland China), ownership of venture capital firm, and location of 
venture capital firm. The descriptive statistics of the independent variables in the 
monitoring and value-added model are presented in Table 4.14.
Table 4.14 Descriptive Statistics o f the independent variables in the model o f monitoring 
mechanism
Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Complementarities 3.7413 3.6 0.6201 2.6 5 52
Guanxi (Pre-Contract) 3.8491 4 0.5276 2.5 5.25 52
Guanxi (Post-Contract) 4.4137 4.5 0.8077 2.75 6 52
Venture age 7.94 7 3.870 2 21 49
Size (logarithm) 1.8559 1.7853 .60833 .78 3.04 47
Complementarities
Literature espousing the resource-based view stresses the strategic importance of 
exploiting complementarities in resources and capabilities. In addition to resources 
and capabilities, complementarities can also stem from the product or service 
offerings of two companies (Amit and Zott 2001, Brandenburger and Nalebuff 
1996). Amit and Zott (2001) argued that complementarities are present whenever 
having a bundle of goods together provides more value than the total value of 
having each of the goods separately. Similarly, Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) 
stated that, “a player is your complementor if customers value your product more 
when they also have the other player’s product than when they have your product 
alone” (1996:18). Complementors are players from whom customers buy 
complementary products or to whom suppliers sell complementary resources 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995). As an example, hardware and software 
companies are classic complementors. Faster hardware increases users’ 
willingness to pay for more powerful software. More powerful software, such as 
the latest Microsoft Office, increases the users’ willingness to pay for faster 
hardware (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995). In this research, complementarities 
are examined both in resources and capabilities as well as in the products and 
services offered to customers.
In order to capture the wide range of complementarities, the construct was 
defined using five indicators covering complementarities both in resources and/or 
capabilities and in products and/or services. Only one factor over 1.0 emerged in 
the factor analysis indicating good construct validity. The factor loadings were all
above .78 for this construct. The measurement items and factor loadings of this 
construct are presented in Table 4.15. The Cronbach’s alpha inter-item reliability 
coefficient for this construct is .887.
Table 4.15 measurement items and factor loadings for the complementarities
construct_____________________________________________________________
Measurement Item Loading
Our resource/knowledge facilitates the use o f the investee's products/services 0.7782
Our resource/knowledge completes a solution set that the investee's customers are
0.7952
demanding
Our resource/knowledge increases the demand for our investee's products/service 0.8842
Our resource/knowledge is highly complementary with the resource/knowledge o f  ^S932
our investee’s
We have superior capabilities/skills in some areas compare to our investee 0.8388
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Unrotated
Guanxi
The idea of social networks and networking in the Chinese context captures the 
indigenous social phenomenon called Guanxi (King, 1991; Luo, 2000; Tsui and 
Farh, 1997). Guanxi is ubiquitous and comes in many varieties. In this present 
research, a distinction was made between Guanxi before signing a contract and 
Guanxi after signing a contract. We argued that the relationship in these two 
periods is substantially different because two independent companies legally and 
officially form an alliance after signing a contract.
We argued that the better Guanxi between investor and investee before signing a 
contract, the more likely the portfolio companies to accept more rigorous 
restrictions. In order to tackle this research question, it is essential to measure the 
Guanxi between entrepreneur and venture capitalists before signing a contract. The 
measurement items and factor loadings of this construct are presented in Table 
4.16. Only one factor over 1.0 emerged in the factor analysis indicating good
construct validity. The factor loadings were all above .74 for this construct. The 
Cronbach’s alpha inter-item reliability coefficient for this construct is .828.
Table 4.16 measurement items and factor loadings for the pre-contract Guanxi
construct_______________________
Measurement Item Loading
How often are you in contact with your investees at working before signing a  ^^
contract
How often do you meet your Investees after work before signing a contract 0.8178
To what extend do you trust your investees before signing a contract 0.8693
To what extend do you know your investees' senior manager on a personal level  ^%4 7 \
before signing a contract 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Unrotated
The first two items (frequency of interaction both formally and informally) were 
adopted from Lee and Dawes (2005). The two other items (trust and knowledge of 
investee’s people on personal level) have earlier been used by Ganesan (1994), 
Chen and Peng (2008), Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) and Yli-Renko et al. (2001a) in 
measuring social interaction in organizational relationships.
Similarly, in informal monitoring mechanism model, Guanxi after signing a 
contract was defined using four indicators measuring various facets of the social 
interaction between the venture and the venture capital investor. The measurement 
items and factor loadings of this construct are presented in Table 4.17. The factor 
loadings were all above .85 in this construct. The Cronbach’s alpha inter-item 
reliability coefficient for this construct is .868.
Table 4.17 measurement items and factor loadings for the post-contract Guanxi 
construct
Measurement Item Loading
How often are you in contact with your investees at working after signing a contract 0.8537
How often do you meet your Investees after work after signing a contract 0.8554
To what extent do you trust your investees after signing a contract 0.8710
To what extent do you know your investees' senior manager on a personal level after 0.8636
signing a contract
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Unrotated
4.5.1.4 Control Variables
Firm age was measured in years since founding on the basis of information 
provided by the respondents. Firm size was measured as the total size of funds 
available to investment in Mainland China at the end of 2006 according to the 
information provided by the respondents. The logarithm of the amount of available 
funds was used in the modelling. Ownership and location of venture capital firm 
effects were controlled in the multiple regression analyses by including dummy 
variables in the analyses.
4.6 Reliability and Validity Analysis
In the dissertation, a considerable amount of attention has been given for 
ensuring the reliability and validity of the results. The hypotheses have been 
developed based on received theories. Related earlier research has been used when 
developing the constructs and measurement items. Most reliable available data 
sources have been used, and the primary data collected in this research has been 
validated through external validation the measures. Statistical methods have been 
carefully selected and employed after ensuring fulfilment of the assumptions. 
Finally, results and conclusions have been carefully analyzed to ensure their 
feasibility. In the following section, the various elements of reliability and validity 
are reviewed in more detail (Carmines and Zeller 1979, Litwin 1995, Nunnally 
1978, Venkatraman and Grant 1986). A summary of the elements is presented in 
Table 4.18. In the following sections, the process by which each of these elements 
has been taken into account in the research is discussed.
Table 4.18 Elements of reliability, validity, and generalizability
Reliability • Reliability o f data sources
• Reliability o f measures
Validity • Face validity: construct conforms to common understanding o f the concept
• Content validity: construct covers all relevant facts o f the concept
• Construct validity: construct theoretically reflects the phenomenon under
study
o Convergent validity: different measures o f the same construct are
correlated
o Discriminant validity: constructs o f the study are conceptually
distinct
• Criterion-related validity: results are in consonance with theory and previous
results
o Concurrent validity: measure is associated with previous validated
measure
o Predictive validity: measure predicts another measure as predicted in
theory
Generalizability • Representativeness
• Generalizability to other contexts
4.6.1 Reliability
Reliability refers to the extent the results of the measurement can be replicated. 
Reliable measurement values are close to their “true” values with little 
measurement error. In this dissertation, several methods were used to ensure the 
reliability. Two dimensions of reliability are explicitly discussed in the next 
section (1) reliability of the empirical data, and (2) reliability of the constructs.
Reliability of the Empirical Data
Reliability of the empirical data refers to the extent how reproducible the 
measurement is (Litwin 1995:6). The analyses in the present study are primarily 
based on primary data collected from the fund managers of venture capital firms 
because of the lack available secondary data covering the measures of interest of 
this study. Several steps were taken to ensure the reliability of the 
single-respondent, self-reported data.
First, in order to maximize the reliability of the data collected by survey, the 
surveys were administered to key informants (John and Reve, 1982). In this study, 
there are the fund managers of the venture capital firms who can be considered to 
be knowledgeable of investment relationships of their investees. In the venture 
capital industry, the fund manager has typically the closest working relationship 
with their portfolio companies. No other person in venture capital firms can be 
expected to be equally knowledgeable of the particular investee relationships and 
their portfolio companies’ performance.
Second, the questionnaire instrument was carefully designed with several rounds 
of revisions. The questionnaire was tested with several VCs and researchers 
familiar with the research questions (Fowler 1993:100-102, Spector 1992). Several 
interviews and the pre-testing of the questionnaire gave confidence to expect that 
the respondents would not have problems understanding the questions and that 
they would be knowledgeable about the issues covered by the questionnaire.
Third, the quality of the data appeared to be good. There were very few missing 
values in the data (only 2.78% of the measurement items missed in the dissertation 
present). The influence of missing values appeared to be insignificant.
Reliability of the Constructs
Reliability of the constructs refers to the extent the measurement of the 
constructs can be considered as reliable. Multi-item scales were used to measure 
all the constructs (Spector 1992). Two main methods were used to examine the 
reliability of the measurement of the constructs: (1) inter-item reliability of the 
constructs and (2) test-retest reliability of the constructs.
Inter-item reliability of the constructs refers to the extent measurement items in 
multi-item scales are correlated with each other. It reflects the degree to which the 
items represent a common latent unobserved construct. The inter-item reliabilities 
of the multi-item constructs were tested using the Cronbach’s alpha measure. 
These measures were .872 or more for all constructs in the analysis. The common 
threshold value for Cronbach’s alpha is .70 (Nunnally 1978). Therefore, all the 
multi-item constructs appear on the basis of this analysis to be highly reliable and 
have high degree of internal consistency (Thorndike, 1996). The results of the 
confirmatory factor analyses and Cronbach’s alphas of the constructs were 
reported in section 4.5. The constructs are summarized in Table 4.19.
Table 4.19 Summery of the constructs
Number of 
Measurement items
Cronbach’s
Alpha
N
Perceived Information Accuracy and 
adequacy
10 .961 52
Formal Monitoring 13 .976 52
Informal Monitoring 5 .850 52
VC value-added provision 3 .905 52
Knowledge access 9 .928 52
Resource Access 4 .976 52
Complementarities 5 .887 52
Guanxi (Pre-Contract) 4 .828 52
Guanxi (Post-Contract) 4 .968 52
Venture age (Years) 1 — 55
Size (Funds) 1 — 53
4.6.2 Validity
Validity refers to the extent a measurement instrument does what it is intended 
to do (Nunnally 1978:86). In the present study, previously validated measures 
have been used when possible in order to improve the validity of the study. In the 
following, the validity of the constructs is discussed in detail divided into four 
dimensions: face validity, content validity, construct validity, and criterion related
validity (Carmines and Zeller 1979, Litwin 1995, Nunnally 1978).
Face Validity
Face validity refers to the extent a construct conforms to the common 
understanding of the related concept (Anastasi, 1988), and was ensured in several 
ways. First, an extensive review of the literature was carried out in order to 
understand the relevant concepts both in theory and in practice. Second, the 
constructs and measurement items were developed on the basis of previous 
research as far as was possible. Third, the questionnaire was developed and 
pre-tested with venture capitalists in the target group academics with experience in 
the relevant fields of research. The measures are in line with common 
understanding of the concepts and previous literature. Therefore, the constructs 
should have good face validity.
Content Validity
Content validity refers to the extent “to which an empirical measurement reflects 
a specific domain of content” (Carmines and Zeller, 1979:20; Venkatraman and 
Grant, 1986). Construct should cover all relevant facets of the concept. In this 
study, several methods were used to ensure and test content validity. First, 
extensive literature reviews were carried out in order to understand the phenomena 
and to identify the most important facets of the constructs. The constructs were 
developed based on previous research and discussions with entrepreneurs and 
investors. Second, all the constructs were operationalized using multiple 
measurement items in order to improve content validity. Content validity was kept 
in mind when developing the constructs and items measuring the constructs. Third, 
the questionnaires were also pre-tested with several VCs and researchers familiar
with the research questions. The content validity and the comprehensiveness of the 
measurement items in measuring the constructs are discussed in more detail in the 
section discussing the construct operationalization.
Construct Validity
Construct validity refers to the extent to which an operationalization measures 
the concept it is supposed to measure (Bagozzi et al., 1991). Construct validity can 
be assessed employing confirmatory factor analysis (Bagozzi et al., 1991; Spector, 
1992). In this study, confirmatory factor analysis was employed to confirm the 
unidimensionality of the multi-item constructs. Confirmatory factor analysis 
indicated that only one factor was represented in each set of items measuring a 
construct and that items measuring different constructs did not load on a common 
factor. In a more in-depth analysis, construct validity can be divided in two 
dimensions that are tested separately: (1) convergent validity and (2) discriminant 
validity.
Convergent validity is the degree to which multiple attempts to measure the 
same concept are in agreement (Bagozzi et al., 1991; Venkatraman and Grant, 
1986). Two or more measures of the same concept should covary highly if they are 
valid measures of the concept (Bagozzi et al., 1991). In this study, several methods 
were used to ensure and test convergent validity. First of all, earlier validated 
constructs and measurement items were used whenever possible. Second, new 
constructs and measurement items were developed on the basis of theory and 
earlier related research. Third, measurement item level correlation matrices were 
examined in order to identify potentially low correlations among measurement 
items belonging to the same constructs. Within factor measurement item 
correlations were found to be high, with 99% of the within factor inter-item
correlations above .50, and all of them exceeding the recommended cut-off value 
of .30 (Hair et al., 1998:118). Fourth, confirmatory factor analysis was carried out. 
All the remaining measurement items load .66 or higher on their primary factor, 
clearly exceeding the common threshold value of .50 (Hair et al., 1998:111) and 
indicating a high degree of internal consistency (Thorndike, 1996).
Discriminant validity is the degree to which measures of different constructs are 
distinct (Bagozzi et al., 1991; Venkatraman and Grant, 1986). If two or more 
concepts are unique, then valid measures of each should not correlate too highly 
(Bagozzi et al., 1991). In this study, several methods were used to ensure and test 
discriminant validity. First, previous validated constructs and measurement items 
were used whenever possible. Second, new constructs and measurement items 
were developed based on theory and earlier related research. Third, measurement 
item level correlation matrices were examined in order to identify potentially high 
correlations among measurement items belonging to different constructs. 
Inter-factor measurement item correlations were found to be low, with 96% of the 
inter-factor correlations below .70, and all of them below the recommended cut-off 
value of .85 (Dijkstra, et al., 1998).
Furthermore, in order to ensure common method variance (Avolio et al., 1991), 
we also examined the possibility of common method variance using Harman’s 
single factor test as suggested by Podsakoff and Organ (1986) and Straub (1989). 
In this procedure, all of items used in the multi-item scales are entered into a factor 
analysis. Following this, the results of the unrotated factor solution are examined 
to determine the number of factors that are necessary to account for the variance in 
the variables. All 57 items yielded 9 factors using the eigenvalue-one criterion 
combined interpretability criteria (Hatcher, 1994: P22-27). The first factor 
explained 59% of the variance and the cumulative percent of variance accounted
for by first 9 factors is 82.8%. Based on this analysis, it appears that common 
method variance is not a serious threat to the validity of this study.
Criterion-Related Validity
Criterion-related validity refers to the extent results are in consonance with 
theory and previous results. It is used to demonstrate the accuracy of a measure or 
procedure by comparing it with another measure or procedure which has been 
demonstrated to be valid. Criterion-related validity can be divided in two 
dimensions: (1) concurrent validity, and (2) predictive validity. Concurrent 
validity refers to the extent the measure is associated with previously validated 
measures (Litwin, 1995:37). There are some earlier validated measures in the 
study that can be used to determine the concurrent validity. In the measure of 
Guanxi, two of the measures had been validated by Yli-Renko et al. (2001a) and 
Tsai and Ghoshal (1998). These measures correlated significantly in the present 
study, indicating concurrent validity. Similarly, measures of knowledge access 
were adopted from previously validated constructs and correlated significantly in 
the present study providing further evidence of the concurrent validity.
Predictive validity refers to the extent the measure predicts another measure as 
predicted in theory (Hough, 1998). Predictive validity is demonstrated in the 
results of the tests of the hypotheses. Results on the hypothesis testing are 
discussed in the next chapter.
4.6.3 Generalizability
Generalizability refers to the extent the results of the study represent the whole 
population (representativeness) and he extent the results can be generalized to 
other contexts. The representativeness and the generalizability of the study to other
contexts are discussed in detail in chapter 6.4 ‘limitations.’
4.6.4 Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) Method
Finally, confirmatory factor analysis within structural equation modelling has 
been used to assess reliability and validity. The results of the confirmatory factor 
analyses on the measurement model (first stage of the two-stage modelling 
procedure) showed the measurement model performed well: standardized factor 
loadings ranged from 0.52 to 0.99 exceeding clearly the recommended minimum 
of 0.40 (Ford et al., 1986). The construct reliabilities ranged from 0.872 to 0.976, 
exceeding the recommended minimum of 0.70. The average variances extracted 
(AVE) ranged from 0.58 to 0.76, exceeding the recommended minimum of 0.50 
(Fomell and Larcker, 1981). Thus, all of the constructs demonstrated good internal 
consistency and reliability. Discriminant validity of the constructs was evaluated 
based on the measurement model. Constructs demonstrate discriminant validity 
when the variance extracted for each is higher than the squared correlation 
between the constructs (Fomell and Larcker, 1981). We examined each pair of 
constructs in our measurement model and found that all demonstrate discriminant 
validity. Convergent validity is also evident from high intra-factor correlations 
between measurement items (five out of seven intra-factor correlations exceeded 
0.50; the remaining two exceeded 0.40). The overall fit of the measurement model 
is also good. The goodness-of-fit index, non-normed fit index and comparative fit 
indices are each over the recommended threshold limit of 0.90. The chi-square 
statistic is also between 1.0 -  2.0 (Hair et al., 1995). Thus, the results indicate that 
all of the constructs are adequate for use in the second stage.
CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH RESULTS
This chapter presents the empirical results from the analyses. First, descriptive 
analyses of the sample companies are reported. The objective is to create a clear 
picture of the venture capital firms included in the analyses. Second, results from 
the statistical analyses are presented. The analyses are presented in three groups 
according to the models developed in Chapter 3: (1) model on monitoring 
mechanisms, (2) model on value-added mechanisms, and (3) model on the role of 
complementarities and Guanxi in monitoring and value-added. For each set of 
hypotheses, the correlation structure is first analyzed followed by a multiple 
regression analysis and mediation tests. Thereafter, an integrated model is tested 
using structural equation modelling.
5.1 Descriptive Analysis
The descriptive analysis is based on the survey and database variables using 
nonmissing values. The purpose of the descriptive analysis is to give an overview 
of the sample firms. In this section, characteristics discussed include firm age, the 
total size of funds available to investment in Mainland China, location where 
respondent based, ownership of the organization, respondent’s industry preference, 
and respondent’s education background and work experience.
5.1.1 Description of the Sample Firms
Ase o f the Sample Firms
The age of the sample firms refers to number of total years venture capital firm 
operated in mainland China at the time of the survey in the end of year 2006. The 
mean age of the sample companies is 7.78 years. More than 80% of the sample VC
firms were younger than 10 years old (Table 5.1). Particularly, more than 60% of 
the sample VC firms were set up in 1999, 2000, and 2001. The location of the 
sample venture capital ultimate head office was used as the indicator for the 
determination of cross-border (foreign) venture capital firm and domestic venture 
capital firm. Sample data shows the increase number of venture capital firms after 
1996 is mainly driven by domestic venture capital firms. 40 out of 43 sample 
domestic venture capital firms (93%) were launched after 1996. In contrast, only 5 
out of 12 foreign VC firms (42%) were established at the same period.
Table 5.1 Age of sample firms
Year of 
funded
Frequency Percent
Nonmissing
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Location o f ultimate 
(Frequency)
head office
In China Outside China
2 1 1.72 1.82 1.82 0 1
3 1 1.72 1.82 3.64 1 0
4 2 3.45 3.64 7.27 2 0
5 6 10.34 10.91 18.18 5 1
6 13 22.41 23.64 41.82 11 2
7 15 25.86 27.27 69.09 15 0
8 5 8.62 9.09 78.18 4 1
9 2 3.45 3.64 81.82 2 0
10 1 1.72 1.82 83.64 0 1
11 1 1.72 1.82 85.45 0 1
12 1 1.72 1.82 87.27 0 1
13 2 3.45 3.64 90.91 1 1
14 2 3.45 3.64 94.55 1 1
17 1 1.72 1.82 96.36 1 0
19 1 1.72 1.82 98.18 0 1
21 1 1.72 1.82 100 0 1
Sub Total 55 94.82 100 43 12
Missing 3 5.17
Total 58 100
Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
7.781818 7 3.690282 2 21
The data reflected the dramatical development of Chinese venture capital
industry. Several important changes happened in the late 1990s that fundamentally 
changed venture capitalists’ perceptions of Chinese firms, especially small private 
firms, which led to continuing capital inflows. Since 1997, venture capital firms 
have been set up by local government, corporations, international venture capital 
funds and even individuals.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Chinese government has played an important 
role in the venture capital boom since 1997. In 1997, Chinese government 
announced that the private economy is “an important component” of China’s 
economy. In the context of Chinese politics, this language change was a 
fundamental change of policies and China’s Constitution was amended in 1999 to 
further promote the status of private ownership, with private firms were allowed to 
be listed on China’s domestic stock exchanges in the late 1990s. The listing quota 
system that heavily favoured state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) was abolished in 
2000. These more-secure property rights have encouraged private firms to plan for 
long-term development and to be more receptive to external financing. Venture 
capitalists also came increasingly to believe that private firms, especially small 
private firms, could succeed in China’s market.
The Chinese government sees the development of venture capital as a tool to 
promote China’s science and technology (White, Gao and Zhang, 2002) and 
encouraged the establishment of state owned enterprise (SOE) venture capital 
firms in the late 1990s to invest in high-tech firms. More than 50 domestic venture 
capital firms were established by the Chinese governments and SOEs in the late 
1990s. The Chinese government also give high-tech firms preferential access to 
IPOs, with a NASDAQ-like ‘second board’ established in 2004 which makes it 
easier for small firms to have IPOs. All these policies have encouraged the 
establishment of new venture capital firms in late 1990s.
The data also revealed venture capital is a relatively new phenomenon in China. 
Venture capital investment was brought by foreign venture capitalists. Only 6.9% 
of the sample domestic VC firms were established before 1997. The sample data 
was in line with AVCJ’s annual report (2002) that shows foreign venture capital 
firms accounted for more than 90% of the total fund raised from 1991-1997, 
although the proportion fell to just above 35% from 1998 to 2000.
Size o f the Sample Firms
The size of the sample firms was measured in terms of the total size of funds 
available to investment in Mainland China at the time of the survey in the end of 
year 2006. On average, the sample companies had US$157 million funds available 
to invest in China, with half of the companies having less than US $50 million, 
and the biggest firm having US$1100 million (Table 5.2). Most of sample 
domestic VC firms have relatively small funds with 36 out of the 42 domestic 
venture capital firms’ (85.7%) fund size below average. In contrast, only 2 out of 
11 sample foreign venture capital firms’ (18%) have a fund size lesser than 
average.
Table 5.2 Fund size of the sample firms (USD Million)
Fund Size 
(USSMillion 
)
Frequenc
y
Percent
Nonmissin 
g Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Location of 
(Frequency)
ultimate head office
In China Outside China
6 2 3.45 3.77 3.77 2 0
9 1 1.72 1.89 5.66 1 0
10 1 1.72 1.89 7.55 1 0
12 1 1.72 1.89 9.43 1 0
13 4 6.90 7.55 16.98 4 0
14 1 1.72 1.89 18.87 1 0
15 1 1.72 1.89 20.75 1 0
17 2 3.45 3.77 24.53 2 0
- 157
19 1 1.72 1.89 26.42 1 0
21 1 1.72 1.89 28.30 1 0
25 2 3.45 3.77 32.08 2 0
28 2 3.45 3.77 35.85 2 0
30 4 6.90 7.55 43.40 4 0
42 1 1.72 1.89 45.28 1 0
46 1 1.72 1.89 47.17 1 0
50 3.45 3.77 50.94 1 1
60 3.45 3.77 54.72 2 0
61 1 1.72 1.89 56.60 1 0
64 1 1.72 1.89 58.49 1 0
79 1 1.72 1.89 60.38 1 0
80 1 1.72 1.89 62.26 0 1
100 1 1.72 1.89 64.15 1 0
110 1 1.72 1.89 66.04 1 0
141 3.45 3.77 69.81 2 0
150 1 1.72 1.89 71.70 1 0
163 1 1.72 1.89 73.58 1 0
165 1 1.72 1.89 75.47 0 1
170 1 1.72 1.89 77.36 0 1
200 1 1.72 1.89 79.25 0 1
257 1 1.72 1.89 81.13 1 0
300 3.45 3.77 84.91 0 2
400 1 1.72 1.89 86.79 0 1
428 1 1.72 1.89 88.68 1 0
450 1 1.72 1.89 90.57 0 1
470 1 1.72 1.89 92.45 1 0
693 1 1.72 1.89 94.34 1 0
800 2 3.45 3.77 98.11 0 2
1100 1 1.72 1.89 100 1 0
Sub Total 53 91.37 100 42 11
Missing 5 8.63
Total 58 100
Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
157.6226 50 236.927 6 1100
Geographic location o f the Sample Firms
The geographical location of the sample companies was clustered in several key 
areas following the general geographical distribution of venture capital firms in the
Mainland China. Beijing was the most common spot, with 41.38% of the sample 
venture capital firms being located there. Shanghai was the second most common 
location, with 20.69% of the sample venture capital firms. Followed by Guandong 
where 12.07% of the sample venture capital firms were based. All of the foreign 
sample venture capital firms were based either in Beijing or Shanghai (Table 5.3).
Table 5.3 Geographic location of the sample firms
Location Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Location o f ultimate head office (Frequency)
In China Outside o f China
Anhui 1 1.72 1.72 1 0
Beijing 24 41.38 43.10 17 7
Fu Jian 3 5.17 48.28 3 0
Guangdong 7 12.07 60.34 7 0
Hubei 4 6.90 67.24 4 0
Heilongjiang 1 1.72 68.97 1 0
Henan 1 1.72 70.69 1 0
Jilin 1 1.72 72.41 1 0
Jiangsu 2 3.45 75.86 2 0
Shanghai 1 2 20.69 96.55 7 5
Shanxi 1 1.72 98.28 1 0
Tianjing 1 1.72 1 0 0 1 0
Total 58 1 0 0 46 1 2
Ownership o f the organization
There are several types of venture capital firms in China. The most mainstream 
of venture capital firm is government-owned investment firm that helps start up 
companies either through state or local venture capital funds (Bruton, 2003). 
Government owned venture capital firms were controlled by national or local 
government, usually led by the national/local bureau of the science and technology 
commission and supported by the finance department of national/local government. 
Government-owned venture capital firms have linkages to the local government 
and thereby represent preferential access to information and investment 
opportunities. This can also be a weakness, however, since they are also
susceptible to local government pressure to support new ventures whose risk and 
return prospects are not attractive (White et al., 2002).
The second most common type of venture firm is an independent venture firm 
that has no affiliations with any other institution. These firms invest their capital 
through funds organized as limited partnerships in which the venture capital firm 
serves as the general partner. These are called “independent firms”.
Venture capital firms may also be affiliates or subsidiaries of an industrial 
corporations who make investments on behalf of the parent itself. These firms are 
typically called “corporate venture capital investors.” As most of the big Chinese 
corporations are state-owned, the government has significant influence on these 
venture capital firms operations.
There are a number of venture capital firms which are backed by universities. 
These venture capital firms benefit tremendously from their university ties, giving 
them privileged access to new venture investment opportunities. On the other hand, 
their investment opportunities are in practice limited to those that emerge from the 
university. University-backed venture capital firms generally followed a relatively 
similar mode of state-owned corporation’s operation (White, Steven, Gao and 
Zhang, 2002).
The ownership of the sample firms are quite representative of the country at 
large with 46.55% of the sample firm being government-owned venture capital 
firms and 36.21% being independent venture capital firms. All of the foreign 
sample venture capital firms are independent venture firm. 59% of domestic 
sample firms are government owned. (Table 5.4).
Table 5.4 Ownership of the sample firms
Ownership Frequency
Percen
t
Cumulati
ve
Percent
Location of ultimate head office 
(Frequency)
In China Outside o f China
Independent VC 2 1 36.21 36.21 9 1 2
Corporate VC Firm 9 15.52 51.72 9 0
University-backed VC 1 1.72 53.45 1 0
Government own firm 27 46.55 1 0 0 27 0
Total 58 1 0 0 46 1 2
Industry preference o f respondent
This research focuses only on the relationship between venture capital firms and 
their high-technology based start-up investees. As specified earlier, the 
classification of high technology firms was drawn from the Venture Economics 
database, which includes seven categories: Biotechnology, Communications, 
Computer Hardware, Computer Software and Services, Internet Specific, 
Medical/Health, and new energy. The respondents from foreign venture capital 
firms mainly invested in semiconductors, internet specific and Medical/Health 
science areas. Fund managers from domestic venture capital firms prefer 
semiconductor investment, although their industry preference is quite evenly 
spread (Table 5.5). The computer software and services sector is most 
unfavourable for both foreign and domestic venture capitalists as piracy seriously 
obstructs the software industry’s development and their profit perspectives.
Table 5.5 Industry preference of respondent
Ownership
Frequenc Percen
t
Cumulati
ve
Location of ultimate head office 
(Frequency)
y Percent In China Outside of China
Biotechnology 9 15.52 15.52 9 0
Medical/Health science 7 12.07 27.59 4 3
Internet specific 9 15.52 43.10 5 4
Communications 8 13.79 56.90 8 0
Computer software and 
services 2 3.45 60.34 2 0
Semiconductors/other electron 18 31.03 91.38 14 4
New energy 5 8.62 100 4 1
Total 58 100 46 12
Respondent's education backeround and previous work experience
The educational background of respondents spans all the levels of education 
with 3 (5.17%) at PhD level. While 38 or 65.52% have Master degree including 22 
(37.93%) with MBA degree. 17 (29.31%) all have Bachelor degrees. More than 
half of the respondents from sample foreign venture capital firms have MBA 
degree while the domestic respondent’s academic levels are fairly well distributed 
(Table 5.6). The majority of the respondents (58.62%) have 
technology/engineering education background (Table 5.7).
Table 5.6 Education level
Education 
(Highest Degree)
Frequenc
y
Percen
t
Cumulati
ve
Percent
Location o f ultimate head office 
(Frequency)
In China Outside of China
Phd 3 5.17 5.17 1 2
Master (not MBA) 16 27.59 32.76 15 1
MBA 22 37.93 70.69 15 7
Bachelor 17 29.31 100 15 2
Total 58 100 46 12
Table 5.7 Degree subject
Education 
(Degree Subject)
Frequenc
y
Percen
t
Cumulati
ve
Percent
Location o f ultimate head office 
(Frequency)
In China Outside o f China
T echnology/Engineerin
g 34 58.62 58.62 25 9
Finance/Banking 17 29.31 87.93 15 2
Accounting 1 1.72 89.66 0 1
Other 6 10.34 100 6 0
Total 58 100 46 12
The data shows that most of respondents have previous work experience. Only
one respondent hasn’t worked anywhere else before joining their current employer. 
The previous work experience of respondents also varies from banking 
professionals through civil servants in government. While industry technicians 
make up the majority of the respondents, more than half of the respondent worked 
in industry before joining current venture capital firm. There are 7 (12.07%) 
respondents, all from domestic venture capital firms, who worked in government 
before joining their current venture capital firm (Table 5.8).
Table 5.8 Previous work experience
Work
Experience
(industry)
Frequency
Percen
t
Nonmissin 
g percent
Cumulati
ve
Percent
Location of ultimate head office 
(Frequency)
In China Outside o f China
Banking 12 20.69 21.05 21.05 11 1
Venture capital 8 13.79 14.04 35.09 2 6
Industry 30 51.72 52.63 87.72 25 5
Government 7 12.07 12.28 100 7 0
Sub Total 57 98.28 100 45 12
Missing 1 1.72
Total 58 100
The average years of venture capital investment experience is 6.09. In terms of 
venture capital investment experience, respondents from sample foreign venture 
capital firms clearly have the predominance with 67% having above average 
investment experience as compared with only 13% from domestic sample firms 
(Table 5.9). 67% of respondents from sample foreign firms have undertaken 
venture capital investments outside of China while only 9% of the respondents 
from domestic firms have the same experience (Table 5.10).
Table 5.9 Years in venture capital industry
Years in 
VC 
industry
Frequency
Percen
t
Nonmissin 
g percent
Cumulati
ve
Percent
Location o f ultimate head office 
(Frequency)
In China Outside of China
3 11 18.97 19.30 19.30 9 2
4 12 20.69 21.05 40.35 12 0
5 13 22.41 22.81 63.16 13 0
6 7 12.07 12.28 75.44 5 2
7 1 1.72 1.75 77.19 0 1
8 3 5.17 5.26 82.46 1 2
10 1 1.72 1.75 84.21 0 1
11 2 3.45 3.51 87.72 2 0
12 2 3.45 3.51 91.23 2 0
13 2 3.45 3.51 94.74 1 1
14 1 1.72 1.75 96.49 0 1
15 1 1.72 1.75 98.25 0 1
17 1 1.72 1.75 100 0 1
Sub Total 57 98.28 100 45 12
Missing 1 1.72
Total 58 100
Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
6.088 5 3.471 3 17
Table 5.10 Venture capital experience outside of China
VC Experience 
outside of China
Frequenc Percen
t
Cumulati
ve
Location of ultimate head office 
(Frequency)
y Percent In China Outside o f China
Yes 12 20.69 20.69 4 8
No 46 79.31 100 42 4
Total 58 100 46 12
5.1.2 Summary of the Descriptive Analysis
To summarize the analysis of the characteristics of the sample venture capital 
firms, it can be said that most of the sample venture capital firms are young. As 
compared to domestic firms, foreign venture capital firm were relatively larger and 
only focused on a few industry sectors in the limited geographic area. The 
majority of the domestic venture capital firms are government owned. They 
spanned nearly all over the country and invested in every single high-tech industry 
sector because they have the responsibility to follow the National Technology 
Development Guideline and balance investment geographically.
5.2 Model on the Monitoring Mechanisms
This section reports the results of analyses testing the model on the monitoring
mechanisms.
5.2.1 Correlations Among Variables
Table5.11 presents the inter-correlations among variables in the model on the 
monitoring mechanisms. Correlations indicated that both formal and informal 
monitoring mechanism factors are significantly correlated with the perceived 
information accuracy and adequacy from investees (p<.001), as hypothesized. All 
the correlations are below .75 (recommended threshold value .85) suggesting that 
multicollinearity should not be a problem in the model.
Table5.11 Correlations among variables in the model on the value-added mechanisms
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
1 Perceived information -
2 Formal monitoring 0.742*** -
3 Informal monitoring 0.720*** 0.554*** -
4 Firm age 0.138 0.149 0.051 -
5 Firm Size (log) 0.290* 0.470*** 0.238J 0.324* -
6 Independent VC (dummy) 0 .686*** 0.566*** 0.626*** 0.222 0.406**
7 Corporate VC (dummy) 0.047 0.098 0.045 0.055 -0.199
8 -0.711** -0.632** -0.639**
Government-owned VC (dummy) * * * -0.2301 -0.290*
9 University subsidiary VC
(dummy) 0.039 0.070 -0.003 -0.066 0.004
1 -0.505** -0.427** -0.405* -0.516**
0
1
Domestic VC (dummy) * -0.353** * * *
1
1 Foreign VC (dummy) 0.505*** 0.353** 0.427*** 0.405** 0.516***
***p<001, **p<01, *p<05, }p< 10, two tailed.
5.2.2 Multiple Regression Analysis of Hypotheses
Multiple regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses in the model on the 
monitoring mechanisms. After confirmatory factor analysis, factor-based scales 
(Hatcher, 1994) were used in testing the hypothesized relationships between the 
variables.
Regression Tests o f Hypotheses 1-2: formal and informal monitorine
influencing the accuracy and adequacy o f perceived information from investees
Table 5.12 presents the results of the regression analyses for Hypotheses 1-2. In 
the table, unstandardized coefficients b-value, standard error of unstandardized 
coefficients b-value, standardized beta coefficients are presented for independent 
variables and control variables. For the hypothesized paths, the significance tests 
are one-tailed. For the control variables, the significance tests are two-tailed. All 
variables were entered simultaneously. In the regression analysis, variance 
inflation factors were examined to detect potential problems from multicollinearity. 
All VIF statistics were 3.1 or lower and tolerance statistics were .322 or higher 
indicating that multicollinearity should not cause problems in the regression 
analysis (Myers, 1990; Bowerman and O’Connell, 1990; Menard, 1995).
Table 5.12 Regression Tests o f Hypotheses 1-2: formal and informal monitoring influencing the 
accuracy and adequacy o f perceived information from investees
Predicted Dependent variable: Perceived
direction information
B Std. Error Beta
Independent variable
Hypothesis 1: formal monitoring + 0.518**
0.608 0.123 *
Hypothesis 2: Informal monitoring + 0.436 0.181 0.254*
Control variables
Firm age 0.000 0.019 -0.001
Firm Size (log) -0.285 0.129 -0.219*
Independent VC (dummy) 0.325 0.201 0.206
Corporate VC (dummy) 0.112 0.235 0.039
University subsidiary VC (dummy) 0.256 0.416 0.046
Foreign VC (dummy) 0.419 0.200 0.223*
Model indices 
R2 .776
Adjusted R2 
F
.734
18.61* *
*
***p<.001 , ** p<01, *p<05, }p<10, , Hypothesized paths one-tailed tests, controls two
tailed
Hypothesis 1 predicted positive relationships between the formal monitoring 
mechanism and the perceived information accuracy and adequacy. Hypothesis 1 
received strong support from the data. Formal monitoring mechanism was 
significantly positively related to perceived information (fi = .518, p<001). The 
significant (3 associated with larger t value indicates the informal monitoring 
mechanism was making a significant contribution to the model (t = 4.94).
Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive relationship between informal monitoring 
mechanism and the perceived information accuracy and adequacy. This hypothesis 
also received support from the regression analysis presented in Table 5.12. 
Informal monitoring was significantly positively related to perceived information 
(P = .254,/? < .05).
Of the control variables, firm size is negatively related to perceived information 
accuracy and adequacy (p = -.219, p  < .05). The smaller the company, the more 
accurate and adequate perceived information. Also, compared to the base group 
(domestic venture capital firm), foreign venture capital firms enjoyed more 
accurate and adequate perceived information through informal monitoring (p 
= .223, p < .05).
5.3 Model on the Value-added Mechanisms
This section reports the results of analyses testing the model on the value-added 
mechanisms.
5.3.1 Correlations Among Variables
Table 5.13 presents the correlations among variables in the model on the 
value-added mechanisms. As hypothesized, correlations indicated that knowledge 
access was significantly correlated with the value-added provision (p<.001). 
However, resource access was not significantly related to value-added provision. 
This result will be discussed in the next chapter. Most of the correlations are well 
below .75, and all of the correlations are below recommended threshold value .85 
suggesting that multicollinearity should not be a problem in the model.
Table 5.13 Correlations among variables in the model on the value-added
mechanisms
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4
Value-added provision 
Resource access 
Knowledge Access 
Firm age
0.113
0.779***
0.123
0.069
0.022 0.169
5 Firm Size (log) 0.260 -0.076 0.371** 0.324* -
6 Independent VC (dummy) 0.754*** -0.141 0.835*** 0.222 0.406**
7
Corporate VC (dummy) -0.073
0.650**
* -0.146 0.055 -0.199
8
Government-owned VC (dummy)
-0.675**
* -0.249
-0.704**
* -0.230 -0.290*
9 University subsidiary VC 
(dummy) -0.072 -0.035 -0.094 -0.066 0.004
1
0
1
1
Domestic VC (dummy)
-0.477**
* 0.126
-0.702**
*
-0.405*
*
-0.516**
*
Foreign VC (dummy) 0.477*** -0.126 0.702*** 0.405** 0.516***
***p<001, **p<01, *p<05, $p< 10, two tailed.
5.3.2 Multiple Regression Analysis of Hypotheses
Multiple regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses in the model on the 
value-added mechanisms. After confirmatory factor analysis, factor-based scales 
(Hatcher, 1994) were used in testing the hypothesized relationships between the 
variables.
Regression Tests o f Hypotheses 3-4: Resource Access and Knowledge access
Influencing Value-added vrovison
Table 5.14 presents the results of the regression analyses for Hypotheses 3-4. In 
the table, unstandardized coefficients b-value, standard error of unstandardized 
coefficients b-value, standardized beta coefficients are presented for independent 
variables and control variables. For the hypothesized paths, the significance tests 
are one-tailed. For the control variables, the significance tests are two-tailed. All 
variables were entered simultaneously. In the regression analysis, variance 
inflation factors were examined to detect potential problems from multicollinearity. 
All VIF statistics were 5.4 or lower and tolerance statistics were .19 or higher 
indicating that multicollinearity should not cause problems in the regression 
analysis (Myers, 1990; Bowerman and O’Connell, 1990; Menard, 1995).
Table 5.14 Regression Tests o f Hypotheses 3-4: resource access and knowledge access influencing 
the accuracy and adequacy of perceived information from investees
Predicted Dependent variable: Value-added 
direction provision
B Std. Error Beta
Independent variable
Hypothesis 3: Resource access + 0.148 0.114 0.185
Hypothesis 4: Knowledge access + 0.623 0.293 0.443*
Control variables
Firm age 0.003 0.026 0.013
Firm Size (log) -0.089 0.165 -0.062
Independent VC (dummy) -0.916 0.546 -0.286
Corporate VC (dummy) -0.775 0.309 -0.453
University subsidiary VC (dummy) -0.625 0.622 -0.100
Foreign VC (dummy) -0.105 0.331 -0.050
Model indices
R2 .655
Adjusted R2 .591
F 10 .2 1 * *
*
***p<001, **p<01, *p<05, }p< 10, Hypothesized paths one-tailed tests, controls two tailed.
Hypothesis 3 predicted positive relationships between resource access and the 
value-added provision. However, resource access was not significantly positively 
related to value-added provision (>5 = . 185, n.s.). The small value of t also suggests 
resource access was not making a significant contribution to the model (t = 1.29). 
This result will be discussed in the discussion of results in next chapter.
Hypothesis 4 predicted a positive relationship between knowledge access and the 
value-added provision. This hypothesis received strong support from the 
regression analysis presented in Table 5.14. Knowledge access is significantly 
positively related to value-added (p = .443,/? < .05).
5.4 The role of Complementarities and Guanxi in 
Integrated Monitoring and Value-added Model
This section reports the results on analyses testing the role of complementarities 
and Guanxi in integrated monitoring and value-added model.
5.4.1 Correlations Among Variables
Table 5.15 presents the correlations among variables in the role of 
complementarities and Guanxi in the integrated monitoring and value-added 
model. Correlations indicate that complementarities, formal monitoring, informal 
monitoring, perceived information, knowledge access, value-added provision, 
Guanxi before signing contract, and Guanxi after signing contract were all 
significantly related to each other. However, resource access was not 
significantly related to other variables. 90% of the correlations are well below .75,
and all of the correlations are below recommended threshold value .85 suggesting 
that multicollinearity should not be a problem in the model.
Table 5.15 Correlations among variables in the model on the value-added mechanisms
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Formal monitoring -
2 Informal monitoring 0.554*** -
3 Resource access 0.141 0.205 -
4 Knowledge Access 0.564*** 0.724*** 0.069 -
5 Complementarities 0.601*** 0.798*** 0.278* 0.839*** -
6 Guanxi (pre contract) 0.107 -0.098 -0.135 -0.092 -0.280* -
7 Guanxi (post contract) 0.620*** 0.761*** 0.218$ 0.843*** 0.816*** -0.149 -
8 Perceived information 0.742*** 0.720*** 0.167 0.749*** 0.777*** -0.153 0.764*** -
9 Value-added provision 0.595*** 0.647*** 0.113 0.779*** 0.748*** -0.129 0.784*** 0.783*** -
10 Firm age 0.149 0.051 0.022 0.169 0.127 -0.068 0.097 0.138 0.123 -
11 Firm Size (log) 0.470*** 0.238$ -0.076 0.371** 0.414** 0.102 0.267$ 0.290* 0.260$ 0.324* -
12 Independent VC (dummy) 0.566*** 0.626*** -0.141 0.835*** 0.696*** -0.019 0.780*** 0 .686*** 0.754*** 0.222 0.406**
13 Corporate VC (dummy) 0.098 0.045 0.650*** -0.146 0.161 -0.308* 0.054 0.047 -0.073 0.055 -0.199
14 Government-owned VC (dummy) -0.632*** -0.639*** -0.249$ -0.704*** -0.772*** 0.180 -0.768*** -0.711*** -0.675*** -0.230$ -0.290*
15 University subsidiary VC (dummy) 0.070 -0.003 -0.035 -0.094 -0.030 0.102 -0.110 0.039 -0.072 -0.066 0.004
16 Domestic VC (dummy) -0.353** -0.427*** 0.126 -0.702*** -0.616*** 0.036 -0.507*** -0.505*** -0.477*** -0.405** -0.516***
17 Foreign VC (dummy) 0.353** 0.427*** -0.126 0.702*** 0.616*** -0.036 0.507*** 0.505*** 0.477*** 0.405** 0.516***
***p<001, **p<01, *p< 05, }p<10, two tailed.
5.4.2 Multiple Regression Analysis of Hypothesis
Multiple regression analysis was used to test the role of complementarities and 
Guanxi in the monitoring and value-added model. After confirmatory factor 
analysis, factor-based scales (Hatcher, 1994) were used in testing the hypothesized 
relationships between the variables.
Resression Test o f Hypothesis 5: Complementarities Influencing Guanxi
Table 5.16 presents the results of the regression analyses testing the hypothesis 
of complementarities influencing the Guanxi between venture capitalist and 
investee both before and after signing a contract. In the table, standardized beta 
coefficients are presented for independent variables and control variables. For the 
hypothesized paths, the significance tests are one-tailed. For the control variables, 
the significance tests are two-tailed. All variables were entered simultaneously. All 
VIF-statistics for hypotheses 5b were 3.7 or lower and tolerance statistics were .27 
or higher indicating that multicollinearity should not cause problems in the 
regression analysis (Myers, 1990; Bowerman and O’Connell, 1990; Menard, 
1995).
Table 5.16 Regression Tests o f Hypotheses 5: resource access and knowledge access influencing 
the accuracy and adequacy o f perceived information from investees
Predicte
d
directio
n
Dependent variable. 
Before signing 
contract
Guanxi 
After signing 
Contract
Independent variable
Hypothesis 5 a: Complementarities - -0.348
Hypothesis 5b: Complementarities + 0.551***
Control variables
Firm age -0.062 -0.044
Firm Size (log) 0.286 -0.092
- 173
Independent VC (dummy) 0.037 0.544***
Corporate VC (dummy) -0.265 0.020
University subsidiary VC (dummy) 0.081 -0.045
Foreign VC (dummy) -0.003 -0.134
Model indices
R2 .256 .786
Adjusted R2 .137 .753
F 2.16*** 23.16***
***p<001, ** p<,01, *p<05, fp<10, Hypothesized paths one-tailed tests, controls two
tailed.
Hypothesis 5 a states that complementarities are positively related to Guanxi 
before signing a contract. However, complementarities were not significantly 
related to Guanxi before signing the contract (p > .172). This result will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
Hypothesis 5b states that complementarities are positively related to Guanxi 
after signing a contract. Hypothesis 5b received strong support from the regression 
analysis that presented in Table 5.16. Complementarities are significantly 
positively related to Guanxi between the venture and the venture capital investor 
after signing the contract (p = .551 ,P <  .001). The significant p associated with 
larger t value indicates the complementarities was making a significant 
contribution to the Guanxi after venture capitalist signed a contract with investee (t 
= 4.1).
Of the control variables, only the dummy variable “independent venture capital” 
was significant related to Guanxi after signing contract (P = .544, p < .001) 
indicating that independent venture capitalists, on average, have closer Guanxi 
with their portfolio companies among several different type of venture capital 
firms after signing a contract.
Reeression Tests o f Hypotheses 6 and 10: Complementarities and Guanxi
influencing formal monitoring
Table 5.17 presents the results of the regression analyses testing the hypothesis 
of complementarities and Guanxi influencing the usage of formal monitoring 
measures. In the table, unstandardized coefficients b-value, standard error of 
unstandardized coefficients b-value, standardized beta coefficients are presented 
for independent variables and control variables. For the hypothesized paths, the 
significance tests are one-tailed. For the control variables, the significance tests are 
two-tailed. All variables were entered simultaneously. All VIF-statistics were 4.34 
or lower and tolerance statistics were .23 or higher indicating that multicollinearity 
should not cause problems in the regression analysis (Myers, 1990; Bowerman and 
O’Connell, 1990; Menard, 1995).
Table 5.17 Regression Tests of Hypotheses 6 and 10: Complementarities and Guanxi influencing 
formal monitoring
Predicted
direction
Dependent variable: Formal monitoring 
B Std. Error Beta
Independent variable
Complementarities + 0.364 0.214 .345/
Guanxi (before signing contract) + 0.309 0.154 .239/
Control variables
Firm age -0.006 0.024 -0.031
Firm Size (log) 0.329 0.149 0.298*
Independent VC (dummy) 0.563 0.240 0.420*
Corporate VC (dummy) 0.560 0.334 0.228
University subsidiary VC (dummy) 0.485 0.502 0.102
Foreign VC (dummy) -0.378 0.266 -0.236
Model indices
R2 .544
Adjusted R2 .459
F 6 4 ***
***p<001, ** p<.01, *p<-05, }p<10, Hypothesized paths one-tailed tests, controls two
tailed.
In the analysis of factors influencing the formal monitoring, hypotheses 6 
predicted a positive relationship between complementarities and formal 
monitoring. Hypotheses 6 received weak support from the regression analysis 
presented in Table 5.17. The regression analysis shows complementarities were 
significantly positively related to the usage of formal monitoring measures (P 
= .345, p < .1).
Hypotheses 10 predicted a positive relationship between Guanxi and formal 
monitoring. This hypotheses received support from the data, the regression 
analysis showed Guanxi was significantly positively related to the usage of formal 
monitoring measures, although the relationship was weak (p = .239, p < .1).
Of the control variables in this model, only the dummy variable shows 
independent venture capital was significantly related to formal monitoring (p 
= .420, p < .05) indicating independent venture capital used relatively more 
restriction covenants in a formal contract compared to the base group—state 
owned venture capital firm. Also, firm size is positively related to usage of formal 
monitoring (p = .298, p  < .05). The larger the venture capital company, the more 
restriction covenants that are used.
Resression Tests o f Hypotheses 7 and 11: Complementarities and Guanxi 
influencing informal monitorins
Table 5.18 presents the results of the regression analyses testing the hypothesis 
of complementarities and Guanxi influencing the informal monitoring. In the table, 
unstandardized Coefficients b-value, standard error of unstandardized Coefficients 
b-value, standardized beta coefficients are presented for independent variables and 
control variables. For the hypothesized paths, the significance tests are one-tailed.
For the control variables, the significance tests are two-tailed. All variables were 
entered simultaneously. All VIF-statistics were 5.12 or lower and tolerance 
statistics were .21 or higher indicating that multicollinearity should not cause 
problems in the regression analysis (Myers, 1990; Bowerman and O’Connell, 
1990; Menard, 1995).
Table 5.18 Regression Tests o f Hypotheses 7 and 11: Complementarities and Guanxi influencing 
informal monitoring
Predicted Dependent variable: Informal monitoring 
direction B Std. Error Beta
Independent variable
Complementarities +
+
0.241 0.152 0.291
0.719**
Guanxi (after signing contract) 0.450 0.110 *
Control variables
Firm age 0.011 0.015 0.068
Firm Size (log) 0.004 0.090 0.005
Independent VC (dummy) -0.027 0.180 -0.026
Corporate VC (dummy) -0.184 0.201 -0.095
University subsidiary VC (dummy) 0.209 0.311 0.056
Foreign VC (dummy)
Model indices 
R2
Adjusted R2 
F
-0.239 0.167 -0.189
.718
.666
13.7***
***p<001, ** p<.01, *p<.05, $p< 10, Hypothesized paths one-tailed tests, controls two
tailed.
Hypothesis 7 predicted a positive relationship between complementarities and 
informal monitoring. This hypothesis did not receive support from the regression 
analysis. Complementarities are not significantly positively related to informal 
monitoring (P = .291, n.s.). This result will be discussed in the discussion of 
results in next Chapter.
Hypothesis 11 predicted a positive relationship between Guanxi and informal
monitoring. This hypothesis received support from the regression analysis 
presented in Table 5.18. Guanxi is significantly positively related to informal 
monitoring (p = .719, p < .001).
Reeression Tests o f Hypotheses 13: Informal Monitorins relating Formal 
Monitorins
Table 5.20 presents the results of the regression analyses testing the hypothesis 
of informal monitoring relating the formal monitoring. In the table, unstandardized 
coefficients b-value, standard error of unstandardized coefficients b-value, 
standardized beta coefficients are presented for independent variables and control 
variables. For the hypothesized paths, the significance tests are one-tailed. For the 
control variables, the significance tests are two-tailed. All variables were entered 
simultaneously. All VIF-statistics were 5.13 or lower and tolerance statistics 
were .20 or higher indicating that multicollinearity should not cause problems in 
the regression analysis (Myers, 1990; Bowerman and O’Connell, 1990; Menard, 
1995).
Table 5.19 Regression Tests of Hypotheses 13: Informal Monitoring influencing Formal 
Monitoring
Predicted Dependent variable: Formal Monitoring
direction B Std. Error Beta
Independent variable
Informal Monitoring + 0.598 0.170 0.466**
Control variables
Firm age -0.010 0.022 -0.050
Firm Size (log) 0.429 0.133 0.385**
Independent VC (dummy) 0.303 0.222 0.224
Corporate VC (dummy) 0.464 0.255 0.187/
University subsidiary VC (dummy) 0.510 0.467 0.106
Foreign VC (dummy) -0.186 0.224 -0.115
Model indices
R2
Adjusted R2 
F
.599
.535
g 3 7 * * *
***p<001, ** p< 01, *p<05, }p<10, Hypothesized paths one-tailed tests, controls two
tailed.
Hypothesis 13 predicted a positive relationship between informal monitoring and 
formal monitoring. This hypothesis received support from the regression analysis. 
Informal monitoring was significantly positively related to formal monitoring (p 
= .466, p < .01).
Resression Tests o f Hypotheses 8 and 14: Complementarities and Guanxi 
influencing resource access
Table 5.20 presents the results of the regression analyses testing the hypothesis 
of complementarities and Guanxi influencing the resource access. In the table, 
unstandardized coefficients b-value, standard error of unstandardized coefficients 
b-value, standardized beta coefficients are presented for independent variables and 
control variables. For the hypothesized paths, the significance tests are one-tailed. 
For the control variables, the significance tests are two-tailed. All variables were 
entered simultaneously. All VIF-statistics were 5.13 or lower and tolerance 
statistics were .20 or higher indicating that multicollinearity should not cause 
problems in the regression analysis (Myers, 1990; Bowerman and O’Connell, 
1990; Menard, 1995).
Table 5.20 Regression Tests o f Hypotheses 8 and 13: Complementarities and Guanxi influencing 
resource access
Predicted
direction
Dependent variable: Resource Access 
B Std. Error Beta
Independent variable 
Complementarities + 0.446 0.373 0.259
Guanxi (after signing contract) + 0.546 0.269 0.420*
Control variables
Firm age 0.031 0.037 0.093
Firm Size (log) 0.159 0.221 0.088
Independent VC (dummy) -0.893 0.440 -0.407
0.529**
Corporate VC (dummy) 2.119 0.493 *
University subsidiary VC (dummy) -0.172 0.762 -0.022
Foreign VC (dummy) -0.631 0.410 -0.241
Model indices
R2 .608
Adjusted R2 .535
F 8.33***
***p<001, ** p<.01, *p< 05, $p< 10, Hypothesized paths one-tailed tests, controls two
tailed.
Hypothesis 8 predicted a positive relationship between complementarities and 
resource access. This hypothesis didn’t receive support from the regression 
analysis. Complementarities are not significantly positively related to resource 
access (p = .259, n.s.). This result will be discussed in the next Chapter. 
Hypothesis 14 predicted a positive relationship between Guanxi and the resource 
access. The result of the data analysis supports this hypothesis (p = .358, p < .05).
Of the control variables in this model, it can be noted that corporate venture 
capital was significantly positively related to resource access (p = .529, p < .001) 
indicating corporate venture capital offered significantly more resource access on 
their portfolio companies among several different type of venture capital firms.
Regression Tests o f Hypotheses 9 and 15: Complementarities and Guanxi
influencing knowledge access 
Table 5.21 presents the results of the regression analyses testing the hypothesis
of complementarities and Guanxi influencing the knowledge access. In the table, 
unstandardized Coefficients b-value, standard error of unstandardized Coefficients 
b-value, standardized beta coefficients are presented for independent variables and 
control variables. For the hypothesized paths, the significance tests are one-tailed. 
For the control variables, the significance tests are two-tailed. All variables were 
entered simultaneously. All VIF-statistics were 5.32 or lower and tolerance 
statistics were .19 or higher indicating that multicollinearity should not cause 
problems in the regression analysis (Myers, 1990; Bowerman and O’Connell, 
1990; Menard, 1995).
Table 5.21 Regression Tests o f Hypotheses 9 and 14: Complementarities and Guanxi influencing 
knowledge access
Predicted
direction
Dependent variable: Knowledge 
B Std. Error
access
Beta
Independent variable
Complementarities + 0.337 0.117 0.344**
Guanxi (after signing contract) + 0.276 0.084 0.372**
Control variables
Firm age 0.005 0.012 0.027
Firm Size (log) -0.084 0.069 -0.081
Independent VC (dummy) 0.157 0.138 0.126
Corporate VC (dummy) -0.359 0.155 -0.157
University subsidiary VC (dummy) -0.080 0.239 -0.018
Foreign VC (dummy) 0.356 0.129 0.239**
Model indices
R2 .880
Adjusted R2 .858
F 39.57**
*
***p<001, ** p<.01, *p<.05, $p< 10, Hypothesized paths one-tailed tests, controls two
tailed.
Hypothesis 9 states that complementarities are positive related to knowledge 
access. This hypothesis received support from the regression analysis. There was a 
significant positive relationship between complementarities and knowledge access
(p = .344, p < .01).
Hypothesis 15 states that Guanxi are positive related to knowledge access. This 
hypothesis received strong support from the regression analysis. There was a 
significant positive relationship between Guanxi and knowledge access (p = .372,
Of the control variables in this model, it can be noted that knowledge access 
offered by foreign venture capital firm was significantly higher than the base 
group, i.e. the domestic venture capital firm (p = .239, p < .01).
Regression Tests o f Hypotheses 18: Value-added Influencins Monitorins
Table 5.22 presents the results of regression analysis testing the hypotheses 18. 
In the table, unstandardized coefficients b-value, standard error of unstandardized 
coefficients b-value, standardized beta coefficients are presented for independent 
variables and control variables. For the hypothesized paths, the significance tests 
are one-tailed. For the control variables, the significance tests are two-tailed. All 
variables were entered simultaneously. All VIF-statistics were 3.44 or lower and 
tolerance statistics were .291 or higher indicating that multicollinearity should not 
cause problems in the regression analysis (Myers, 1990; Bowerman and O’Connell, 
1990; Menard, 1995).
Table 5.22 Regression Tests of Hypotheses 18: Valued added influencing Monitoring
Predicted
direction
Dependent variable: Perceived 
information 
B Std. Error Beta
Independent variable 
Value-added + 0.496 0.113 0.552***
Control variables
Firm age -0.016 0.022 -0.068
Firm Size (log) 0.021 0.135 0.016
Independent VC (dummy) 0.430 0.231 0.273/
Corporate VC (dummy) 0.478 0.255 0.166/
University subsidiary VC (dummy) 0.702 0.470 0.126
Foreign VC (dummy) 0.215 0.228 0.115
Model indices 
R2
Adjusted R2 
F
.697
.649
14.44***
***p<001, ** p<01, *pS05, $p<lO, Hypothesized paths one-tailed tests, controls two
tailed.
Hypothesis 18 predicted a positive relationship between monitoring and 
value-added. This hypothesis received strong support from the regression 
analysis presented in Table 5.22. Value-added is significantly positively related to 
perceived information (p = .552, p < .001).
Of the control variables in this model, it can be noted that through valued added 
activities independent venture capital and corporate venture capital firms 
perceived more accurate and adequate information from portfolio companies (p < . 
10).
5.4.3 Multiple Regression Analysis of Mediation Effects
Regression Test o f Hypothesis 12: Guanxi mediatins Complementarities 
influence to informal monitoring
Three formal tests of mediation developed by Goodman (1960), Sobel (1982), 
and Aroian (1944/1947) were introduced in the methods section (Chapter 4). The 
results of the Sobel’s, Aroian’s and Goodman’s test of mediation are presented in 
Table 5.23. All the test identify the statistically significant mediation (p < .001). 
Guanxi is the mediator that mediates complementarities influence to informal
monitoring.
Table 5.23 Mediation test of Guanxi mediating the positive relationship between complementarities 
and informal monitoring
Dependent variables: Guanxi Dependent variables: Informal monitoring
Independent variables B Std. Error B Std. Error
Guanxi .451 .080
Complementarities 1.063 .101 .086 .105
Test Statistic Z-value P-value
Sobel Test 4.969 .001
Aroian Test 4.952 .001
Goodman Test 4.987 .001
However, the three tests do not tell one whether partial or full mediation has 
occurred. To identify the partial or full mediation, we followed the Baron and 
Kenny (1986) and Judd and Kenny’s (1981) four steps in testing mediation that 
discussed in the methods section for establishing mediation (Chapter 4.4.3). Table 
5.24 presents the results of the four steps in testing the mediating effects of Guanxi 
mediating the complementarities influence to informal monitoring. In Step 1, 
complementarities (independent variable) are shown to be significantly related to 
informal monitoring (dependent variable). This is shown in the first model in 
Table 5.24 (p = .687, p < .001). In the second step, complementarities 
(independent variable) are shown to be significantly related to Guanxi (mediator 
variable). This is shown in the second model in Table 5.24 (P = .551, p < .001). In 
Step 3, Guanxi (mediator variable) is shown to be significantly related to informal 
monitoring (dependent variable). This is shown in the third model in Table 5.24 (P 
= .719, p < .001). In this third regression model, both the independent variable and 
the mediator variable are included in the analysis simultaneously. In Step 4, it is 
shown that inclusion of Guanxi (mediator variable) in the regression with 
complementarities (independent variable) reduces the influence of 
complementarities on informal monitoring. In order to be able to claim complete
mediation in this testing sequence, the effect of the independent variable should be 
zero when the mediator is included. In this analysis, the effect of 
complementarities was no longer significant after the inclusion of the mediator (P 
= .291, n.s.). Therefore, a full mediation has been identified. It can be claimed that 
Guanxi fully mediates the relationship between complementarities and informal 
monitoring.
Table 5.24 Regression Tests o f Hypotheses 12: Guanxi mediating Complementarities influence to 
informal monitoring
Dependent variable 
Informal monitoring Guanxi Informal monitoring
Independent variable
Complementarities 0.687*** 0.551*** 0.291
Guanxi (after signing contract) 0.719***
Control variables
Firm age 0.036 -0.044 0.068
Firm Size (log) -0.061 -0.092 0.005
Independent VC (dummy) 0.365* 0.544*** -0.026
Corporate VC (dummy) -0.081 0.020 -0.095
University subsidiary VC (dummy) 0.023 -0.045 0.056
Foreign VC (dummy) -0.285/ -0.134 -0.189
Model indices
R2 .608 .786 .718
Adjusted R2 .546 .753 .666
F g 7^*** 23.16*** 13.71***
***p< 001,
two tailed.
p<01, *p<05, }p<10, Hypothesized paths one-tailed tests, controls
Regression Test of Hypothesis 16: Guanxi mediatins complementarities 
influence to resource access
Three more formal tests of mediation developed by Goodman (1960), Sobel 
(1982), and Aroian (1944/1947) were introduced in the methods section (Chapter 
4). The results of the Sobel’s, Aroian’s and Goodman’s test of mediation are
presented in Table 5.25. All the test indicate mediation effects are not statistically 
significant (p > .05). Guanxi is not the mediator that mediates complementarities 
influence to resource access.
Table 5.25 Mediation test o f Guanxi'mediating the positive relationship between complementarities 
and Resource Access
Dependent variables: Guanxi Dependent variables: Resource Access
Independent variables B Std. Error B Std. Error
Guanxi .292 .174
Complementarities 1.063 .101 .484 .223
Test Statistic Z-value P-value
Sobel Test 1.657 .097
Aroian Test 1.649 .099
Goodman Test 1.664 .096
Regression Test o f Hypothesis 17: Guanxi mediatins Complementarities 
influence to knowledge access 
Three more formal tests of mediation developed by Goodman (1960), Sobel 
(1982), and Aroian (1944/1947) were introduced in the methods section (Chapter 
4). The results of the Sobel’s, Aroian’s and Goodman’s test of mediation are 
presented in Table 5.26. All the test indicate statistically significant mediation 
effects (p < .001). Guanxi is the mediator that mediates complementarities 
influence to knowledge access.
Table 5.26 Mediation test of Guanxi mediating the positive relationship between complementarities 
and informal monitoring
Dependent variables: Guanxi Dependent variables: Knowledge Access
Independent variables B Std. Error B Std. Error
Guanxi .639 .052
Complementarities 1.063 .101 .818 .071
Test Statistic Z-value P-value
Sobel Test 7.993 .000
Aroian Test 7.978 .000
Goodman Test 8.008 .000
To identify whether partial or full mediation has occurred, we followed the 
Baron and Kenny (1986) and Judd and Kenny’s (1981) four steps in testing 
mediation that discussed in the methods section for establishing mediation 
(Chapter 4.4.3). Table 5.27 presents the results of the four steps in testing the 
mediating effects of Guanxi mediating the complementarities influence to 
knowledge access. In Step 1, complementarities (independent variable) are shown 
to be significantly related to knowledge access (dependent variable). This is shown 
in the first model in Table 5.27 (P = .549, p < .001). In the second step, 
complementarities (independent variable) are shown to be significantly related to 
Guanxi (mediator variable). This is shown in the second model in Table 5.27 (P 
= .551, p < .001). In Step 3, Guanxi (mediator variable) is shown to be 
significantly related to knowledge access (dependent variable). This is shown in 
the third model in Table 5.27 (p = .372, p < .01). In this third regression model, 
both the independent variable and the mediator variable are included in the 
analysis simultaneously. In Step 4, it is shown that inclusion of resource 
acquisition (mediator variable) in the regression with complementarities 
(independent variable) reduces the influence of complementarities on knowledge 
access. In order to be able to claim complete mediation in this testing sequence, 
the effect of the independent variable should be zero when the mediator is 
included. In this analysis, complementarities still remain significant after the 
inclusion of the mediator (p = .344, p < .01). Therefore, a partial mediation has 
been identified. On the basis of this testing sequence, it can be claimed that 
Guanxi partially mediates the relationship between complementarities and 
knowledge access.
Table 5.27 Regression Tests o f Hypotheses 18: Guanxi mediating Complementarities influence to 
informal monitoring
Dependent variable 
Knowledge access Guanxi Knowledge access
Independent variable
Complementarities 0.549*** 0.551*** 0.344**
Guanxi (after signing contract) 0.372**
Control variables
Firm age 0.010 -0.044 0.027
Firm Size (log) -0.116 -0.092 -0.081
Independent VC (dummy) 0.328** 0.544*** 0.126
Corporate VC (dummy) -0.150 0.020 -0.157*
University subsidiary VC (dummy) -0.035 -0.045 -0.018
Foreign VC (dummy) 0.189 -0.134 0.239***
Model indices
R2 .851 .786 .880
Adjusted R2 .827 .753 .858
F 35.85*** 23.16*** 39.57***
***p<001, ** pSOl, *p<f05, fp<10, Hypothesized paths one-tailed tests, controls two
tailed.
5.5 Integrated Structural Equation Model
This section presents the results from the test of the model integrating the 
previously tested sub-models. Path analysis is carried out using structural equation 
modelling.
5.5.1 Model Fit and Nested Model Testing
Following the procedure outlined in Chapter 4.4 describing the use of structural 
equation modelling in this study, we first examined the feasibility of the parameter 
estimates. The parameter-level examination indicates a good model fit. No 
correlations above 1.00, or negative variances were found (Byrne 2001:75). The 
determinant of sample covariance matrix was also positive definite. Standard 
errors were also reasonable and the direction and significance of the parameters
were according to the underlying theories and hypotheses in fifteen out of sixteen 
hypothesized parameters, also suggesting good fit of the model. These analyses 
should reveal potential severe violations in the model fit. Based on these analyses, 
the model appears to behave well. The parameter estimates are further discussed in 
later sections discussing the results of hypotheses testing.
Table 5.28 Goodness of fit statistics for the structural equation models
Model x2 d f P Normed x2 GFI NNFI CFI AIC PNFI
1 Null Model 442 36 .000 12.28 .275 .000 .000 460 .445
2 Hypothesized model 28.7 19 .071 1.51 .900 .955 .976 80.7 .095
3 Full mediation model I 29.4 20 .080 1.47 .899 .958 .977 79.4 .091
4 Full mediation model II 43.1 20 .002 2.154 .866 .898 .943 93.1 .142
5 Full mediation model III 30.5 20 .062 1.53 .894 .953 .974 80.5 .096
Full mediation model I: Direct path deleted between complementarities and informal monitoring. 
Full mediation model II: Direct path deleted between complementarities and knowledge access. 
Full mediation model III: Direct path deleted between complementarities and resource access. 
Normed Chi-square = Chi-square adjusted by degrees o f freedom, GFI = Joreskog and SOrbom’s 
goodness-of-fit index, compares predicted squared residuals with obtained residuals, not adjusted 
by degrees of freedom; NNFI = Non-Normed Fit Index (Tucker and Lewis’ index) compares 
proposed model to null model, adjusted by degrees o f freedom; and CFI = compares proposed 
model to null model, adjusted by degrees o f freedom; AIC = Akaike information criterion; PNFI = 
Parsimonious normed-fit index.
The next phase of the analysis is the examination of the model as a whole. To 
support the claim of model testing, a nested model approach recommended by 
Anderson and Gerbing (1988) was used. Five different nested models were 
estimated, and the fit statistics are provided Table 5.28. Goodness of fit statistics 
demonstrates hypothesized model (model 2), full mediation model I (model 3) and 
full mediation model III (model 5) all met the fit criteria. These three models of 
perfect model fit in the population are all rejected at the .05 level. The Chi-square 
tests indicate a significant difference between the hypothesized and observed 
covariance matrices. The Normed Chi-square statistics are within acceptable 
threshold limits—1.0-2.0 or 3.0 (Hair et al. 1998). Values very close to or 
above .90 on the goodness-of-fit index and non-normed fit index are also desirable 
(Bentler and Bonett, 1980). The hypothesized model achieved these confines. The 
comparative fit index values were over .974 exceeding the new strict criteria
of .950 thus indicating a good fit (Hu and Bentler 1999). Both the Akaike 
information criterion and parsimonious normed-fit index was relatively smaller 
among 5 models.
As hypothesized model (model 2), full mediation model I (model 3) and full 
mediation model III (model 5) all met the fit criteria, a nested model approach 
recommended by Loehlin (1987:62-67) was employed to assess the fit of the 
hypothesized model and to test its robustness by comparing it to other alternative 
models. Nested model tests are means of internally validating a hypothesized 
model by comparing the Chi-squares of models that differ in the number of paths 
hypothesized. Nested models can be derived from each other by adding or deleting 
paths. A significant difference in Chi-square indicates that the more complex 
model provides a better fit with the data (Steiger et al. 1985: 254).
The five nested models compared in the analysis are: (1) a null model, in which 
no relationships are posited; (2) the hypothesized model; (3) a full mediation 
model in which a direct path deleted between complementarities and informal 
monitoring; (4) a full mediation model in which a direct path deleted between 
complementarities and knowledge access; and (5) a full mediation model in which 
a direct path deleted between complementarities and resource monitoring. Table 
5.29 summarizes the testing sequence employed.
Table 5.29 Nested model testing sequence and difference tests
More Parsimonious Model Less Parsimonious Model A x2 A d f P Preferred
1 Null Model vs 2 Hypothesized model 413.3 17 <.001 Model 2
3 Full mediation model I vs 2 Hypothesized model 0.7 1 >.25 Model 2
4 Full mediation model II vs 2 Hypothesized model 14.4 1 <.001 Model 2
5 Full mediation model III vs 2 Hypothesized model 1.8 1 >.20 Model 2
In the testing sequence, the first comparison is the comparison between the 
hypothesized model and the null model. The goodness-of-fit statistics (Table 5.28)
and the nested model test (Table 5.29) indicate that the hypothesized model 
provides a significant better fit than the null model.
The second comparison is a robustness test testing the strength of the mediation 
effect of Guanxi mediating the complementarities effects to informal monitoring. 
In this comparison, the hypothesized model was compared to the full mediation 
model in which a direct path was deleted from the hypothesized model between 
complementarities and informal monitoring. The difference in Chi-square is 0.7. A 
table of Chi-square indicates that the critical value of Chi-square with 1 degree of 
freedom is 3.841 (p< .05), indicating that there was not significant difference 
between the hypothesized model and parsimonious model.
The third comparison is a robustness test testing the strength of the mediation 
effect of Guanxi mediating the complementarities effects to knowledge access. In 
this comparison, the hypothesized model was compared to the full mediation 
model in which a direct path was deleted from the hypothesized model between 
complementarities and knowledge access. The goodness-of-fit statistics (Table
5.28) and the nested model test (Table 5.29) indicate that the hypothesized model 
provides a significantly better fit than the parsimonious full mediation model II.
The fourth comparison is a robustness test testing the strength of the mediation 
effect of Guanxi mediating the complementarities effects to resource access. In 
this comparison, the hypothesized model was compared to the full mediation 
model in which a direct path was deleted from the hypothesized model between 
complementarities and resource access. The difference in Chi-square is not 
significant (p> .20).
Having tested all the relevant model alternatives, we conclude that the
hypothesized model (Model 2) provides the best fit and terminate the model 
testing. Figure 5-1 presents the diagram of the full mediation model I (Model 3) 
tested using structural equation modelling.
Guanxi (Before) Formal Monitoring
Informal monitoring
Complementanties Guanxi (After)
Knowledge Access
Resource Access
.75
i Perceived Info
k
42***
*** .61
i  Value-Added
Hypothesized model 
Chi-square=28.71 (df-19) 
Normed x2 =1.51 
P=071
e8
** *p < 0 0 1 , * * p < 0 1 ,* p < 0 5 , tp < .1 0
Figure 5-1 Structural equation-modelling results of the hypothesized integrated
model
5.5.2 Path Analyses
Testing the fit of the hypothesized model and finding no signs of 
misspecification allowed testing of the hypotheses made in the hypothesized 
model. Table 5-30 presents the standardized maximum likelihood parameter 
estimates and their statistical significance levels for the hypothesized path model.
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In the hypothesized model, sixteen relationships are tested. Eleven out of sixteen 
hypotheses received significant support from the empirical data.
Table 5.30 Structure equation m odelling tests o f  hypotheses
Hypothesis Description o f  Path Coefficient
Model on Monitoring mechanisms
HI Formal monitoring 
H2 Informal monitoring
—► (+) Perceived information 
—* (+) Perceived information
.33***
3Q***
Model on Value-added mechanisms
H3 Resource access 
H4 Knowledge access
—► (+) Value-added 
—* (+) Value-added
.06
77***
Model on the role o f  complementarities in monitoring and Value-added
H5a Complementarities 
H5b Complementarities 
H6 Complementarities 
H7 Complementarities 
H8 Complementarities 
H9 Complementarities
—► (+) Guanxi before signing contract 
—► (+) Guanxi after signing contract 
—* (+) Formal monitoring 
—*• (+) Informal monitoring 
—► (+) Resource access 
—► (+) Knowledge access
-.28
82***
44***
.11
.30
4^***
Model on the role o f  Guanxi as a facilitator in value-added and monitoring mechanism
H 10 Guanxi before signing contract 
H 11 Guanxi after signing contract 
H13 Informal monitoring 
H14 Guanxi after signing contract 
H15 Guanxi after signing contract
: —> (+) Formal monitoring 
—»• (+) Informal monitoring 
—> (+) Formal monitoring 
—» (+) Resource access 
—► (+) Knowledge access
.24*
7 4 ***
.35**
-.03
^  j * * *
Model on relationship between value added and monitoring mechanism
HI 8 Value-added —»(+) Perceived information 42***
***p< 001, **p<01, *p< 05, hypothesized paths one-tailed tests
Model on the Monitoring Mechanisms
The first set of hypotheses predicts the monitoring mechanisms through which 
venture capital investments may increase the perceived information accuracy and 
adequacy venture capitalist receives from portfolio companies. The first 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) predicts formal monitoring is positively related to 
perceived information accuracy and adequacy. This hypothesis received strong 
support from the data (p = .33, p < .001). Hypothesis 2 states that that informal 
monitoring is positively related to perceived information accuracy and adequacy.
This hypothesis received strong support from the data as well (p = .30, p < .001).
Model on the Value-added Mechanisms
The second set of hypotheses indicates the mechanisms through which venture 
capital investments may add value to portfolio companies. Hypothesis 4 states that 
that knowledge access was positively related to value-added. This hypothesis 
received strong support from the data (p = .77, p < .001). Hypothesis 3 predicts 
resource access is positively related to value-added. This hypothesis didn’t receive 
support from the data (p = .06, n.s.). We will discuss potential reasons for this 
surprising result in the discussion of the results in Chapter 6.
Model on the Role o f Complementarities in Monitoring and Value-added
The third set of hypotheses concerns complementarities affecting monitoring and 
value-added mechanisms. The first hypothesis (Hypothesis 5) predicts the 
influences of complementarities on two different stages of Guanxi. Hypothesis 5a, 
which states that complementarities are positively related to Guanxi before signing 
contract, didn’t receive support from the data (p = -.28, n.s.). We will discuss 
potential reasons for this surprising result in the discussion of the results in 
Chapter 6.1.1. Hypothesis 5b states that complementarities are positively related to 
Guanxi after signing contract. The data shows complementarities were 
significantly related to Guanxi after signing contract (p = .82, p < .001).
The next two hypotheses predict the complementarities influencing two types of 
monitoring mechanism. Hypothesis 6 states that complementarities are positively 
related to formal monitoring. This hypothesis received strong support from the 
data (p = .44, p < .001). Hypothesis 7 states that complementarities are positively
related to informal monitoring. However, this hypothesis didn’t receive support 
from the data (P = .11, n.s.). We will discuss potential reasons for this surprising 
result in the discussion of the results in Chapter 6.
Finally, Hypothesis 8 and 9 predict the complementarities influencing two types 
of value added mechanism. Hypothesis 9 states that complementarities are 
positively related to knowledge access. This hypothesis also received support from 
the data (P = .43, p < .001). Hypothesis 8 states that complementarities are 
positively related to resource access. However, this hypothesis didn’t receive 
support from the data (P = .30, n.s.). We will discuss potential reasons for this 
surprising result in the discussion of the results in Chapter 6.1.1.
Model on the role of Guanxi as a facilitator in monitorins and value-added 
mechanism
The fourth set of hypotheses concerns Guanxi affecting monitoring and valued 
added mechanisms. The first hypothesis in this set of hypotheses (Hypothesis 10) 
states that Guanxi before signing a contract is positively related to formal 
monitoring. This hypothesis received support from the data (p = .24, p < .05). 
Hypothesis 11 states that Guanxi after signing contract is positively related to 
informal monitoring. This hypothesis received strong support from the data (p 
= .74, p < .001). hypothesis 13 states that informal monitoring is positively related 
to formal monitoring. This hypothesis received support from the data (p = .35, p 
< . 01).
The next two hypotheses predict the Guanxi after signing contract influencing 
two types of value-added mechanism. Hypothesis 14 states that Guanxi after 
signing contract is positively related to resource access. This hypothesis didn’t
receive support from the data (p = -.03, n.s.). Hypothesis 15 states that Guanxi 
after signing contract is positively related to knowledge access. This hypothesis 
received support from the data (p = .51, p < .001).
Model on relationship between value added and monitorins
Finally, Hypothesis 18 predicts the value-added influencing the result of 
monitoring. Hypothesis 18 states that value-added activities increase venture 
capitalists perceived information’s accuracy and adequacy from portfolio 
companies. This hypothesis received strong support from the data (P = .42, p 
< . 001).
Mediation Effects
Hypothesis 12 predicts that Guanxi mediates the influence of complementarities 
on informal monitoring. The statistical results presented in Table 5.23 shows the 
Sobel’s t (or z) value was sufficiently large and yielding a p-value of less than .01, 
indicating a significant mediation which means, in practice, the association 
between the complementarities and the informal monitoring has been significantly 
reduced by the inclusion of the mediating variable (Guanxi).
To determine a partial or full mediation for specific relationships, we followed 
the four steps discussed in the methods section for establishing mediation (Chapter 
4.4.3). The statistical results are presented in Table 5.31. First, the independent 
variable (complementarities) was shown to be related to the mediator (Guanxi). 
Second, the mediator was shown to be related to the dependent variable (informal 
monitoring). Third, the relationship between the independent variable 
(complementarities) and the dependent variable (informal monitoring) was shown
to be insignificant when the mediator is accounted for. Thus, it appears that 
Guanxi fully mediates the relationship between complementarities and informal 
monitoring.
Table 5.31 Path analysis o f Hypothesis 12
Path description Model 2 Model 3
Complementarities -> (+ ) Guanxi 82*** 82***
Guanxi - ( + ) Informal monitoring 74*** 83***
Complementarities -> (+ ) Informal monitoring .11
***p<001, **p< 01, *p<,05,
Hypothesis 16 predicts that Guanxi mediates the influence of complementarities 
on resource access. The results of the four steps mediation tests presented in Table 
5.32 show there are not significant relationship between mediator (Guanxi) and 
dependent variable (informal monitoring).
Table 5.32 Path analysis o f Hypothesis 16
Path description Model 2 Model 4
Complementarities -> (+ ) Guanxi 82*** 82***
Guanxi — ► (+) Resource Access -.03 .22
Complementarities - ( + ) Resource Access .30
***p<001, ** P<,01, *p<05,
Hypothesis 17 predicts that Guanxi mediates the influence of complementarities 
on knowledge access. We followed the same four steps discussed earlier. The 
statistical results presented in Table 5.26 shows the Sobel’s t (or z) value was 
sufficiently large and yielding a p-value of less than .01, indicating a significant 
mediation which means, in practice, the association between the 
complementarities and the knowledge access has been significantly reduced by the 
inclusion of the mediating variable (Guanxi). Furthermore, the regression test 
results presented in Table 5.27 indicate that Guanxi mediates the relationship 
between complementarities and knowledge access cannot be claimed that the 
mediation would be a full mediation.
To determine whether a partial or full mediation has occurred, we tested this 
hypothesis by examining the results of the nested model tests and then analyzing 
the specific relationships between the constructs. In the nested model tests (Table
5.29), the hypothesized mediation model (Model 2) provided a better fit than the 
alternative full mediation model in which a direct path was deleted to the 
hypothesized model between complementarities and knowledge access (Model 5). 
This result provides evidence in support of a partial mediating role of Guanxi in 
mediating the effects of complementarities. Furthermore, the path analysis of 
model 2 and model 5 (Table 5.33) also indentified a partial meditation as the 
association between the complementarities and the knowledge access is still 
significant after inclusion of the mediating variable (Guanxi). Thus, it appears that 
Guanxi partially mediates the relationship between complementarities and 
knowledge access.
Table 5.33 Path analysis of Hypothesis 17
Path description Model 2 Model 3
Complementarities - ( + ) Guanxi .83*** .83***
Guanxi - ( + ) Knowledge access .65***
Complementarities -*(+) Knowledge access .31**
***p<001, **p<01, *p<05,
Table 5.34 provides further evidence of the critical role of Guanxi and 
complementarities in China. In this table, the standardized total effects of Guanxi 
and complementarities on all endogenous variables are estimated on the basis of 
the structural equation model results for the hypothesized model. The coefficients 
are relatively high for all endogenous variables.
Table 5.34 Standardized total effect
Complementarities Post-Guanxi Pre-Guanxi
Perceived Information 0.693 0.468 0.079
Formal Monitoring 0.621 - 0.243
Informal Monitoring 0.709 0.737
Resource Access 0.278 -0.026
Knowledge Access 0.839 0.505
Value-added 0.666 0.39
Post-Guanxi 0.816
Pre-Guanxi -0.28
***p<001, **p<01, *p<f05,
5.6 Summary of the Results
Table 5.35 provides a summary of the statistical results of both regression 
analyses and structural equation modelling. All but one hypothesis are supported 
in both sets of analyses.
Table 5.35 Summary of the results
Multiple Structural
Hypothesis Regression Equation
analysis Modelling
Model on Monitoring mechanisms
HI Formal monitoring is positively related to perceived information Supported Supported
H2 informal monitoring is positively related to perceived information Supported Supported
Model on Value-added mechanisms
H3 Resource access is positively related to value-added Not significant Not significant
H4 Knowledge access is positively related to valued-added Supported Supported
Model on the role o f  complementarities in Value-add and Monitoring
H5A Complementarities is positively related to Guanxi before signing contract Not significant Not significant
H5B Complementarities is positively related to Guanxi after signing contract Supported Supported
H6 Complementarities is positively related to formal monitoring Supported Supported
H7 Complementarities is positively related to informal monitoring Supported Supported
H8 Complementarities is positively related to resource access Not significant Not significant
H9 Complementarities is positively related to knowledge access Supported Supported
Model on the Role o f  Guanxi as a Facilitator in knowledge access and
informal monitoring
H 10 Guanxi is negatively related to formal monitoring Supported Supported
H11 Guanxi is positively related to informal monitoring Supported Supported
H12 Guanxi mediates the positive relationship between complementarities and 
informal monitoring
Supported Supported
H13 Informal monitoring is positively related to formal monitoring Supported Supported
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H14 Guanxi is positively related to resource access Not significant Not significant
H15 Guanxi is positively related to knowledge access Supported Supported
H16 Guanxi mediates the positive relationship between complementarities and 
resource access
Not significant Not significant
HI7 Guanxi mediates the positive relationship between complementarities and 
knowledge access
Supported Supported
Model on Relationship between Value Added and Monitoring mechanism
H18 Value added is positively related to monitoring Supported Supported
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Discussion of the Results
This dissertation set out to analyze the relationship between venture capital 
investors and their portfolio companies in a Chinese business culture setting with 
the objective of identifying the primary monitoring and values added mechanisms 
and the factors influencing those mechanisms. In order to identify these 
monitoring and value-added mechanisms and the factors influencing those 
mechanisms, earlier research on relationships between venture capital investors 
and their portfolio companies and Chinese business culture was reviewed. As it 
was recognized that there is very little earlier research focusing on this topic, the 
literature review was expanded to cover other related and partly analogous types 
of inter-organizational relationships in Western countries. Review of earlier 
research on the research topic and several related fields of empirical research and 
identification of commonalities in the literature provided a solid basis for 
hypothesis development.
In addition to the review of empirical research on the research topic and related 
fields, the most relevant theoretical approaches were reviewed. These included 
asymmetric information and signalling theory, resource-based view, 
knowledge-based view, social capital theory, resource dependence perspective, 
agency theory, and transaction economics. These theories were summarized, their 
related empirical applications reviewed, and the critiques of these theories were 
discussed. Finally, the Chinese business culture, Chinese institutional environment 
and recent research on venture capital in developing countries were also reviewed.
All these theories were compared and their applicability to the present study was 
assessed. An extensive review of both empirical and theoretical literature relating 
to the research topic gave a solid basis for hypothesis development.
Building on these reviews of earlier empirical research and relevant theoretical 
approaches, theoretical models were built focusing on (1) two main forms of 
monitoring provided by venture capital investors; (2) two main forms of 
value-added provided by venture capital investors; (3) the effect of 
complementarities; (4) the role of Guanxi; and (5) value-added influencing the 
effect of monitoring. Together these five sub-models comprise an integrated model 
of the monitoring and value-added mechanisms and the factors influencing those 
mechanisms in relationships between technology-based firms and their venture 
capital investors.
These models were validated through contemporary survey data collected from 
the fund managers of venture capital firms which are based in mainland China. 
The models were tested using factor analysis and regression analysis. These 
models are the first theory-based, empirically validated models that examine the 
relationships between Chinese venture capital firms and their portfolio companies. 
Finally, an integrated model consisting of all the sub-models was tested using 
structural equation modelling. In the following chapters, the five sub-models are 
discussed.
The research answers the three research questions posed in chapter 1.2 by 
indentifying the key monitoring and value-added mechanisms and the factors 
influencing those mechanisms. The mechanisms are further discussed in the next 
chapter in the discussion of the model on the monitoring and value-added 
mechanisms. The factors influencing the monitoring and value-added mechanisms
are discussed in chapters 6.1.3, 6.1.4 and 6.1.5.
Based on the model of these monitoring and value-added mechanisms and the 
factors influencing those mechanisms, the present study also explains how venture 
capital investors should select investees and how should venture capital investors 
manage their relationship with investees. These normative recommendations are 
discussed in Chapter 6 (6.3 managerial implications).
6.1.1 Model on the monitoring mechanism
The model of the monitoring mechanisms posits that venture capital firms deal 
with information asymmetry primarily through two main mechanisms: formal 
monitoring and informal monitoring. Formal monitoring refers to the contractual 
mechanisms such as requirements for the provision of detailed and regular 
information and restriction on management’s actions encoded in a contract and 
enterprise’s Articles of Association/Corporate Charter. Informal mechanisms are 
derived from board representation and regular meetings between the venture 
capitalist and the entrepreneur (Mitchell, Reid and Terry, 1995). These monitoring 
mechanisms were predicted to be associated with the accuracy and adequacy of 
perceived information.
The paths between both formal and informal monitoring and the perceived 
information were statistically significant. But the structural equation-modelling 
analysis shows the total effects from informal monitoring on perceived 
information is much more intensive than that from formal monitoring (.611 
vs .392). It is not a surprising result. Based on the institutional theory, Feng Zeng 
(2004) and Bruton et al. (2004) predicted that China’s relatively weaker 
institutional and contracting environment should have made it difficult for investor 
to use contractual restriction alone to solve the agency problem efficiently and
venture capital monitoring is done much more through personal interactions with 
the entrepreneur who founds the firm. This study has provided empirical evidence 
to support previous theoretical prediction. Supporting the hypotheses of Feng Zeng 
(2004) and Bruton et al. (2004), this study found that the formal contract 
restriction alone could not significantly mitigate the information asymmetry 
between the principal and the agent, and the improvement of accuracy and 
adequacy of perceived information is made mainly through informal and non-rule 
based monitoring approaches. The present study also found both foreign and 
domestic independent venture capital firms conducted significantly more informal 
monitoring activities on their investees than the other types of venture capital 
firms.
6.1.2 Model on the Value-added Mechanisms
The model of the value-added mechanisms posits that venture capital firms 
provide value-added to their portfolio companies primarily through two main 
mechanisms: resource access and knowledge access. Resource access refers to 
concrete resources such as distribution channels and production facilities that the 
portfolio company can access through its relationship with the venture capital 
investor. Knowledge access refers to organizational learning by the 
technology-based firm through its interaction with the venture capital investor and 
access to their knowledge base. These knowledge access mechanisms were in 
general shown to be associated with the value-added provision. All of the 
hypotheses regarding knowledge access mechanisms received support from the 
analyses.
While all the other hypotheses in the present study received support from the 
analyses, all the hypotheses related to resource access did not receive support from 
SEM analysis. The reason for this result is because concrete resources such as
distribution channels and production facilities can only be offered by corporate 
venture capital and university subsidiary venture capital which only accounted for 
about 20% of the total sample. 80% of the total sample venture capital firms 
simply did not possess these resources and had to rate the four resource access 
measurement items (namely, production facilities, technology, research and 
development and distribution channel) “totally not accessible”. As these four 
measurement items were not related to any other construct measurement items, all 
the path coefficients associated with resource access in SEM were not significant.
Overall, the development of a consistent and theoretically grounded framework 
is a valuable contribution for the understanding of monitoring and value-added of 
venture capital as a consistent theory-based framework enables the theoretical 
explanations when and how these mechanisms work.
6.1.3 Model on the Role of Complementarities in Monitoring and 
Value-added
Contributing to a deeper understanding of the monitoring and value-added 
mechanisms of venture capital firm, the role of complementarities in monitoring 
and value-added model explains the factors influencing monitoring and value 
added within the relationship between venture capital and their portfolio 
companies.
Recognizing organizations as economic actors (although embedded in social 
context), the economic motivation is an important factor influencing the 
willingness to collaborate (Amit and Zott 2001, Brandenburg and Nalebuff 1996). 
Complementarities were argued to be related to economic benefits and therefore 
create an incentive for collaboration. Supporting this hypothesis, 
complementarities between the venture capital investor and the portfolio company
were significantly positively related to Guanxi after signing a contract, formal 
monitoring and knowledge access.
Building on the asymmetric information theory (Gompers, 1995; Sahlman, 
1990), this model demonstrates the role of complementarities influencing the 
usage of rigorous terms in a formal contract. Building on the agency theory 
(Gompers, 1995; Lemer, 1995), this model also demonstrates the role of 
complementarities enhance informal monitoring and this influence was fully 
mediated by Guanxi. Similarly, building on the knowledge-based view (Lane and 
Lubatkin 1998), the model also indicates the role of complementarities influencing 
knowledge access. The relationship between complementarities and knowledge 
access was found significant but the effect was only partially mediated by Guanxi. 
Finally, building on the resource-based view, this model was designed to examine 
the role of complementarities as an enabler of value creation through resource 
sharing (Rothaermel and Deeds 2001, Rothwell 1989, Rothwell and Zegweld 1982, 
Teece 1986). But the relationship between complementarities and resource access 
was not significant due to the reason mentioned in chapter 6.1.2.
6.1.4 Model on the Role of Guanxi in Monitoring and 
Value-added
Recognizing the problems of information asymmetry and transferring valuable 
complementary resources and knowledge over organizational boundaries, the 
model drew from social capital theory (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, Tsai and 
Ghoshal, and Yli-Renko et al. 2001a) and demonstrated the important role of 
Guanxi in facilitating inter-organizational information sharing, knowledge 
learning and resource access.
Guanxi is widely seen as crucial to business relationship in China, where
important business interactions are rarely conducted between strangers. Guanxi, 
which relies on social capital drawn from personal contacts, bridges critical 
information gaps and engender favours based on trust or mutual benefit. Once 
established, it can substitute for and even override institutional or legal guarantees 
common in the West.
Guanxi can be vital as a source of information and as a means of monitoring or 
value-added. It can shape everything from deal sourcing to exit options (Ahlstrom 
and Bruton, 2007). In this study, Guanxi was strongly positively related to formal 
monitoring, informal monitoring, knowledge access and resource access in the 
investment relationship involving venture capital and portfolio companies. 
Providing support for the hypotheses, Guanxi was shown to mediate the influence 
of complementarities on informal monitoring and knowledge access. Finally, it 
was shown that foreign venture capital have closer Guanxi with their portfolio 
companies than domestic venture capital in deal negotiation period. After signing 
a contract, both foreign and domestic independent venture capital firm have 
similar levels of Guanxi with the investees.
6.1.5 Model on the relationship between value added and 
monitoring
This model builds on the earlier research on agency theory, resource-based view, 
knowledge-based view and inter-organizational relationship. Primarily, it seeks to 
explain the interaction between value-added and monitoring mechanism. The 
associated hypotheses in the present study received strong support from the 
analyses. The value added was significantly positively related to the effect of 
monitoring—accuracy and adequacy of perceived information. This finding has 
noteworthy managerial implications for venture capital firm operating in mainland 
China. Value added could be a powerful monitoring mechanism to relieve the
agency problem in transitional economies where the institutional and contracting 
environment is relatively weak. In particular, the present research demonstrated 
independent venture capital firms offered significantly more value-added to their 
portfolio companies. As a result, they perceived significantly more accurate and 
adequate information from their investees.
Overall, the model has extended the understanding of the factors influencing 
monitoring mechanism. The model integrates monitoring and value-added 
mechanism and predicts how various factors are influencing the accuracy and 
adequacy of perceived information.
6.2 Theoretical and Empirical Contributions of the 
Dissertation
The present study makes several theoretical and empirical contributions to the 
literature on venture capital in transitional economy and inter-organizational 
relationships in general. In the following, these contributions are briefly discussed: 
firstly from the perspective of venture capital research in transitional economy and 
secondly from the perspective of research on inter-organizational relationships in 
general.
6.2.1 Contributions to the Literature on Venture Capital in 
transitional economy
(1) The first rigorous empirical analysis o f  the relationships between venture 
capitalists and technology-based firms in a transitional economy. One of the key 
contributions of the present study relates to the observation made earlier that there 
has been an important research gap in the rigorous empirical research focusing on 
the relationships between venture capital investors and technology-based firms in
transitional economies. The few studies (Gompers and Lemer 1998, Kelley and 
Spinelli 2001, and Maula and Murray 2000a, 2000b) have relied on secondary data 
and therefore had limitations in creating a more thorough understanding of the 
dynamics of these relationships. Most existing research has taken place in 
relatively stable Western economies. It follows that inter-organizational 
relationship in transitional economies such as Eastern Europe, the former Soviet 
republics, and China may embody more useful social capital that can compensate 
for these countries’ lack o f market supporting institutions such as transparent laws 
and regulations (Peng and Heath, 1996). By 1) building a theoretically grounded 
model o f the monitoring and value-added mechanisms, which incorporates the 
factors affecting these mechanisms in transitional economy; 2) collecting primary 
data from the fund managers o f venture capital based in mainland China; and 3) 
then statistically testing the hypotheses, the present study has contributed to 
providing empirical support for previous theoretical venture capital research on 
Guanxi, monitoring and value-added in a transitional economy setting and giving a 
deeper understanding of the venture capital investors’s relationship with their 
portfolio companies in a transitional economy.
(2) Comprehensive analysis o f  monitoring and value-adding mechanisms and 
the factors influencing them. The present study builds on the earlier research on 
venture capital and provides theory-based and empirically tested explanations for 
earlier suggestions that venture capitalists use a variety of formal and informal 
mechanism to mitigate agency risk (Mitchell et al., 1995; Sapienza and Korsgaard, 
1996; Steier and Greenwood, 1995; Sweeting, 1991) and offer potential 
value-added benefits for start-up companies (Gompers and Lemer 1998, Maula 
and Murray 2000a). Obtaining primary data from the fund managers of venture 
capital based in mainland China, the present study has been able to get inside the 
‘black box’ of how venture capital mitigates agency risk and how venture capital
adds value to portfolio companies. Employing this primary data, the present study 
has been able to test the roles o f different monitoring and value-adding 
mechanisms and the factors influencing these mechanisms, especially Guanxi, thus 
creating an enhanced understanding of the monitoring and value-added processes 
in venture capital investment in a transitional economy.
6.2.2 Contributions to the Literature on Inter-organizational 
Relationships
In addition to contributing to the scarce literature on venture capital in 
transitional economies, the present study makes more general contributions to the 
wider body o f literature on inter-organizational relationships.
(3) Multi-theoretic framework o f  the mechanisms o f  monitoring, knowledge 
transfer, resource sharing, and value creation in inter-organizational 
relationships. The study contributes to the research on inter-organizational 
relationships by developing a multi-theoretic framework of the monitoring and 
value added mechanisms in inter-organizational relationships and the factors 
influencing those mechanisms.
Inter-organizational relationships have been researched from many different 
theoretical perspectives. While focusing on one theory would help understand how 
that specific theory works, a multi-theoretic approach is required to understand the 
complex phenomena related to inter-organizational relationships (Gulati 1998, 
Lado et al. 1997, Osborn and Hagedoom 1997, Park et al. 2001, Smith et al. 1995). 
Two of the underlying bases o f the present study are the asymmetric information 
and resource-based view (Akerlof, 1970, Barney 1991, Penrose 1959, Peteraf 
1993). This perspective predicts that resource complementarities are an important 
factor influencing monitoring effect and value creation in inter-organizational
alliances (Hsu, 2004, Das and Teng 2000, Hitt et al. 2000, Teece 1986). The 
resource-based view and resource dependence perspective predict that resource 
access via inter-organizational relationships is important for new ventures (Das 
and Teng 1998, Jarillo 1989, Park et al. 2001, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
Knowledge-based view predicts the importance of knowledge access as one of the 
value creating mechanisms in inter-organizational relationships (Lane and 
Lubatkin 1998).
Based on the resource-based view and asymmetric information, Hsu (2004) 
argued that entrepreneurs are willing to accept more rigorous contract terms in 
order to form a partnership with venture capital firm with better reputations and 
resource. Similarly, the expectation of reciprocal benefits through combining 
complementary resources collaboratively enhances the entrepreneurs’ willingness 
to accept more informal monitoring activities and disclose more accurate and 
adequate information to their venture capital investors. On the other hand, 
knowledge-based views are also used to recognize the problems of transferring 
knowledge (especially tacit knowledge) over organizational boundaries. Social 
capital (Guanxi in the Chinese context) has been found to be an important 
facilitator o f resource and knowledge exchange (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, Tsai 
and Ghoshal 1998, Yli-Renko et al. 2001a, Fried and Hisrich, 1995, Bruton 2003).
The present study has developed a multi-theoretic framework of monitoring, 
knowledge transferring, resource sharing, and value creation mechanisms and the 
factors influencing these mechanisms in inter-organizational relationships between 
venture capital and investees and tested it in the context of transitional economy. 
Despite the specific empirical context of transitional economy, the predicted 
relationships are likely to apply to some extent to inter-organizational relationships 
in other type of economies because the model has been built on the theories tested
in multiple contexts and combines them after an examination of the commonalities 
and differences between theories in terms of predicted relationships. The result of 
this work is a rather comprehensive framework explaining monitoring and value 
added in inter-organizational relationships, particularly in the Chinese cultural 
setting, but one which is also reasonably applicable to other cultural contexts 
involving inter-organizational relationships between venture capital and their 
investees.
(4) Contributions to the literature on agency theory in inter-organizational 
relationships. Contributing to the literature on the agency theory in 
inter-organizational relationship, the present study integrates the agency theory, 
asymmetric information, resource-based view, and social capital theory arguments 
to see how formal contract negotiation and informal monitoring activities are 
influenced by complementarities directly or through Guanxi, even through value 
added activities. From organizational economics, the present study adopted the 
role o f expectation of reciprocal benefits influencing the investees’ willingness to 
accept more rigorous monitoring requirements and disclose more accurate and 
adequate information to investor. This combination of the agency theory with 
other theories has been used in recent research on venture capital (Hsu, 2004). By 
integrating monitoring and value added mechanism model, we examined 
simultaneously these two mechanisms’ influence on the elimination of agency risk 
and provided empirical support for the previous theoretical research on Chinese 
venture capital (Feng Zeng, 2004; Bruton et al., 2004).
(5) Contributions to the literature on resource and knowledge access in 
inter-organizational relationships. Contributing to the research on resource and 
knowledge access in inter-organizational relationships, the present study integrates 
the resource-based view which argues the importance of complementary assets for
value created in the inter-organizational relationship with other relevant 
perspectives. From organizational economics, the present study adopted the role of 
potential economic benefits influencing the motivation for collaboration. This 
combination of the resource-based view with other theories has been advocated in 
research on inter-organizational relationships (Das and Teng 2000:55).
(6) Contributions to the literature on Guanxi (and the social capital theory in 
general). From the social capital perspective, the resource and knowledge access 
model adopted the idea of Guanxi as a facilitator o f resource and knowledge 
access. In doing so, the present study contributes to the existing literature on 
Guanxi and inter-organizational knowledge transfer by providing further empirical 
validation for the recent research which suggests the importance of Guanxi in 
influencing business relations in China (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2000; Jeng 2000; 
Liu and Zhang, 2006; Peng 2002; Peng 2005; White 2005). As an important 
contribution to the literature on Guanxi, the present study has also demonstrated 
that Guanxi is driven by the effort to mitigate agency risk as well as by the 
motivation to acquire potential benefits through collaboration. By arguing 
theoretically and demonstrating empirically the importance of complementarities 
as a prerequisite for the successful build-up of Guanxi and subsequent formal and 
informal monitoring, knowledge and resource access, the present study extends the 
previous understanding and applicability of Guanxi and its link to other theoretical 
frameworks.
(7) Contributions to empirical testing o f  theories in interorganizational 
relationships. Much of the recent research on the influence of interorganizational 
relationships on the performance of new ventures employed primarily 
count-measures with relatively few focusing on the characteristics of partners and 
relationships (DeCarolis and Deeds 1999, Deeds and Hill 1996, Rothaermel and
Deeds 2001, Shan et al. 1994, Wang et al. 2001). However, some authors have 
recently argued that the characteristics of the partners and relationships may be 
much more important than the mere numbers of partners (Stuart et al. 1999, Stuart 
2000). Some recent research has suggested that focusing on dyadic level on the 
relationships with the most important constituencies of the new firms would help 
to create a better understanding of the influence of interorganizational 
relationships on their performance (Galunic and Moran 2000, Lane and Lubatkin 
1998, Stuart 2000, Yli-Renko et al. 2001a).
Employing this strategy, the present study has been able to gather rich data from 
the fund managers o f Chinese venture capital firms concerning relationships with 
their technology-based portfolio companies. The present study has extended the 
understanding on the role of interorganizational relationships by arguing and 
demonstrating the influence of this relationship on monitoring and value-added 
mechanisms.
6.3 Managerial Implications
The findings of the present study have several implications for venture capitalist 
and entrepreneurs on monitoring, value-added, eliminating agency risks and 
managing Guanxi. These implications are briefly discussed in the following 
chapters.
6.3.1 Implications for Venture Capital Investors
Investee Selection
The findings of the present study imply that complementarities between the 
venture capital investor and the portfolio company are a crucially important 
success factor and a key determinant of value creation. Given that 
complementarities were found to be an important structural factor influencing the
benefits available from the relationship, complementarities should always be 
considered by the venture capitalists when considering making investment. The 
existence and extent of complementarities, therefore, should be explicitly studied 
during the due diligence process. The success of investment is not only on the 
basis of the resources investee control themselves, but additionally on the basis of 
resources available through relationships with venture capital investors.
What complementary resources should venture capitalists look for when they 
consider an investment in China? One of the key success factors for many Chinese 
ventures is the practical knowledge and understanding of local business culture. 
Venture capitalists need to combine their managerial and financial knowledge with 
entrepreneurs’ understanding of local constraints and opportunities to develop 
business models that work in the Chinese context.
Recent experience shows that business models from other culture setting can be 
successfully adapted for China, if the entrepreneurs truly understood the 
contextual differences. For example, TaoBao.com, the successful Chinese 
online-auction company, was inspired by ebay.com but modified the business 
model for Chinese customers. TaoBao had 70% of the Chinese auction market for 
the first six months of 2007, compared with eBay’s 26%, according to China 
Internet Network Information Centre, a quasigovemmental agency. No wonder, 
due to the difference of local custom or peculiarity, most popular non-Chinese 
websites do not have official Chinese versions. That leaves plenty of room for 
Chinese enterprising start-ups transplant the ideas and localise them to suit 
Chinese tastes. But investors also have to be much more discriminating. There are 
over 200 YouTube like video-sharing website in China, about 10% of them backed 
by venture capital (The Economist, 15^-21st September 2007). Not surprisingly, 
most of them will go liquidation in just few years as the video-sharing market is so
saturated and competition is extreme high in China.
In China, investors are finding that success does not necessarily require 
breakthrough technology — it can be achieved just as well by excelling at the 
application of technology. Given that, an entrepreneur with good knowledge and 
understanding of local business culture setting can be seen as especially valuable 
complementarities for venture capitalists, especially for foreign venture investors.
Managing Relationships (Guanxi)
The present study identified Guanxi as a key facilitator of monitoring and 
valued-added mechanisms. The finding that Guanxi mediates the benefits from 
complementarities and greatly facilitates informal monitoring and knowledge 
access has implications for venture capitalists in managing their relationships with 
investees. This finding suggests that Guanxi is an important lever that the venture 
capital can use to obtain more accurate and adequate information from their 
relationships with investees. While it was shown that the complementarities have a 
significant catalyzing role for Guanxi after signing a contract, the development of 
close Guanxi is recommended for the venture capitalist in China, especially those 
who have complementary resources.
Previous research has shown that Chinese business men/women are much less 
reliant on contracts and institutions and place far greater emphasis on personal 
relationships. As such, Guanxi is a critical element of conducting business in 
China (Davison and Ou, 2008). This research has produced confirmatory results 
for Guanxi’s significant effects on information transferrence, monitoring and value 
creation. The present study found that the better Guanxi between the venture 
capital and the entrepreneur before signing a contract, the more likely the investee 
to be receptive of the usage of contract covenants and to accept attached terms and 
conditions, which in turn use more formal warrants. Venture capitalist may want
to maintain a close Guanxi with entrepreneurial team to improve 
multi-understanding and ease the distrust between the two parties.
After signing a contract, the findings of the present study imply that closer 
Guanxi provided venture capitalists with better access to desired information and 
ensure its accuracy. Because the quality of information obtained through informal 
monitoring depends on the resources committed to this activity (Harris and Raviv, 
1979). And the resources committed to monitoring depend on how well 
established the relationship is between the two parties. For the venture capitalist 
who wants to aggregate accurate information, they must develop a high level of 
trust between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur, in which case the venture 
capitalist is seen not just as an investor but also as a trusted advisor.
Monitoring
Many researchers argued the monitoring of the firm is done much more 
frequently through personal interactions with the entrepreneur who founds the firm 
in China. This study has provided the first empirical evidence to support previous 
theoretical prediction. The structural equation-modelling analysis shows the total 
effects from informal monitoring on perceived information is much more intensive 
than that from formal monitoring. The difficulties involved in monitoring a firm 
are further magnified due to China’s relatively weaker institutional and legal 
system as identified in Chapter 2. Venture capitalists in China are recommended to 
maintain appropriate vigilance to ensure that the firm is performing as desired. 
Venture capitalists may need to send people to a firm to count things and to double 
check that things are generally going smoothly, irrespective of what the 
accounting data is saying. Foreign venture capitalist should be cautioned against 
maintaining the same number of investments as in the North American or West 
European market because of the intensive monitoring and assistance these firms 
typically need.
Value-added
Beyond providing financial capital, venture investors are typically expected to 
add value to their investments. China is no exception. The statistical analysis in 
this study shows venture capital firms in China provide value-added to their 
portfolio companies. We also found knowledge access offered by foreign venture 
capital firm was significantly higher than the base group—domestic venture 
capital firm and corporate venture capital offered significantly more resource 
access to their portfolio companies among several different types of venture 
capital firms. However, it is a big challenge for venture capitalists to add value to 
their portfolio companies.
Like their western counterparts, venture investors in China add value by 
screening and recruiting management team members; helping companies navigate 
national and global markets in search of capital and customers; maintaining 
financial controls; and identifying ways to improve productivity and achieve lower 
costs. Not surprisingly, attempts to add value often lead to conflicts with 
entrepreneurs, who view such involvement as interference in their managerial 
prerogatives. Venture investors must rely heavily on their Guanxi to mediate these 
conflicts and delivery value-added.
Finally, the way venture capitalists provide value-added in China is different 
than in the West. In the US, advice provided to CEOs of funded firms is often very 
direct and may occur in regular interactions (Fried and Hisrich, 1995). However, 
in China the venture capitalist must deal appropriately with the rather formidable 
cognitive institution known as minzi—face. Its relatively greater importance in a 
Chinese-based culture is widely recognized (Bond, 1988). Venture capitalists can 
advise managers but in a manner that allows the managers to maintain their ‘face’.
Elimination o f  Agency Risk
For years, venture capitalists complained about the incomplete and high agency 
risk in transitional economies which increase the cost of premature termination of 
investment projects. The findings of the present study imply that both 
complementarities and Guanxi are the key determinant of effective elimination of 
agency risk. It is expected that entrepreneurs are willing to accept more rigorous 
formal contract terms and informal monitoring requirement in order to form a 
partnership with right venture capital firm and disclosure more accurate and 
adequate information to an investor that has good Guanxi with them.
Furthermore, this study found that value added mechanism is positively related 
to the effect of monitoring—accuracy and adequacy of perceived information. The 
standardized total effects from value added to the accuracy and adequacy of 
perceived information is .42 (p< .001) that indicates value added is a powerful 
monitoring mechanism to relieve the agency problem. This finding is in line with a 
strong social norm in Chinese society called renqing (Reciprocal favour). The 
rules of reciprocal favour require the recipient who has received the favour to 
return the favour as soon as the opportunity arises (Hwang 1987). It would be very 
hard for entrepreneur to refuse disclosure his information after receiving helping 
from venture capitalists. This finding has noteworthy managerial implications for 
venture capital firm in transitional economies where the institutional and 
contracting environment is relatively weak.
6.3.2 Implications for Entrepreneurs
The findings of the present study also have useful implications for entrepreneurs. 
Investor selection
As discussed before, entrepreneurs must make conscious choices about who
provides capital and most importantly what value they can add in addition to 
capital. The empirical data demonstrated that there are significant differences in 
the value-added providing from venture capital investors. The findings of the 
present study imply that complementarities are a key determinant of the potential 
economic value creation. Therefore, entrepreneur should select venture capital 
investors on the basis of their ability to provide complementary support and advice 
in their respective areas of strength.
Role o f  Guanxi
The finding of the present study indicate that Guanxi are an important 
determinant of value-added provided by venture capital investors for their 
portfolio companies. This finding suggests that Guanxi is an essential tool that the 
entrepreneurs can use to obtain greater value-added from venture capital investors. 
It is up to the management to interact with the venture capital investors and reap 
the benefits from the association. Therefore, active relationship management is 
recommended for the entrepreneurs.
6.4 Limitations of the Study
There are no studies without limitations. Some of the limitations of the present 
study and the implications of these limitations are discussed in this section.
Cross-sectional nature o f the study. Even though this study combines both 
survey data and secondary data collected at different times, the nature of the study 
is essentially cross sectional. This design limits the opportunities for claiming 
causalities in the identified relationships purely on the basis of empirical findings. 
However, the hypotheses were developed on the basis of received theories and 
empirical research, thus improving the validity of the results. Despite the 
simultaneous data collection for many of the variables, some of these variables are
such that causalities are fairly clear (such as Guanxi influencing knowledge access 
and not vice versa).
Focus on one side o f  the dyadic relationships. This study focused on the dyadic 
relationships between the venture capital firm and its portfolio companies. 
Nevertheless, the dyadic relationships were examined only from the venture 
capital perspective. Simultaneous research of the relationships from both the 
entrepreneur and corporate investor perspectives would provide additional insights, 
or at least additional factors to be considered. However, the practical 
implementation of such a study would have been difficult or impossible because of 
the inherent reduction in the sample size and increase in time and costs (Mohr and 
Spekman 1994, Yli-Renko et al. 2001a). Providing validity for the measurement 
from one side of the dyad, Sapienza (1992) and Sapienza and Gupta (1994) 
demonstrated a very high similarity in answers regarding value-added provided by 
venture capitalists from both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.
Use o f primarily perceptual measures. One of the limitations of this study is that 
it employs primarily perceptual measures. However, this strategy has been 
intentionally chosen in order to examine issues where objective measures are not 
available. The use of survey-based measures has recently been warranted (Das and 
Teng 2000:53). The reliability of perceptual measures in has been shown to be 
good in many of the studies examining analogous situations such as value-added 
in venture capital (Sapienza 1992, Sapienza and Gupta 1994), performance of joint 
ventures (Geringer and Hebert 1989, 1991, Lyles and Salk 1996), and performance 
in vertical supplier-customer relationships (Anderson and Narus 1990, Heide and 
John 1990, Mohr and Spekman 1994, Yli-Renko et al. 2001a). The use of 
perceptual measures in many of the studies has been based on the notion that 
success is determined, in part, by how well the partnership achieves the
performance expectations set by the partners (Anderson and Narus 1990, Mohr 
and Spekman 1994). Increasing the reliability and validity of the perceptual 
measures in the present study, the constructs have been operationalized using 
theoretically based and, in many cases, previously validated multi-item scales, and 
tested for inter-item reliability (Nunnally 1978), and convergence and divergence 
validity using confirmatory factor analysis.
Increasing the reliability and validity of the perceptual measures in the present 
study, the constructs have been operationalized using theoretically based and, in 
many cases, previously validated multi-item scales, and tested for inter-item 
reliability (Nunnally 1978), and convergence and divergence validity using 
confirmatory factor analysis.
The use of perceptual measures has also clear benefits in research examining the 
performance implications of certain types of interorganizational relationships. 
Separating performance implications resulting from specific interorganizational 
relationships is difficult without primary data focusing on those relationships. Use 
of secondary data might be problematic because performance differences in cross 
sectional studies are always subject to unobserved heterogeneity and selection bias. 
Unobserved heterogeneity refers to the potential unobserved factors influencing 
the performance differences between firms. Selection bias refers to the potential 
problem that higher potential ventures are likely to attract better partners. The use 
of primary data focusing on the processes occurring in specific dyads is likely to 
suffer less from the above-mentioned problems.
Overall, the present dissertation is the first study to develop and empirically 
validate a comprehensive model on the monitoring and value-added mechanisms 
and the factors influencing these mechanisms in the relationships between
technology-based new firms and their venture capital investors. In addition to 
contributing to the emerging literature on venture capital, the present study also 
contributes to a wider body of literature on interorganizational relationships and 
has implications both for researchers and practitioners regarding monitoring and 
value creation in interorganizational relationships.
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You can also mail to Prof. Dylan Jones-E vans, Centre for Advanced Studies, Cardiff University, 44-45 Park Place, 
Cathays Park, Cardiff CF10 3BB, United Kingdom. Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact our 
Research Team, Mr. Feng Li or Hongjun Hou, Tel: (44) 77 2591 7920, Fax: (44) 29 2065 4684, E-mail: LIF6@CF.AC.UK .
Guidance Notes:
1. Apart from your firm’s background and personal information, please answer all the questions based on High-tech VC investment in 
Mainland China only due to the scope of this survey.
2. For Question 5 to Question 8, if your organization is only an area representative office in Mainland China, please answer these questions 
based on your own office only.
3 We adopted the Venture Economics’ classification of high technology firms in this survey, which includes companies operating in the 
following sectors: biotechnology, medical/health science, Internet specific, communications, computer software and services, computer 
hardware, semiconductors/other electronics and new energy.
4. Information provided here will be used to derive a series of aggregate analyses. P lease rest assured that your information will be kept 
strictly CONFIDENTIAL & will not be disclosed individually to the public without your prior consent.
Questionnaire completed by
Name Position Phone
Do you allow me to acknowledge your com panies nam e a s  a source at the end of the repbrt? S YES n
Do you allow me to acknowledge your nam e a s  a source at the end of the report? D Y ES UNO
If I want to use quote of yours I will contact you and ask for permission, since quotes call for a direct source.)
VENTURE CAPITAL IN CHINA
fRM BACKGROUND
.Firm name:
.Type of organization:
] Independent VC 
] Bank Private Equity Arm 
] Securities Firm Subsidiary
3 Other (Please specify)
□  Corporate VC Firm 
CD Insurance Firm Subsidiary 
O  Government-owned Firm
.Is the ultimate head office of your organization:
3 In China 0  Outside of China
L Currently, what is the approximate total size of funds available to Invest in Mainland 
Mna by your whole firm? Million USS
20. How close do you maintain a Social Relationship with your Investee before 
signing a contract.?
□  Very close O  Fairly close O  Something in the middle
0  Keep the distance 0  Don't have any social relationship
21. To what Extend do you know your Investees’ senior Msnager on a Personal 
Level before signing a contract?
0  Very well 0  Fairly well 0  Something in the middle
0  A little 0  Very little
22. On average, how often are you In Contact with your Investees after signing a 
contract (Including all formal or informal meeting and telephone call, fax etc.)?
0  Everyday 0  Three times a week 0  Once a week
0  Once every fortnight 0  Once a month 0  Once every two month
0  Once a quarter 0  Less often
I How many senior Investment executives d oss your Firm currently employ? (Senior 
awstment executives Include presidents, chairpersons, fund managers, portfolio
imagers, analysts snd chartered accountants) Persons
1 What Is the average number of business proposals your firm is currently presented 
Ah per month?
3 Less than 5 0 5 - 1 0  0 1 0 - 2 0  0 2 0 - 3 0  0  30 and above
f.On average, what portion of the received proposals obtain financing from your firm 
achyear? %
23. On average, how often do you meet your Investees Informally after s igning a contract 
(including informal dinner and private party, etc.)?
0  Everyday 0  At least twice a week 0  Once a week
O  Once Every fortnight 0  Once a month O o n c e  every two month
0  Once a quarter 0  Less often
24. How close do you maintain a Social Relationship with your Investee after slonina 
a contract?
0  Very close 0  Fairly dose 0  Something in the middle
0  Keep the distance O  Don't have any social relationship
I Based on your firm’s  current situation, how Important are the following sources for 
eur Firm to collect the business proposals? (Please weight the relevant source on a 
Bale from 1 to 5, where 1 is ’Irrelevant’ and 5 is ‘Essential’):
intrapreneur cold calls
bferred by other venture capitalists (induding syndication)
Warred by parent organizations or prior investees 
Werred by friends & personal acquaintances 
Werred by government organizations 
Werred by banks or investment broker
fen activity—attendance at conventions, trade shows, conferences 
fen activity -  attendance at venture capital groups or associations
1 2 3 4 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 o 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 o 0 0
0 0 o o 0
PERSONAL INFORMATION
lAge: 10. Genders 0  Male 0  Female
11. Education level (Please tick all a s apply)
G PhD 0  Master 0  MBA 0  Bachelor 
0 Technology/Engineering 0  Finance/Banking
G Other (Please soecific) -------------------------
0  Law 
0Accounting
II Do you have other experience before joining current Arm? (Please tick all as apply)
G Banking 0  Accounting/Auditing
0  Stock broking 0  Consulting/Strategy
Q Venture capital O  Industry
G Legal service
G Other (Please specific) ---------------------------------
II Number of total years experience in venture capital?
14 Do you have venture capital experience outside mainland China? 0  Yes 0  No
If. How many entrepreneurial firms are managed by you? ____  _______________
A Investment stage preferences (Please tick all as apply)
G Seed 0  Start-up / Early Stage
Q Expansion / Development 0  Leveraged Buy-out/Buy in and pre IPO
G T urnaround/Restructuring
Q Other (Please spedfy) ........   —........... -....  -
17a. Industry preference:
G High Technology O  Non- High Technology 0  General
17b. If you invest in high-technology industry, what is your sector preference:
IFIease tick all a s  apply)
G Biotechnology 0  Medical/Health science
G Internet spedfic O Communications
G Computer software and services 0  Semiconductors/other electron
Q Computer hardware 0  New energy
«. On average, how often are you in Contact with your Investees before signing a 
contract (Including all formal or informal meeting and telephone call, fax etc.)?
G Everyday O  Three times a week O  Once a week
G Once every fortnight O  Once a month 0  Once every two month
0  Once a quarter O  Less often
#. On average, how often do you meet your Investees Informally before, signing a contract 
deluding informal dinner and private party, etc.)?
G Everyday O At least twice a week O Once a week
SOnce Every fortnight □  Once a month 0Once every two monthOnce a quarto- 0  Less often
25. To what extend do you know your investees’ senior Manager on a Personal 
Level after signing a contract?
0  Very well 0  Fairly well 0  Something in the middle
0  A little 0  Very little
SCREENING & DUE DILIGENCE
26. In general, what is your preferred average deal size? (Please tick all as apply)
0  Less than USS 1 million 0  USS 1 - 3  million 0  USS 3 - 5  million
0  USS 5-10 million 0  USS 10 -  20 million 0  USS 2 0 -5 0  million
0  Over USS 50 million 0  No deal size preferences
27. What geographical preferences do you have? (Please tick all as apply)
0  Local 0  Regional 0  National 0  Asia 0  World wide
28. In general, how many years do you expect to be involved In an Investment?
O  Less than 1 year 0  1 - 3  years 0 3 - 5  years 0 5 - 7  years 0 7 -  10years 
O  Over 10 years
29. In general, how long do you spend on due diligence process?
O  Less than 3 months 0  3 - 6  months 0 6 - 1 2  months O  Over 1 year
VALUATION
30. How important are the following sources of information in your valuation process? 
(Please consider the availability, accuracy and cost constraints of these information and
weight the relevant source on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is ‘Irreleva
‘Essential’):
1 2 3 4 5
Business plan accounting & financial data 0 0 0 0 0
Own due diligence reports 0 0 0 O o
Information provided by entrepreneurs 0 0 o O 0
Government industry statistics 0 0 0 0 0
External statistical and information services 0 0 0 0 0
Product/technical/marketing/sales information 0 o 0 0 0
Accounting/consulting firms’ reports 0 o 0 0 0
Financial press & Trade Journals 0 0 0 O 0
Curriculum vitae of management 0 0 0 0 0
Other venture capitalists (networks or association) 0 o 0 O 0
31. Please rate how often you use the following valuation methods In valul
Investment In your flrm?( Please weight the relevant method on a scale from ‘
1 1s ‘Never used’ and 5 is ‘Always used’): 1 2 3 4 5
Historic cost book value o 0 0 0 o
Replacement cost asset value 0 0 0 0 0
Liquidation value of assets (orderly sale) 0 0 O o 0
Liquidation value of assets (forced sale) 0 0 0 0 0
Discounted future cash flows 0 o 0 0 0
Dividend yield basis 0 0 0 o 0
Price/earning multiple (historic basis) 0 0 0 0 0
Price/earning multiple (prospective basis) 0 0 0 0 0
Capitalised maintainable earning (EBITDA multiple) 0 0 0 0 0
Capitalised maintainable earning (EBIT multiple)] 0 o 0 o o
Recent transaction prices for acquisitions in the sector 0 0 0 0 0
Industry’s special 'rule of thumb’ pricing ratios 0 0 0 0 0
Option value of projects (e.g. R&D) 0 0 0 0 o
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VENTURE CAPITAL IN CHINA
>U When more than one valuation methods are used, how often are the following 
approaches used for determining the range of entry price?( Please tick the relevant 
approach on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is ‘Never used’ and 5 is ‘Always used’):
1 2  3 4 8
’Place greatest weight on one particular method and use others f~1 [~1 f~l l~l
ms check
the average valuation 
>M the lowest valuation 
)M the median valuation 
>M the highest valuation
□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □
Ul Please rate how important the following factors are in your assessing the risk of 
itn investment (Please weight the relevant factor on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is 
Mnelevant* and 8 is ‘Essential’):
1 2 3 4 8
^Contribution by management in terms of their managerial skills □ □ □ □ □
-nencial contribution by management □ □ □ □ □
«llure of product market of the company □ □ □ □ □
fMure of the capital market □ □ □ □ □
Stage of financing □ □ □ □ □
deeded time horizon to exit from the company □ □ □ □ □
LEjpected time horizon to redemption of preference shares □ □ □ □ □
134 There are some factors which were thought Important In influencing the targeted 
«dum of an investment How important a re the following factors? (Please weight the 
ralsvant factor on a scale from 1 to 8, where 1 is ‘Irrelevant* and 8 is ‘Essential’):
1 2 3 4
rnw expected length of investment in a particular proposal I I I l I l
'Tlw actual cash amount invested in a proposal (size of proposal) □  Q  □
rrhs market condition relating to a particular proposal I I I l I l
Stage of financing D D D
rnw actual cash amount you seek to receive from an investment □  □  □
rrhs industrial/product sector of the investment Q  D  □
mw geographical region of the investment G  D  O
Whether you have a majority of the equity Q  Q  Q
rThe expected gearing ratio when the finance is structured CD 0  O
VtONITORING A VALUE-ADDED
□□□□□□□ □ □ □ □ □
131 Please rate how often you use the following policy In structuring investment 
:contracts? (Please identify below on a scale from 1 to 8, where 1 is ‘never* and 8 Is
1□□□□
standard contract for all deals 
flexible contracts 
i ndustry specific contracts 
:Each contract drafted by legal advisor
!31 In Structuring a contract, how important are each of the following? (Please 
•identify below on a scale from 1 to 8, where 1 is ‘irrelevant or not important at all’ and 
!5ls ‘essential’.)
2□□□□
3□□□□
4□□□□
8□□□□
1 2  3 4 8
; Relationship with investees □  □  □  □ □
I Enforceability □  □  □  □ □
: Costs incurred □  □  □  □ □
fine spent □  □  □  □ □
increasing value& decreasing risk □  □  □  □ □
Liquidation preference □  □  □  □ □
;37. Please rate how often you use the following financial instruments in a
: contracting? (Please identify below on a scale from 1 to 8, where 1 is ‘never* and 8 is
tiways’.) 1 2 3 4 8
loan □  □ □ □ □
Stock □  □ □ □ □Preferred Stock 
Options
Convertible Debt
□  □ □ □ □
□  □ □ □ □
Additional clauses (e.g. veto rights, board membership etc) Q  |~| □ □ □
40. To what extend Is the following information you receive from the investee 
adequate and accurate for monitoring? (Pease Weight the following Information on 
a Scale from 1 to 8, Where 1 is ‘insufficient* and 8 is ‘full/completely’):
1 2 3 4 8
Management account □ □ □ □ □
Balance sheet □ □ □ □ □
Cash flow □ □ □ □ □
Decision-making processes □ □ □ □ □
Product development □ □ □ □ □
Marketing of product □ □ □ □ □
Strategy of business □ □ □ □ □
Patents □ □ □ □ □
Goodwill □ □ □ □ □
Training of staff □ □ □ □ □
41. What Is your board representation in your portfolio companies? (Please Identify 
below on a scale from 1 to 8, where 1 is ‘never* and 8 is ‘always’.)
Has seat on Board 
Has observer seat on board 
No representation on board
1 2 3 4 8□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □□ □ □ □ □
42. To what extend, have the portfolio companies obtained these resource from your VC 
firm? (Please identify below on a scale from 1 to 8, where 1 is totally not accessible’ 
and 8 is fully accessible’.)
1 2 3 4 8
Managerial knowledge □ □ □ □ □
Marketing knowledge □ □ □ □ □
Strategic knowledge □ □ □ □ □
Accounting knowledge □ □ □ □ □
Market research on investee’s products □ □ □ □ □
Global competition Information □ □ □ □ □
Local competition Information □ □ □ □ □
Information/knowledge on customer needs & trends □ □ □ □ □
Production facilities □ □ □ □ □
Technology □ □ □ □ □
Research & Development □ □ □ □ □
Distribution Channel □ □ □ □ □
Customer list □ □ □ □ □
43. To what extend do you agree the following statements? (Please identify belo>
a scale from 1 to 8, where 1 is ‘disagree strongly’ and 5 is ‘agree strongly*.)
1 2 3 4 8
Our value-added support has been critical for our 
investee's success
□ □ □ □ □
Our value-added support is extremely valuable for our 
investee
□ □ □ □ □
Our investee is very happy about our value-added 
support
□ □ □ □ □
Our resource/knowledge facilitates the use of the 
investee's products/services
□ □ □ □ □
Our resource/knowledge completes a solution set that 
the investee's customers are demanding
□ 0 0 □ □
Our resource/knowledge increases the demand for our 
investee's products/service
□ □ □ □ □
Our resource/knowledge is highly complementary with 
the resource/knowledge of our investee’s
□ □ □ □ □
We have superior capabilities/skills in some areas 
compare to our investee
□ □ □ □ □
31. Please rate how often you use the following restriction in a contract? (Please 
identify below on a scale from 1 to 8, where 1 is ‘never* and 8 is ‘always’.)
1 2 3 4 8
Restrictions on changes in ownership □ □ □ □ □
Restrictions on mergers & acquisition □ □ □ □ □
1o capital expenditure beyond certain limits without approval □ □ □ □ □
Restrictions on asset disposals □ □ □ □ □
Restrictions on additional borrowings □ □ 0 □ □
Restrictions on top manager's appointment □ □ □ □ □
Restrictions on director management’s remuneration □ □ □ □ □
I. please rate how often you use the following as the mean of monitoring investees 
Please identify below on a scale from 1 to 8, where 1 is ‘never* and 8 is ‘always’.)
1 2 3 4 8
'Cs board membership at the investee company □  □  □  □  □
■Cl membership of investee’s audit committee □  □  □  □  □
nquency of full board meetings 0  0  0  0  0
‘•gular meetings with entrepreneur 0  0  0  0  0
edited annual accounts
Iiquirement of certain accounting policies D  D  D  D  G
Iiquirement to use a particular auditing firm O  O  O  O  O
Iiquirement for direct access to investee’s accounting system O  O  O  O  O
Iiquirement for monthly management accounts Q  □  0  O  O
iiquirement for evaluation of monthly performance Q  Q  G  Q  Q
44. How strong an Influence do you have over your investee
internal management? (Please identify below on a scale from 1 to I
‘no influence’ and 8 is ‘complete control’.)
1 2 3 4 8
Financial reporting policies □ □ □ □ □
Management Account □ □ □ □ □
Decision-making processes □ □ □ □ □
Control of staff □ □ □ 0 □
Management recruitment □ □ □ □ □
Replacing management personnel □ □ □ □ □
Product development □ □ □ □ □
Business strategy □ □ □ □ □
Marketing plans □ □ □ □ □
48. On average, how often do you have disagreement with th
following area? (Please identify below on a scale from 1 to 8, when
is ‘always’.) 1 2 3 4 8
Strategy □ □ □ □ □
Marketing □ □ □ □ □
Issues related to financing □ □ □ □ □
Research and Development □ □ □ □ □
Human resources □ □ □ □ □
Day to day management of business □ □ □ □ □
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